Common Purpose USA, Inc. v. Obama

• Decision Date: 30 December 2016
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 16–345 (GK)
• Citation: 227 F.Supp.3d 21
• Parties: COMMON PURPOSE USA, INC., Plaintiff, v. Barack OBAMA, et al., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

227 F.Supp.3d 21

COMMON PURPOSE USA, INC., Plaintiff,

v.Barack OBAMA, et al., Defendant.

Civil Action No. 16–345 (GK)

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

Filed December 30, 2016

Charles Herold Helein, The Helein Law Firm PC, Lansdowne, VA, for Plaintiff.

Peter C. Pfaffenroth, U.S. Attorney's Office, Andrew J. Saindon, D.C. Office of Attorney General, Washington, DC, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Gladys Kessler, United States District Judge

Plaintiff, Common Purpose USA, Inc. ("Common Purpose"), alleges that Defendants, the United States, the District of Columbia, and various officials of both governments, have violated the due process rights of Plaintiff's members by allowing them to be subject to past gun violence and the threat of future gun violence. Plaintiff seeks declaratory relief, which it believes will eliminate the threat of future gun violence against its members.

This matter is before the Court on Defendants' respective Motions to Dismiss. Upon consideration of the Motions, Oppositions, and Replies, and the entire record herein, it is evident that the Court lacks jurisdiction to hear Plaintiff's Complaint, and the Motions to Dismiss are granted.

I. BACKGROUND

Common Purpose is a domestic non-profit organization. Complaint at 5. Its members are direct or indirect victims of gun violence in the United States, including the District of Columbia. Id. However, Common Purpose has not identified a single member of the group. See Id. A paraphrased statement of its mission is that it seeks to advance an understanding of the United States' Constitution that reduces gun violence. Complaint at 5.

Plaintiff brings this action against President Barack Obama, Loretta Lynch, Attorney General of the United States, Vanita Gupta, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Thomas Brandon, Deputy Director of the U.S. Department of Justice and head of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms and Explosives ("ATF"), all in their official capacities, and the United States of America (collectively "Federal Defendants"), as well as the District of Columbia and Cathy Lanier, in her official capacity as Chief of the Metropolitan Police Department of the District of Columbia, (collectively "District Defendants").

Common Purpose alleges that its members' constitutional rights have been violated by gun violence resulting from "the unfettered right to bear arms." Opposition to Federal Defendants' Mot. to Dismiss [Dkt. No. 5] ("Fed. Opp'n"); Complaint at 2–5. It attributes this violence to the manner in which Federal Defendants enforce and implement the various laws of the United States, Opp'n at 10, and to the District's laws and regulations authorizing the concealed carrying of firearms. Complaint at 3–4.

Plaintiff's Complaint presents seven claims or issues to the Court:

"Issue 1. Do the Federalist Papers and in particular Federalist Paper No. 29 and the practices and use of militias in the early years of this country's republic, establish that the "right to bear arms" was intended to be limited to a "well-regulated militia," subject to both state and Congressional regulation?

Issue 2. Must interpretation of the Second Amendment adhere to and apply the basic principle that a statute, a fortiori , the Constitution, must be read in its entirety?

Issue 3. If the answer to Issue 2 is affirmative, must the interpretation of the "right to bear arms" under the Second Amendment strike a proper balance between and among other Articles and Amendments to the Constitution, lest such Articles and Amendments be read out of the Constitution?

Issue 4. In light of the presentations made and reviewed in Issue 3, must the "right to bear arms" be balanced against other constitutional powers and guarantees?

Issue 5 If the "right to bear arms" includes the right to modern weapons, such as attack weapons, against what foreign or domestic persons, entities, organizations may the right be exercised and who decides against whom and if and when to exercise such right?

Issue 6. If the "right to bear arms" includes the right to use modern weapons, such as attack weapons, against domestic persons, entities, and/or organizations, does that create an environment conducive to anarchy?

Issue 7: Does the District's Concealed Carry laws interfere with the enforcement of federal laws?"¹

Complaint at 6–7.

In essence the Complaint raises two sets of claims. First are the "Constitutional Claims": Issues 1–6, asking the Court to interpret the Second Amendment; and those parts of Issue 7 that ask the Court to declare that the District's concealed carry laws are unconstitutional. Second are the "Preemption Claims," those parts of Issue 7 asking the Court to declare that the District's concealed carry laws are preempted by federal law.

Plaintiff brings these claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201, 2202 ("the Declaratory Judgment Act"), and the judicial review provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701 et seq. See Complaint at 4–6.

