Committee for Educational Rights v. Edgar
| Citation | 672 N.E.2d 1178,174 Ill.2d 1,220 Ill.Dec. 166 |
| Decision Date | 18 October 1996 |
| Docket Number | No. 78198,78198 |
| Parties | , 220 Ill.Dec. 166, 114 Ed. Law Rep. 576 The COMMITTEE FOR EDUCATIONAL RIGHTS et al., Appellants, v. Jim EDGAR, Governor of the State of Illinois, et al., Appellees. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
Robert J. Lenz, Bloomington, C. Richard Johnson, Roger Pascal, Charles H.R. Peters and Jeffrey Bushofsky of Schiff, Hardin & Waite, Chicago, David C. Long, Mill Valley, California, and Patricia A. Brannan and Paul A. Minorini, of Hogan & Hartson, Washington, DC, for appellants.
James E. Ryan, Attorney General, Springfield (Barbara A. Preiner, Solicitor General, and Rita M. Novak, Assistant Attorney General, Chicago, of counsel), for appellees.
Joan Marsh and Anne-Marie Eileraas, of Kirkland & Ellis, and Karen Berman and Rosa Abreu, Chicago, for amici curiae League of Women Voters of Illinois and the Mexican American Legal Defense & Education Fund.
This appeal draws us into the sensitive and controversial area of public school finance. The plaintiffs in this action are the Committee for Educational Rights (which consists of more than 60 school districts associated pursuant to an intergovernmental agreement), the boards of education of 37 school districts named individually, and a number of students and their parents. The defendants are Governor Jim Edgar, the State Board of Education and State Superintendent of Education Joseph A. Spagnolo. Plaintiffs brought this action in the circuit court of Cook County seeking a declaratory judgment that the statutory scheme governing the funding of public schools violates various provisions of the Illinois Constitution of 1970. The trial court dismissed the complaint and the appellate court affirmed. 267 Ill.App.3d 18, 204 Ill.Dec. 378, 641 N.E.2d 602. The appellate court issued a certificate of importance under Supreme Court Rule 316 (155 Ill.2d R. 316) giving rise to the present appeal. We affirm the appellate court, which affirmed the dismissal of plaintiffs' complaint.
We begin with a general and vastly simplified description of those aspects of public school finance in Illinois that are germane to this appeal. Public schools receive funds from various federal, state and local sources. The controversy in the present case hinges on the relationship between funding derived from local property taxes and funds supplied by the state. Under the School Code (105 ILCS 5/1-1 et seq. (West 1994)) school districts are authorized to levy property taxes for various school purposes up to specified maximum rates. See, e.g., 105 ILCS 5/17-2, 34-53 (West 1994). The voters of a school district may authorize higher property tax rates by referendum, but even with such voter approval the School Code places an upper limit on school property tax rates. 105 ILCS 5/17-3, 17-4, 17-5, 34-53 (West 1994). Obviously, the amount which a school district is able to raise through property taxes is determined by the taxable property wealth within the district. Wealthy districts--those with substantial taxable property wealth per pupil--are able to raise more revenue per pupil at a given tax rate than poor districts.
There are principally two categories of state financial assistance which supplement local property tax revenues and other local sources of funding. First, the state provides assistance to school districts in the form of categorical grants for a variety of specific purposes. See, e.g., 105 ILCS 5/2-3.51 (West 1994) (reading improvement programs); 105 ILCS 5/2-3.65 (West 1994) (arts programs); 105 ILCS 5/18-7 (West 1994) (teacher retirement benefits); 105 ILCS 5/27-24.4 (West 1994) (driver education programs); 105 ILCS 5/29-5 (West Supp.1995) (student transportation). School districts also receive distributions of general state aid from the state's common school fund pursuant to the formula set forth in section 18-8 of the School Code (105 ILCS 5/18-8 (West Supp.1995)).
