Common Cause v. Board of Supervisors

• Decision Date: 24 August 1989
• Docket Number: B022802,No. S001833,S001833
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: , 777 P.2d 610 COMMON CAUSE OF CALIFORNIA, et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY, et al., Defendants and Appellants.

Page 574

261 Cal.Rptr. 574

49 Cal.3d 432, 777 P.2d 610

COMMON CAUSE OF CALIFORNIA, et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY, et al., Defendants and Appellants.

No. S001833, B022802.

Supreme Court of California,

In Bank.

Aug. 24, 1989.

DeWitt W. Clinton, Raymond G. Fortner, Jr., Philip H. Hickok, Sidley & Austin, Charles S. Vogel and Lori Huff Dillman, Los Angeles, for defendants and appellants.

Hufstedler, Miller, Carlson & Beardsley, Dennis M. Perluss, Los Angeles, Linda J. Wong, Richard Fajardo, Roy M. Ulrich, Santa Monica, Mark D. Rosenbaum, Paul L. Hoffman, William J. Genego, Los Angeles, Margaret C. Crosby, Alan Schlosser and Edward Chen, San Francisco, for plaintiffs and respondents.

Daniel J. Popel, Paul D. Kamenar, Marianne Mele Hall, Phillip D. Mink, Washington, D.C., Ronald A. Zumbrun, Anthony T. Caso and Jonathan M. Coupal, Sacramento, amici curiae, on behalf of defendants and appellants.

John K. Van de Kamp, Atty. Gen., Andrea Sheridan Ordin, Chief Asst. Atty. Gen., Marian M. Johnston, Deputy Atty. Gen., San Francisco, R. Samuel Paz, Alhambra, Munger, Tolles & Olson, Bradley S. Phillips and Felicia A. Marcus, Los Angeles, amici curiae, on behalf of plaintiffs and respondents.

LUCAS, Chief Justice.

The Registrar-Recorder, County Clerk, and Board of Supervisors of the County of Los Angeles (collectively referred to as County), appeal from the granting of a preliminary mandatory injunction requiring them to deputize as voting registrars certain county employees who have frequent contact with low-income and minority citizens. The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's order. We reverse.

I. BACKGROUND

County operates a "voter outreach program" which includes various measures designed to encourage eligible citizens to register to vote. It distributes registration-by-mail forms in several thousand locations throughout the county, including libraries, post offices, fire stations, state and local public services offices, and state Department of Motor Vehicles branches. It mails such forms to registered voters to encourage them to keep their registrations current. County also maintains a toll-free telephone information service, uses news bulletins and public service announcements to promote registration, conducts an educational program at local high schools, and provides a van to volunteer organizations conducting community registration drives. It does not, however, deputize significant numbers of its employees as voting registrars.

Plaintiffs, a Los Angeles County taxpayer and several organizations concerned with voting rights, brought the present action in superior court, ¹ seeking declaratory relief, a writ of mandate, and a preliminary and permanent injunction requiring County to implement an employee deputization program under which county employees who have frequent contact with non-White and low-income citizens would be deputized as registrars. Plaintiffs contend that a great disparity exists between the registration rates of high-income White citizens and those of low-income and minority citizens, and that an employee deputization program would reduce this disparity. Their complaint alleges that County's present voter outreach program violates the requirements of the Elections Code and the equal protection guaranties of the United States and California Constitutions.

Simultaneously with the filing of this action, plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction requiring County to implement an employee deputization program. In support of their motion, plaintiffs produced a statistical analysis demonstrating disparities based on race and income in voter registration rates in the county, and declarations of various prominent political scientists to the effect that voter registration requirements greatly depress actual voter turnout. County, in response, produced a statistical analysis concluding that age and education are more important factors than race or income in predicting voter registration patterns.

After a hearing, the trial court granted a preliminary injunction. ² Applying the usual test for reviewing the propriety of a preliminary injunction, the Court of Appeal affirmed. It sustained the trial court's finding that the probability of plaintiffs' success on the merits at trial, together with the balance of harm (i.e., the likely degree of harm flowing from a failure to issue the injunction compared to such harm flowing from its issuance), justified issuance of the preliminary mandatory injunction. The Court of Appeal determined that plaintiffs had demonstrated a strong likelihood of success on the merits on either of two statutory theories: (i) that the Elections Code requires the implementation of an employee deputization program if such a program will maximize registration; and (ii) even if the code does not require such a program, a court may require that one be implemented as a remedy for a county's violation of other requirements of the code. The Court of Appeal did not reach plaintiffs' constitutional claims.

