COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE v. PG Lake, Inc.
Decision Date | 01 February 1957 |
Docket Number | No. 16126.,16126. |
Citation | 241 F.2d 71 |
Parties | COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Petitioner, v. P. G. LAKE, Inc., Respondent. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit |
Melva M. Graney, Hilbert P. Zarky, John N. Stull, Attys., Dept. of Justice, Washington, D. C., Charles K. Rice, Asst. Atty. Gen., John Potts Barnes, Chief Counsel, Claude R. Marshall, Sp. Atty., I. R. S., Washington, D. C., for petitioner.
Harry C. Weeks, Fort Worth, Tex., for respondent. Weeks, Bird, Cannon & Appleman, Fort Worth, Tex., of counsel.
Before HUTCHESON, Chief Judge, and HOLMES and BORAH, Circuit Judges.
This appeal by the commissioner from one of a series of adverse decisions1 of the Tax Court presents the single question whether $600,000 received as consideration for an assignment of overriding oil payment interests limited to $600,000 carved out of two oil and gas leaseholds or working interests2 is taxable to the seller as ordinary income subject to depletion rather than, as the Tax Court held, as long term capital gains under Sec. 117 of the 1939 Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C.A. § 117.
Here vigorously assailing the decision of the Tax Court in this and the other cases, on the ground that they were all based on the premise that all oil payment assignments constitute sales of capital assets entitled to capital gains treatment under Sec. 117, and declaring, "That premise was specifically rejected in the Hawn case", the commissioner thus continues:
Having thus, as he thinks, cleared the ground for an all out and unembarrassed attack on the Tax Court's ruling, the commissioner assails it: (1) as contrary to our decision in Hawn's case in that it treats as substantial an interest which, under the teachings of that decision, is insubstantial; (2) in that what was here transferred was not any part of the leasehold interest, the "property representing income producing property, the vendor's capital investment", it was a transfer merely of a right to receive future income and, under the teachings of Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U.S. 103, 53 S.Ct. 74, 77 L.Ed. 199, and the Corn Products case, Corn Products Refining Co. v. Commissioner, 350 U.S. 46-52, 76 S.Ct. 20, 24, 100 L.Ed. 29,3 it was not entitled to Sec. 117 preferential treatment; (3) in that, if contrary to No. (2) above, the oil payment is treated as a sale of income producing property, it had not been held for six months because it did not come into existence until the oil payment was created; and (4) in that the property sold was the oil itself and thus was property "primarily held for sale in the ordinary course of business", and specifically excluded from capital gains treatment.
In reply to these contentions, respondent, insisting that all prerequisites to long term capital gains treatment, if there was a sale of "property" or "real property used in the trade or business" within Sec. 117 I.R.C. of 1939, are here present, urges upon us that whether or not there was such a sale here is ruled by Ortiz Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 5 Cir., 102 F.2d 508 and Caldwell v. Campbell, 5 Cir., 218 F.2d 567, and not by Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Hawn, 5 Cir., 231 F.2d 340.
Arguing that the first two cases treat similar transactions to these as sales, that the Hawn case is clearly distinguishable and that petitioner's arguments have heretofore been rejected by this court in Caldwell v. Campbell, respondent points out that a glance at the table of cases in commissioner's brief and in the brief of Collector Campbell in Caldwell v. Campbell will show that commissioner's opposing arguments here are but an expanded repetition of those advanced in that case.
Insisting that the transaction under consideration was an assignment of a part of respondent's property interests in the two leases, the respondent cites in support Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Fleming, 5 Cir., 82 F.2d 324; Columbus Oil & Gas Co. v. Commissioner, 5 Cir., 118 F.2d 459; Thomas v. Peckham Oil Co., 5 Cir., 115 F.2d 685; Lee v. Commissioner, 5 Cir., 126 F.2d 825; and Fleming v. Campbell, 5 Cir., 205 F.2d 549.
They recall too that the Supreme Court of the United States, this court, the Supreme Court, and the Intermediate Appeal Courts, of Texas4 have held that oil and gas leases, royalty interests, overriding royalty interests, and oil payments are interests in land, and that the Texas courts have held that these interests, are subject to ad valorem taxes, to statute of frauds treatment as real estate and in cases of intestacy pass as real estate.
On the commissioner's general position that oil payments carved out of working interests differ from royalties so carved, respondent, quoting from Tennant v. Dunn, supra, 130 Tex. at page 290, 110 S.W.2d at page 56:
points to the uniform course of decision that oil payments are in law and in fact of the same nature, indeed are identical, with royalties, except that a royalty is not limited as to duration and an oil payment is.
To commissioner's third contention that respondent did not have the requisite six months holding period for the oil payment interest conveyed, a contention on its face requiring the wholly untenable postulate that respondent, in and by the act of conveying the oil payment, acquired it, respondent points to its complete refutation in the stipulation that respondent had owned and held the leases for productive use in its trade or business of producing oil and not for sale for several years prior to Dec. 29, 1950, and to the fact that it is obvious that what respondent conveyed, and the only thing that it could convey, was a part of the estate which it acquired in the acquisition of the leases.
As to his fourth contention, that, in assigning an interest in the leases, respondent did not assign any part of the property held by it for producing income but assigned merely the oil, the property held for sale in its daily business, and that this must be so because the interest of any oil payment owner is only in the oil as personal property, respondent quotes from the leading case of Tennant v. Dunn, supra, in which, after stating that the particular instrument in question in that case, which carved an oil payment out of a working or leasehold interest, did not purport to convey oil in place, and that the ultimate right of Mrs. Dunn was a right to a certain quantity of oil after it was produced from the well, the same to be delivered to her free from any charges for production or operation, went on to say:
To continue reading
Request your trial-
U.S.A v. Gonzales
... ... Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 2795, 125 ... ...
-
Bransford v. Commissioner
...in part 16 T.C. 395 (1951); Commissioner v. P.G. Lake, Inc. 58-1 USTC ¶ 9428, 356 U.S. 260, 265 (1958), revg. 57-1 USTC ¶ 9364 241 F. 2d 71 (5th Cir. 1957), affg. Dec. 21,233 24 T.C. 1016 (1955); Kaltreider v. Commissioner 58-2 USTC ¶ 9542, 255 F. 2d 833, 838 (3d Cir. 1958), affg. Dec. 22,3......
-
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Lake
...case, is a suit for a refund originating in the District Court. 143 F.Supp. 240. All five are from the same Court of Appeals, 241 F.2d 71, 65, 78, 84, 69. The cases are here on writs of certiorari which we granted because of the public importance of the question presented. 353 U.S. 982, 77 ......
-
Matthews v. United States
...for that belief. Scofield v. O'Connor, 5 Cir., 1957, 241 F.2d 65; Commissioner v. Weed, 5 Cir., 1957, 241 F.2d 69; Commissioner v. P. G. Lake, Inc., 5 Cir., 1957, 241 F.2d 71; Fleming v. Commissioner, 5 Cir., 1957, 241 F.2d 78, 79; and Commissioner v. Wrather, 5 Cir., 1957, 241 F.2d The Sup......