Commitment of Goodson, In re, 95-0664

• Decision Date: 18 January 1996
• Docket Number: No. 95-0664,95-0664
• Citation: 544 N.W.2d 611,199 Wis.2d 426
• Court: Wisconsin Court of Appeals
• Parties: In re the COMMITMENT OF GOODSON. Philip ARREOLA, Chief of Police for the City of Milwaukee, and the City of Milwaukee, Appellants-Cross Respondents, E. Michael McCann, District Attorney of Milwaukee County, Co-Appellant-Cross Respondent, v. STATE of Wisconsin, Plaintiff-Respondent-Cross Respondent, Richard Lee Goodson, Defendant-Respondent-Cross Appellant.

Page 611

544 N.W.2d 611

199 Wis.2d 426

In re the COMMITMENT OF GOODSON Philip ARREOLA, Chief of Police for the City of Milwaukee and the City of Milwaukee, Appellants-Cross Respondents E. Michael McCann, District Attorney of Milwaukee County Co-Appellant-Cross Respondent, v. STATE of Wisconsin, Plaintiff-Respondent-Cross Respondent, Richard Lee Goodson, Defendant-Respondent-Cross Appellant.

No. 95-0664.

Court of Appeals of Wisconsin.

Submitted on Briefs Dec. 12, 1995.

Opinion Released Jan. 18, 1996.

Opinion Filed Jan. 18, 1996.

Appeal from an order in Circuit Court, Dodge County; Andrew P. Bissonnette, Judge. Reversed and cause remanded.

For the appellants-cross respondents the cause was submitted on the briefs of Grant F. Langley, City Attorney, Milwaukee, with Linda Uliss Burke, Assistant City Attorney.

For the co-appellant-cross respondent the cause was submitted on the brief of E. Michael McCann, District Attorney of Milwaukee County, with Jane Vinopal, Assistant District Attorney.

For the plaintiff-respondent-cross respondent the cause was submitted on the brief of James E. Doyle, Attorney General, with Sally L. Wellman, Assistant Attorney General.

Before EICH, C.J., and DYKMAN and SUNDBY, JJ.

EICH, Chief Judge.

The City of Milwaukee and its chief of police, Philip Arreola, and E. Michael McCann, district attorney of Milwaukee County, appeal from a dispositional order of the Dodge County Circuit Court placing Robert L. Goodson, a person found to be "sexually violent" under the Sexual Predator Law, ch. 980, STATS., on supervised release in Milwaukee County. ¹ They argue that the order should be vacated because they received no notice of the court's hearings concerning Goodson's release. They also contend that we should reverse because no plan for Goodson's release was prepared by the Department of Health and Social Services (DHSS) and the Milwaukee County Department of Social Services, as required by § 980.06(2)(c), STATS. ²

We conclude that the applicable statutes neither require nor provide for the notice argued by McCann and Arreola. We also conclude, however, that other portions of the law requiring DHSS and the county to which such offenders are proposed to be released to prepare and submit a supervision plan to the court were not complied with, and that that failure deprived the trial court of competency to order Goodson's release to Milwaukee County. We therefore reverse the order and remand to the court for further proceedings in compliance therewith.

The statutory scheme for commitment of "sexually violent" persons is somewhat complicated and warrants discussion.

Chapter 980, STATS., sets forth the commitment procedures. When a person convicted of a sexually violent offense is nearing release from prison, the agency having the authority or duty to release the person is required to notify the justice department and "each appropriate district attorney" of the impending release, providing basic information as to the conviction and related matters. Section 980.015, STATS. Either the justice department or the district attorney of either the county of conviction or the county in which the person resides (or will be placed upon release) may then file a petition with the circuit court alleging that the person is a "sexually violent person" as defined in the statute, ³ and seeking his or her commitment to DHSS for either institutional placement or supervised release. Sections 980.02 and 980.05, STATS.

If, after trial, it is determined that the person is a sexually violent person, the court is required to order him or her committed to the custody of DHSS "for control, care and treatment until such time as the person is no longer a sexually violent person." Section 980.06(1), STATS. The commitment order may call for either institutional care in a "secure mental health unit or facility" or "supervised release" to the community. Section 980.06(2)(b). In deciding between institutionalization and release, the court may consider, among other things,

the nature and circumstances of the behavior that was the basis of the allegation in the petition [that the person is sexually violent], ... the person's mental history and present mental condition, where the person will live, how the person will support himself or herself, and what arrangements are available to ensure that the person has access to and will participate in necessary treatment.

