Commonwealth Edison Company v. Montana, 80-581
Decision Date | 02 July 1981 |
Docket Number | No. 80-581,80-581 |
Citation | 101 S.Ct. 2946,69 L.Ed.2d 884,453 U.S. 609 |
Parties | COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY et al., Appellants, v. State of MONTANA et al |
Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
Montana imposes a severance tax on each ton of coal mined in the State, including coal mined on federal land. The tax is levied at varying rates depending on the value, energy content, and method of extraction of the coal, and may equal, at a maximum, 30% of the "contract sales price." Appellants, certain Montana coal producers and 11 of their out of state utility company customers, sought refunds, in a Montana state court, of severance taxes paid under protest and declaratory and injunctive relief, contending that the tax was invalid under the Commerce and Supremacy Clauses of the United States Constitution. Without receiving any evidence, the trial court upheld the tax, and the Montana Supreme Court affirmed.
Held :
1. The Montana severance tax does not violate the Commerce Clause. Pp. 614-629.
(a) A state severance tax is not immunized from Commerce Clause scrutiny by a claim that the tax is imposed on goods prior to their entry into the stream of interstate commerce. Any contrary statements in Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Co., 260 U.S. 245, 43 S.Ct. 83, 67 L.Ed. 237, and its progeny are disapproved. The Montana tax must be evaluated under the test set forth in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279, 97 S.Ct. 1076, 1079, 51 L.Ed.2d 326, whereby a state tax does not offend the Commerce Clause if it "is applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing State, is fairly apportioned, does not discriminate against interstate commerce, and is fairly related to services provided by the State." Pp. 614-617.
(b) Montana's tax comports with the requirements of the Complete Auto Transit test. The tax is not invalid under the third prong of the test on the alleged ground that it discriminates against interstate commerce because 90% of Montana coal is shipped to other States under contracts that shift the tax burden primarily to non-Montana utility companies and thus to citizens of other States. There is no real discrimination since the tax is computed at the same rate regardless of the final destination of the coal and the tax burden is borne according to the amount of coal consumed, not according to any distinction between in-state and out-of-state consumers. Nor is there any merit to appellants' contention that they are entitled to an opportunity to prove that the tax is not "fairly related to the services provided by the State" by showing that the amount of the taxes collected exceeds the value of the services provided to the coal mining industry. The fourth prong of the Complete Auto Transit test requires only that the measure of the tax be reasonably related to the extent of the taxpayer's contact with the State, since it is the activities or presence of the taxpayer in the State that may properly be made to bear a just share of the state tax burden. Because it is measured as a percentage of the value of the coal taken, the Montana tax, a general revenue tax, is in proper proportion to appellants' activities within the State and, therefore, to their enjoyment of the opportunities and protection which the State has afforded in connection with those activities, such as police and fire protection, the benefit of a trained work force, and the advantages of a civilized society. The appropriate level or rate of taxation is essentially a matter for legislative, not judicial, resolution. Pp. 617-629.
2. Nor does Montana's tax violate the Supremacy Clause. Pp. 629-636.
(a) The tax is not invalid as being inconsistent with the Mineral Lands Leasing Act of 1920, as amended. Even assuming that the tax may reduce royalty payments to the Federal Government under leases executed in Montana, this fact alone does not demonstrate that the tax is inconsistent with the Act. Indeed, in § 32 of the Act, Congress expressly authorized the States to impose severance taxes on federal lessees without imposing any limits on the amount of such taxes. And there is nothing in the language or legislative history of the Act or its amendments to support appellants' assertion that Congress intended to maximize and capture through royalties all "economic rents" (the difference between the cost of production and the market price of the coal) from the mining of federal coal, and then to divide the proceeds with the State in accordance with the statutory formula. The history speaks in terms of securing a "fair return to the public" and if, as was held in Mid-Northern Oil Co. v. Walker, 268 U.S. 45, 45 S.Ct. 440, 69 L.Ed. 841, the States, under § 32, may levy and collect taxes as though the Federal Government were not concerned, the manner in which the Federal Government collects receipts from its lessees and then shares them with the States has no bearing on the validity of a state tax. Pp. 629-633.
