Committee v. Ganim, No. 19192.

• Court: Supreme Court of Connecticut
• Writing for the Court: ROGERS
• Citation: 311 Conn. 430,87 A.3d 1078
• Parties: STATEWIDE GRIEVANCE COMMITTEE v. Joseph P. GANIM.
• Decision Date: 15 April 2014
• Docket Number: No. 19192.

311 Conn. 430
87 A.3d 1078

STATEWIDE GRIEVANCE COMMITTEE
v.
Joseph P. GANIM.

No. 19192.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued Dec. 3, 2013.
Decided April 15, 2014.

[87 A.3d 1081]

Harold R. Rosnick, with whom, on the brief, were Bruce L. Levin and Barbara M. Schellenberg, Bridgeport, for the appellant (defendant).

Patricia A. King, chief disciplinary counsel, with whom was Suzanne B. Sutton, first assistant chief disciplinary counsel, for the appellee (plaintiff).

ROGERS, C.J., and PALMER, ZARELLA, EVELEIGH, McDONALD, ESPINOSA and VERTEFEUILLE, Js.

ROGERS, C.J.

This case addresses the limits of the deference that should be afforded to a local standing committee of the state bar when that committee recommends that an individual, who recently has been released from prison after serving a lengthy term for multiple federal felonies that he committed while holding public office, should be reinstated to the bar and, therefore, entrusted again with the privilege of practicing law. The defendant, Joseph P. Ganim, was suspended from the practice of law upon presentment by the plaintiff, the Statewide Grievance Committee, as a result of his conviction of sixteen federal felony offenses stemming from actions he took while he was the mayor of Bridgeport, the state's largest city.¹ Soon after his release from prison, he applied for reinstatement to the bar. Although a local standing committee that investigated the defendant's application recommended that he be reinstated, the trial court rejected that recommendation and denied the defendant's application. The defendant appeals ² from the trial court's judgment, claiming that the court improperly failed to defer to the standing committee's recommendation that he be reinstated and, relatedly, that the court misinterpreted that committee's report, committed legal improprieties when reviewing the report, and wrongfully determined that some of the standing committee's findings were clearly erroneous. We disagree with these claims and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The following facts and procedural history are relevant to the appeal. The defendant was admitted to the Connecticut bar in 1984. He served as mayor of the city of Bridgeport (city) from 1991 until 2003,

[87 A.3d 1082]

when he was convicted, after a jury trial, of the federal offenses of racketeering in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c), racketeering conspiracy in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d), extortion in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951, honest services mail fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341 and 1346, bribery involving programs receiving federal funds in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(B), conspiracy to commit bribery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371, and filing false tax returns in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7206(1). United States v. Ganim, 510 F.3d 134, 136 (2d Cir.2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1313, 128 S.Ct. 1911, 170 L.Ed.2d 749 (2008). The events underlying the defendant's convictions are summarized, as follows, in the opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit upholding those convictions. “As mayor [of the city], [the defendant] was responsible for the overall operation of municipal government and, among other responsibilities, had final authority over the [c]ity's contracts. During his first campaign for mayor, [the defendant] became acquainted with Leonard J. Grimaldi (Grimaldi), who acted as a media advisor, and Paul J. Pinto (Pinto), who began as his driver and aide. [The defendant] developed close relationships with Grimaldi and Pinto over the years that followed. Grimaldi subsequently formed a public relations company called Harbor Communications, of which he was the sole proprietor and employee. Pinto became associated with (and later purchased an ownership interest in) the Kasper Group, a Bridgeport architecture and engineering firm.

“A. [Professional Services Group] Contract Bid

“In 1995 and 1996, [the city] was considering privatizing its wastewater treatment facilities. [The defendant] suggested that Grimaldi contact Professional Services Group (PSG) to act as PSG's public relations consultant in connection with its bid for the water treatment contract. Grimaldi then contacted PSG, which retained him as a consultant for a fee of $30,000. PSG submitted a proposal for the contract, as did U.S. Water, a competing firm which was represented by Pinto and by United Properties. The owners of United Properties, Albert Lenoci, Sr. and Albert Lenoci, Jr. (the Lenocis), were [the defendant's] political benefactors.

“After the bids were submitted, [the defendant] told Pinto that he had decided to award the contract to PSG, but that Pinto should arrange a financial deal between PSG and United Properties because [the defendant] did not want to choose between big supporters. [The defendant] told Pinto that [i]f they want the deal, they'll do it. In turn, Pinto explained to Grimaldi that if PSG wanted to win the contract, it would have to take care of the Lenocis. Grimaldi acquiesced, as did PSG upon his advice. PSG agreed to pay Grimaldi $70,000 more per year for the contract's duration, which he was to pass on to Pinto and the Lenocis. Pinto informed [the defendant] of the deal, and [the defendant] approved the selection of PSG to operate the wastewater treatment facilities.