Id.

If the court finds that supervised release is appropriate, it is required to notify DHSS, and DHSS is required to work with the social services agency in the county in which the person will be residing to prepare a release plan and present it to the court for approval within twenty-one days. Section 980.06(2)(c), STATS. The plan identifies the supervision conditions and the treatment and services the community will provide to the person. ⁴ Id. The county designated by DHSS may refuse to prepare the plan, however, in which case DHSS must attempt to arrange for another county to do so and, presumably, to accept the person. Id. If DHSS is unable to locate a county that will agree to participate, the court "shall designate a county department to prepare the plan ... and place the person on supervised release in that county." Id. If that, too, proves unsuccessful, the court may order a county to prepare the plan and accept the person for supervised release. Id. ⁵

Finally, § 980.06(2)(d), STATS., provides, among other things, that "[b]efore a person is placed on supervised release by the court under this section, the court shall so notify the municipal police department and county sheriff for the municipality and county in which the person will be residing."

The facts of this case are undisputed. In July 1994, the Department of Corrections, as required by § 980.015, STATS., notified the justice department and the Dodge County district attorney that Goodson, who had been convicted of sexually violent crimes in that county, would soon be released from prison. The district attorney then petitioned the court to determine Goodson to be a sexually violent person under ch. 980, and the case proceeded to a trial to the court. At the trial's conclusion, the court ruled that Goodson was a sexually violent person as defined in § 980.01(7), STATS., and scheduled a dispositional hearing for December 22. At the hearing, the Dodge County district attorney stipulated to Goodson's supervised release to Milwaukee County. The trial court found that such release would be appropriate but did not notify DHSS to prepare a plan in cooperation with the Milwaukee County social services agency as required by § 980.06(2)(c), STATS. Instead, the court entered an order finding that Goodson was an appropriate subject for supervised release based on his involvement in drug and alcohol rehabilitation programs, his "good correctional record," his previous stable employment, and the report of the State's "examining psychologist" containing "favorable information regarding [his] treatment progress." The order released Goodson to Milwaukee County and imposed various "conditions," including "sex offender treatment" and counseling.

After the order was issued, the court wrote to Chief Arreola and the Milwaukee County sheriff, notifying them of the ch. 980 proceedings and the order for supervised release, as required by § 980.06(2)(d), STATS. District Attorney McCann was never notified.

When McCann learned of the court's dispositional order, he moved to vacate it on grounds that he had neither been notified of Goodson's anticipated release to Milwaukee County nor been given an opportunity to be heard on the subject prior to the order's entry. Arreola moved to vacate the order on similar grounds. The trial court denied both motions.

I. Notice to McCann

McCann claims that he was entitled to notice of the hearing on Dodge County's petition under § 980.015, STATS., which governs commencement of the commitment process. The statute provides that if an agency has 'the authority or duty to release or discharge" a person "who may meet the criteria for commitment as a sexually violent person," the agency "shall inform each appropriate district attorney and the department of justice regarding the person as soon as possible beginning 3 months prior to [the release or discharge]." Section 980.015(1) and (2). The agency--in this case, DHSS--is required to provide the district attorney and department of justice with "[t]he person's name, identifying factors, anticipated future residence and offense history," together with applicable documentation of the person's treatment and "adjustment to ... institutional placement." Section 980.015(3)(a) and (b).

In denying McCann's motion to vacate the dispositional order, the trial court interpreted § 980.015, STATS., as relating only to the notice of the person's impending release to the agency authorized by § 980.02, STATS., to commence the commitment proceedings: the department of justice or the district attorney of the county of the person's conviction, residence or placement.

We are, of course, not bound by the trial court's interpretation of a statute; statutory interpretation involves questions of law which we decide independently. Minuteman, Inc. v. Alexander, 147 Wis.2d 842, 853, 434 N.W.2d 773, 778 (1989). We are satisfied, however, that the trial court properly read and applied the statutes.

Considered as a whole, and in the order they appear in the chapter, §§ 980.015 and 980.02, STATS., plainly contemplate a process whereby: (1) the agency about to release a person who may meet the requirements for commitment as a sexually violent person is required to notify the department of justice and the "appropriate" district attorney of that impending release, and to provide a summary of identifying information; and then (2) upon receipt of that information, either the department of justice or the district attorney in the county of conviction, or the...