Federal Defendants brought a Motion to Dismiss, arguing that, pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b) (1) and 12(b) (6), the Court lacks jurisdiction and Plaintiff has failed to state a claim. Motion to Dismiss [Dkt. No. 4–1] ("Fed. Mot. to Dismiss"). Plaintiff filed an Opposition to the Federal Defendants' Motion, Fed. Opp'n, and the Federal Defendants filed a Reply. Reply in Support of Federal Defendants' Motion to Dismiss [Dkt. No. 8] ("Fed. Reply").

The District Defendants also filed a Motion to Dismiss, in which they joined the Federal Defendants' arguments and additionally argued for dismissal due to improper service of process pursuant to Rules 12(b) (2) and 12(b) (5). District of Columbia's Motion to Dismiss [Dkt. No. 9] ("District Mot. to Dismiss"). Plaintiff filed an Opposition, Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to the District of Columbia's Motion to Dismiss [Dkt. No. 10] ("District Opp'n"), and the District Defendants filed a Reply. District of Columbia's Reply [Dkt. No. 11] ("District Reply").

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A. Motion to Dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b) (1)

As courts of limited jurisdiction, federal courts possess only those powers specifically granted to them by Congress or directly by the United States Constitution. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am. , 511 U.S. 375, 377, 114 S.Ct. 1673, 128 L.Ed.2d 391 (1994). The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that the Court has subject matter jurisdiction to hear the case. See Shuler v. United States , 531 F.3d 930, 932 (D.C. Cir. 2008). In deciding whether to grant a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction under Rule 12(b) (1), the court must "accept all of the factual allegations in [the] complaint as true." Jerome Stevens Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Food & Drug Admin. , 402 F.3d 1249, 1253–54 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (quoting United States v. Gaubert , 499 U.S. 315, 327, 111 S.Ct. 1267, 113 L.Ed.2d 335 (1991) ).

Nonetheless, "[t]he plaintiff's factual allegations in the complaint will bear closer scrutiny in resolving a 12(b) (1) motion than in resolving a 12(b) (6) motion for failure to state a claim." Grand Lodge of Fraternal Order of Police v. Ashcroft , 185 F.Supp.2d 9, 13–14 (D.D.C. 2001). The Court may also consider matters outside the pleadings, and may rest its decision on its own resolution of disputed facts.² See Herbert v. Nat'l Acad. of Sci. , 974 F.2d 192, 197 (D.C. Cir. 1992).

III. ANALYSIS

A. The Court Lacks Jurisdiction Because Plaintiff Lacks Standing and Because There Is no Case or Controversy

1. Standing Is a Jurisdictional Requirement of Article III

Article III of the Constitution limits the jurisdiction of federal courts to certain "Cases" and "Controversies." See U.S. Const. art. III, § 2. "[N]o principle is more fundamental to the judiciary's proper role in our system of government than the constitutional limitation of federal-court jurisdiction to actual cases or controversies." Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l USA , ––– U.S. ––––, 133 S.Ct. 1138, 1146, 185 L.Ed.2d 264 (2013) (internal citations omitted). "One element of the case-or-controversy requirement is that plaintiffs must establish that they have standing to sue." Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

"[T]he irreducible constitutional minimum of standing contains three elements. First, the plaintiff must have suffered an injury in fact ... which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical. Second, there must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of ... Third, it must be likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision." Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife , 504 U.S. 555, 560–61, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351, (1992) (internal quotation marks, citations, and footnotes omitted).

Ordinarily, an organizational plaintiff may attempt to show standing in one of two ways. First, under the theory of "organizational standing," an organization may sue on its own behalf in order to protect its own interests. Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. United States , 101 F.3d 1423, 1427–28 . (D.C. Cir. 1996). Alternatively, under the theory of "associational standing," an organization may sue on behalf its members to protect their interests. Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Commission , 432 U.S. 333, 343, 97 S.Ct. 2434, 53 L.Ed.2d 383 (1977) ; Air Transp. Ass'n v. Reno , 80 F.3d 477, 483 (D.C. Cir. 1996).

2. Common Purpose Lacks both Organizational and Associational Standing

In order to establish organizational standing, a plaintiff must show that it satisfies each of the traditional three prongs of the standing inquiry—injury in fact, causation, and redressability. Nat'l Treasury Employees Union at 1427. The alleged injury must be a "concrete and demonstrable injury to [the organization's] activities." Id. at 1427–28.

Common Purpose argues that it has suffered the requisite injury...