“Between May 1997 and April 1999, PSG paid Grimaldi roughly $311,396 in consulting fees, much but not all of which Grimaldi paid to Pinto. Grimaldi and Pinto used some portion of this money to provide [the defendant] benefits such as entertainment, meals and clothing.

“B. Fifty–Fifty Fee Sharing Agreement

“In December 1996, [the defendant] traveled with Pinto and Grimaldi to Tucson, Arizona. During the trip, [the defendant] told them they should join forces by agreeing to split any consulting fees they earned through future dealings with the [c]ity, and that [the defendant] would steer contracts to the pair, in return for which they would tak[e] care of his expenses and

[87 A.3d 1083]

needs. Upon returning to [the city], the three men met to confirm the agreement. Grimaldi testified that during that meeting, he and Pinto agreed that ... a portion of that money [from the agreement] would be to take care of [the defendant]. If he needed cash, we would take care of him. If he needed suits, we'd take care of him. If he needed shirts, we'd take care of him. Any needs that he required, off of that 50/50 arrangement, we would take care of [the defendant]. In exchange for that, [the defendant] would make sure that all of our clients would get work from the city if they wanted it, that he would steer city contracts and jobs to our clients....

“Pursuant to the fee sharing agreement, [the defendant] steered certain projects (some of which are discussed below) to Pinto's and Grimaldi's clients from February 1997 to April 1999. Meanwhile, Grimaldi and Pinto provided [the defendant] with cash, meals, fitness equipment, designer clothing, wine, jewelry and other items. Also at around that time, Grimaldi employed [the defendant's] wife. At [the defendant's] insistence, Grimaldi overpaid her, gave her payments in cash and did not report her income to the Internal Revenue Service.

“C. Bridgeport Energy–Funded Programs

“In 1998, [the defendant] had Grimaldi arrange for Bridgeport Energy—one of Grimaldi's clients—to contribute [$1 million] to fund a promotional advertising campaign and the [c]ity's Clean & Green program, which demolished and rehabilitated blighted properties. [The defendant] then arranged for Grimaldi to over-see the advertising campaign and for one of the Lenocis' firms, represented by Pinto, to administer the Clean & Green monies. Pursuant to the fee-sharing agreement, Grimaldi and Pinto used a portion of their consulting fees for these programs to benefit [the defendant].

“D. PSG Contract Extension & One–Third–Each Fee Sharing

“In late 1998, PSG sought a long-term extension of its contract to operate the [c]ity's wastewater treatment facilities. In a meeting with Grimaldi and Pinto, [the defendant] told Grimaldi that he would support the contract extension. In exchange, Grimaldi was to renegotiate his contract with PSG to get more of his consulting fees up front. [The defendant] also directed that the three men would split those fees—as well as fees from all future deals with the [c]ity—one-third each. Grimaldi was to pay [the defendant's] share to Pinto, who would hold the fees for [the defendant]. Following these discussions, Grimaldi successfully renegotiated his consulting fees with PSG, such that he was paid $495,000 in a front-loaded deal. On May 27, 1999, [the defendant] awarded PSG the contract extension. Over several weeks Grimaldi paid Pinto roughly two-thirds of the consulting fee, one third of which was for [the defendant]. Pinto kept [the defendant's] share mixed with his own money to avoid detection.

“Throughout most of 1999, Grimaldi and Pinto provided [the defendant]—upon his request—with money and benefits such as wine, cabinets, home improvements and meals. Pinto stated at trial that I was holding [the defendant's] money. When he needed the money, I'd give it to him or use it the way he directed me to....

“In September 1999, [the defendant] and Grimaldi had a falling out, and eventually Grimaldi stopped paying [the defendant's] portion of the money to Pinto. From that point forward, [the defendant] shunned Grimaldi and prevented his clients from obtaining contracts with the [c]ity.

“E. Life Insurance Policy

“In early 1999, [the defendant] sought to use [c]ity funds to purchase a [$1 million]

[87 A.3d 1084]

life insurance policy for himself, as well as for certain [c]ity department heads as cover. He approached Frank Sullivan (Sullivan), a childhood friend who had become a stockbroker, about brokering the deal. [The defendant] approved the purchase of the policies in April, 1999 without the [c]ity [c]ouncil's approval. After the purchase of the policies was leaked to...