County has not challenged the propriety, as a procedural matter, of awarding interim mandamus relief that neither preserves the status quo nor restores a status quo that previously existed. (Cf. People ex rel. S.F. Bay, etc., Com. v. Town of Emeryville (1968) 69 Cal.2d 533, 536-539, 72 Cal.Rptr. 790, 446 P.2d 790.) Because any error would not be jurisdictional, we do not address the issue. Rather, we conclude there is no likelihood that plaintiffs could prevail on the merits at trial. Thus, the Court of Appeal erred in upholding issuance of the preliminary injunction.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Standing

County offers three reasons why plaintiffs lack standing to bring this action. First, it argues taxpayers have no standing under Code of Civil Procedure section 526a to force a municipality to expend funds to adopt a new program in the absence of any illegal expenditure by that municipality for an existing program. Second, County ascribes to the Attorney General exclusive standing to enforce the relevant provisions of the Elections Code. Third, County asserts plaintiffs failed to exhaust their administrative remedies before filing suit. Although County did not raise these issues before the Court of Appeal, contentions based on a lack of standing involve jurisdictional challenges and may be raised at any time in the proceeding. (McKinny v. Board of Trustees (1982) 31 Cal.3d 79, 90, 181 Cal.Rptr. 549, 642 P.2d 460; Horn v. County of Ventura (1979) 24 Cal.3d 605, 619, 156 Cal.Rptr. 718, 596 P.2d 1134.) We therefore consider each claim in turn.

1. Taxpayer Standing

Plaintiff Mark Ridley-Thomas is a Los Angeles County taxpayer. The other plaintiffs are organizations whose members include Los Angeles County taxpayers. They assert standing to seek an injunction under Code of Civil Procedure section 526a, which provides taxpayers with standing to bring "An action to obtain a judgment, restraining and preventing any illegal expenditure of ... funds ... of a county...." County contends that plaintiffs lack standing under section 526a because the object of their suit is not to halt any existing or threatened illegal expenditure, but to require County to expend funds to incorporate a new feature into its existing voter outreach program.

We find it unnecessary to reach the question whether plaintiffs have standing to seek an injunction under Code of Civil Procedure section 526a, because there is an independent basis for permitting them to proceed. The ultimate relief sought in this action includes a writ of mandate compelling adoption of the employee deputization program. " ' "[W]here the question is one of public right and the object of the mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a public duty, the relator need not show that he has any legal or special interest in the result, since it is sufficient that he is interested as a citizen in having the laws executed and the duty in question enforced...." ' " (Green v. Obledo (1981) 29 Cal.3d 126, 144, 172 Cal.Rptr. 206, 624 P.2d 256; see 8 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (3d ed. 1985) Extraordinary Writs, § 74, pp. 713-714, and cases cited.) The question in this case involves a public right to voter outreach programs, and plaintiffs have standing as citizens to seek its vindication.

Given that plaintiffs have standing as citizens to seek the relief granted here at a trial on the merits, they have standing to seek the same relief on a provisional basis, if such relief is otherwise proper. ³ The purpose of a standing requirement is to ensure that the courts will decide only actual controversies between parties with a sufficient interest in the subject matter of the dispute to press their case with vigor. (Baker v. Carr (1962) 369 U.S. 186, 204, 82 S.Ct. 691, 703, 7 L.Ed.2d 663; Harman v. City and County of San Francisco (1972) 7 Cal.3d 150, 159, 101 Cal.Rptr. 880, 496 P.2d 1248.) This purpose is met when, as here, plaintiffs possess standing to have the underlying controversy adjudicated and the desired relief granted after a trial on the merits; no greater interest is required to seek the same relief on an interim basis. (Cf. Harman, supra, 7 Cal.3d at pp. 159-160, 101 Cal.Rptr. 880, 496 P.2d 1248 [taxpayer standing to seek injunction establishes standing to seek money damages on behalf of municipality].) Accordingly, it is unnecessary for plaintiffs to show a separate basis for standing to obtain a preliminary injunction, distinct from the basis for their standing to seek a writ of mandate at a trial on the merits.

2. Exclusive Enforcement

Elections Code section 304 ⁴ directs the Secretary of State to formulate regulations requiring counties to develop and implement voter outreach programs. It also provides for the Secretary to review the design and implementation of county outreach programs annually and to report violations to the Attorney General. County suggests that only the Attorney...