General state aid is distributed based on a weighted average daily attendance (ADA 1) at schools within a particular district and on the equalized assessed valuation (EAV) of property in the district. The general state aid formula is designed to enable districts with modest property tax bases to achieve a certain minimum level of funding per pupil. This minimum funding level, commonly known as the "foundation level," is computed by the State Board of Education based on the amount available for distribution from the common school fund. The foundation level represents a hypothetical "guaranteed" dollar amount of taxable property wealth per pupil (hereinafter, guaranteed EAV) (see 105 ILCS 5/18-8(A)(5)(a) (West Supp.1995)) multiplied by a specified tax rate (hereinafter, foundation rate) (see 105 ILCS 5/18-8(A)(5)(d)(2) (West Supp.1995)). The amount of general state aid per pupil that a particular district receives is calculated by subtracting the district's EAV per weighted ADA pupil from the guaranteed EAV and multiplying the difference by the foundation rate. The formula may be expressed as follows: general state aid per weighted ADA pupil = (guaranteed EAV--district EAV per weighted ADA pupil) X foundation rate. See 105 ILCS 5/18-8(A)(5)(d)(2) (West Supp.1995). This formula is structured to provide that if a district levies property taxes at exactly the foundation rate, the sum of local revenues and general state aid will equal the foundation level. In order to receive full state aid under this formula, the district's local tax rates must equal or exceed a specified minimum "qualifying" rate (which is lower than the foundation rate) 2 but the amount of aid received does not otherwise depend on the actual local tax rates applied. See 105 ILCS 5/18-8(A)(5)(d)(1), (A)(5)(d)(2) (West Supp.1995). Thus, to receive the full amount of general state aid the district must tax at or above the "qualifying" rate. To achieve foundation level funding, the district must tax at the foundation rate. Where a district's local tax rate exceeds the foundation rate, the sum of local revenues and general state aid will exceed the foundation level.
The above method of distributing general state aid only applies in districts where the EAV per weighted ADA pupil is less than 87% of the guaranteed EAV. 105 ILCS 5/18-8(A)(5)(e) (West Supp.1995). In wealthier districts, an alternative formula applies. The minimum amount of general state aid under the alternative formula is fixed at 7% of the foundation level. 105 ILCS 5/18-8(A)(5)(f) (West Supp.1995).
In their five-count complaint, plaintiffs allege that under the present financing scheme, vast differences in educational resources and opportunities exist among the State's school districts as a result of differences in local taxable property wealth. During the 1989-90 school year, the average tax base in the wealthiest 10% of elementary schools was over 13 times the average tax base in the poorest 10%. For high school and unit school districts, the ratios of the average tax bases in the wealthiest and poorest districts were 8.1 to 1 and 7 to 1, respectively, during the 1989-90 school year.
Plaintiffs allege in their complaint that the general state aid formula does not effectively equalize funding among wealthy and poor districts. While the general state aid formula ensures minimum funding at the foundation level, the wealthiest districts are able to raise funds through property taxes considerably in excess of the foundation level. Moreover, the provision of a minimum grant--equal to 7% of the foundation level--to even the wealthiest school districts is counterequalizing.
Plaintiffs allege that disparities among wealthy and poor districts are reflected in various measures of educational funding; in several "key indicators" of educational quality (such as the percentage of teachers with master's degrees, teacher experience, teacher salaries, administrator salaries and pupil/administrator ratios); and in a comparison of the facilities, resources and course offerings in two neighboring school districts with dramatically disparate tax bases. According to the complaint, these disparities are attributable to variations in property wealth rather than tax effort; on average, the poorest school districts tax at higher rates than the wealthiest.
Based on these allegations, in counts I through III plaintiffs seek a declaratory judgment that to the extent that the statutory school finance scheme "fails to correct differences in spending and educational services resulting from differences in [local taxable property wealth]" the scheme violates our state constitution's equal protection clause (count I), prohibition against special legislation (count II) and education article (count III). Ill. Const.1970, art. I, § 2; art. IV, § 13; art. X, § 1.
Counts IV and V of the complaint pertain to the educational opportunities available to certain socio-economically disadvantaged children who are at risk of academic failure (at-risk children). Plaintiffs allege that at-risk children frequently exhibit educational deficits and require early intervention in order to succeed academically. Section 2-3.71 of the School Code (105 ILCS 5/2-3.71 (West 1994)) provides for a grant program administered by the State Board of Education for the establishment of preschool educational programs addressing the needs of at-risk children. Plaintiffs allege that such programs are effective in correcting the educational deficits that at-risk children suffer, but grants under section 2-3.71 and other sources of funding are sufficient to provide such programs for only a fraction of the children who need them. Plaintiffs seek a declaratory judgment that by failing to provide sufficient funding for preschool educational programs, the State's system for financing public education violates the equal protection clause (count IV) and education article (count V) of our state constitution.
The trial court dismisse...
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