Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Shoong, 12136.
Decision Date | 09 September 1949 |
Docket Number | No. 12136.,12136. |
Citation | 177 F.2d 131 |
Parties | COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE v. SHOONG (two cases). |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit |
Theron Lamar Caudle, Asst. Atty. Gen., Ellis N. Slack, Robert N. Anderson, Fred E. Youngman and Sumner Redstone, Sp. Assts. to Atty. Gen., for petitioner.
Gavin McNab, Schmulowitz, Aikins, Wyman & Sommer, Nat Schmulowitz, Peter S. Sommer and Sidney F. DeGoff, San Francisco, Cal., for respondents.
Before DENMAN, Chief Judge, and BONE and POPE, Circuit Judges.
This review concerns the determination under 26 U.S.C.A. § 125 of the amount of "amortizable bond premium" deduction, if any, from the two taxpayers' gross incomes in the tax year 1944, because of the purchase in June 1944 and holding in that year by each of 5,000 debenture bonds of the American Telephone and Telegraph Company. Since the questions of law and fact are identical for each taxpayer, the reviews were consolidated for hearing.
Each bond is for a principal sum of $100 and bears interest at three (3) percent. It also has a stock purchasing option by which one share of the company's stock may be purchased by the payment to the company of $40 and the surrender of the bond at its face value of $100. This right to purchase may be exercised by the bondholder at once. The bonds were callable by the corporation at $104 on September 1, 1944. Joe Shoong purchased his bonds at $120 1/8; Rose Shoong at from $120 1/8 to $120 7/8.
The taxpayers' 1944 returns each had a deduction from gross income of the difference between the callable $104 and the purchase price of the 5,000 bonds held by each in the tax year. This was claimed as "amortizable bond premium" under 26 U.S. C.A. § 125. The Commissioner disallowed the deduction as not such an amortizable bond premium, holding that the purchase price of the bonds above their par value arose entirely from the stock purchasing covenant and not from the 3% interest factor of the bond.
On the hearing of the taxpayers' petitions the evidence incontrovertibly sustained the Commissioner's holding that the $20 1/8 and $20 7/8 above par paid for the bonds was paid solely for the stock purchasing covenant. Since the issuance of the bonds in September 1941 and up to December 1944 their market value had varied with the market value of the Telephone Company's stock of the stock purchase option.1 Nevertheless, the Tax Court held that the deductions claimed were valid as amortizable bond premiums under 26 U.S. C.A. § 125.
The effect of the Tax Court's holding is that Joe Shoong is allowed a deduction from gross income of $81,879.94, which left him with a net income of $6,770.82, and a tax saving of $58,441.99. Rose Shoong is allowed a deduction of $85,607.29, which gave her a net income of $4,691.59, resulting in a tax saving of $61,841.
We do not think that Congress intended to have its section 125 so construed as to produce this unreasonable result from what in reality is a profitable stock investment. The Commissioner's characterization of the result as "garish" is an understatement.
In reaching this conclusion we are guided by the decisions holding that Congress regards all deductions from gross income as acts of its "legislative grace," Deputy v. Du Pont, 308 U.S. 488, 493, 60 S.Ct. 363, 84 L.Ed. 416, and provisions for such deductions "are to be strictly construed" against the taxpayer. Helvering v. Northwest Steel Rolling Mills, 311 U.S. 46, 49, 61 S.Ct. 109, 111, 85 L.Ed. 29. We are of the opinion that
Paid For An Option To Buy Stock Of The Corporation Contained In Its Bond.
Section 125 provides for an "amortizable bond premium" and the computation of its amount, but it does not purport to define that phrase. What it means must be ascertained from a consideration of the section as a whole, in connection with the report of the Congressional Committee concerning the purpose of the legislation.
Bondholders paying a premium above the bond redemption price or maturity payment of principal because of an interest return above the average for corporate bonds and having them redeemed at less than cost, had their relief confined to the capital loss provisions of section 117 of the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C.A. § 117.
Congress thought this led to a tax inequality between holders of bonds upon which the interest is exempt from taxation and holders of bonds on which the interest is taxable. In § 125(a) (1) and (2) it gave to holders of interest taxable bonds the option to spread the capital loss through the years of interest payments up to the callable date of the bonds and denied this right to bonds whose interest is not taxable.
From the above it is apparent that the Congressional intent in creating the amortizable bond premium deduction was because of the interest provisions of the bonds.
The "sound accounting practice" of amortizing bond premium which the Congressional report says has not been recognized in tax legislation and which the 1942 Act seeks to recognize is that stated by the Tax Adviser to the Secretary of the Treasury, Randolph Paul, before the Ways and Means Committee of the House. It is, "(d) Amortization of bond premium. Holders of a tax-exempt security purchased at a premium are today in the unique position of being relieved of tax on the interest paid on the security and of receiving a deductible loss upon redemption or other disposition of the security to the extent of the premium. As the premium at which a bond is obtained represents to the holder merely an effective yield lower than the actual interest rate, the holder is entitled merely to tax exemption solely with respect to such effective yield. The difference between the yield and the actual interest rate is simply a return of capital and should be treated as such rather than as a capital loss. On the other hand, the holder of a taxable security purchased at a premium is in the unfortunate position of being taxed upon the interest at high rates and of receiving a capital loss upon redemption whose deductibility is subject to the restrictions placed upon capital losses. Since the yield rather than the actual interest rate reflects the true income to the taxpayer, only that income should be subject to tax and the capital loss should disappear.
(Emphasis supplied.)
In the instant bonds the amount of the interest played no part in determining their purchase price above par. There was not the return of capital loss year by year from the interest factor in the bond as contemplated by Paul's statement.
It is obvious that the 1942 Act's embodiment of this accounting practice is not applicable to the price above the principal of the bond attributable solely to a covenant to sell the company's stock at what may bring a profit to the purchaser. The stock option value of the bonds here involved would not decrease by the mere passage of time to the call or maturity date contemplated by the statute.
That Congress was solely concerned with the interest factor of the bonds and amortizable bond premium further appears in section 125(d) providing:
(Emphasis supplied.)
It is reasonable interpretation of the phrase of 125(b) (1) providing for "reference to the amount of the basis (for determining loss on sale or exchange) of such bond" that it concerns only the cost of such bond as described in 125(d), that is, the added cost due solely to its interest bearing factor. This view is further sustained by the provisions of 125(a) (1), (2) and (3) classifying the bonds solely with reference to their interest bearing factor.
Furthermore, to grant as a deduction a capital loss on a bond where there is no loss...
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