(b) The tax is not unconstitutional on the alleged ground that it frustrates national energy policies, reflected in several federal statutes, encouraging production and use of coal, and appellants are not entitled to a hearing to explore the contours of these national policies and to adduce evidence supporting their claim. General statements in federal statutes reciting the objective of encouraging the use of coal do not demonstrate a congressional intent to pre-empt all state legislation that may have an adverse impact on the use of coal. Nor is Montana's tax pre-empted by the Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use Act of 1978. Section 601(a)(2) of that Act clearly contemplates the continued existence, not the pre-emption, of state severance taxes on coal. Furthermore, the legislative history of that section reveals that Congress enacted the provision with Montana's tax specifically in mind. Pp. 633-636.
Mont., 615 P.2d 847, affirmed.
William P. Rogers, for appellants.
Michael T. Greely, Helena, Mont., for appellees.
Montana, like many other States, imposes a severance tax on mineral production in the State. In this appeal, we consider whether the tax Montana levies on each ton of coal mined in the State, Mont.Code Ann. § 15-35-101 et seq. (1979), violates the Commerce and Supremacy Clauses of the United States Constitution.
Buried beneath Montana are large deposits of low-sulfur coal, most of it on federal land. Since 1921, Montana has imposed a severance tax on the output of Montana coal mines, including coal mined on federal land. After commissioning a study of coal production taxes in 1974, see House Resolutions Nos. 45 and 93, Senate Resolution No. 83, 1974 Mont.Laws 1619-1620, 1653-1654, 1683-1684 (Mar. 14 and 16, 1974); Montana Legislative Council, Fossil Fuel Taxation (1974), in 1975, the Montana Legislature enacted the tax schedule at issue in this case. Mont.Code Ann. § 15-35-103 (1979). The tax is levied at varying rates depending on the value, energy content, and method of extraction of the coal, and may equal, at a maximum, 30% of the "contract sales price." 1 Under the terms of a 1976 amendment to the Montana Constitution, after December 31, 1979, at least 50% of the revenues generated by the tax must be paid into a permanent trust fund, the principal of which may be appropriated only by a vote of three-fourths of the members of each house of the legislature. Mont.Const., Art. IX, § 5.
Appellants, 4 Montana coal producers and 11 of their out-of-state utility company customers, filed these suits in Montana state court in 1978. They sought refunds of over $5.4 million in severance taxes paid under protest, a declaration that the tax is invalid under the Supremacy and Commerce Clauses, and an injunction against further collection of the tax. Without receiving any evidence the court upheld the tax and dismissed the complaints.
On appeal, the Montana Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court. Mont., 615 P.2d 847 (1980). The Supreme Court held that the tax is not subject to scrutiny under the Commerce Clause 2 because it is imposed on the severance of coal, which the court characterized as an intrastate activity preceding entry of the coal into interstate commerce. In this regard, the Montana court relied on this Court's decisions in Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Co., 260 U.S. 245, 43 S.Ct. 83, 67 L.Ed. 237 (1922), Oliver Iron Mining Co. v. Lord, 262 U.S. 172, 43 S.Ct. 526, 67 L.Ed. 929 (1923), and Hope Natural Gas Co. v. Hall, 274 U.S. 284, 47 S.Ct. 639, 71 L.Ed. 1049 (1927), which employed similar reasoning in upholding state severance taxes against Commerce Clause challenges. As an alternative basis for its resolution of the Commerce Clause issue, the Montana court held, as a matter of law, that the tax survives scrutiny under the four-part test articulated by this Court in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 97 S.Ct. 1076, 51 L.Ed.2d 326 (1977). The Montana court also rejected appellants' Supremacy Clause 3 challenge, concluding that appellants had failed to show that the Montana tax conflicts with any federal statute.
We noted probable jurisdiction, 449 U.S. 1033, 101 S.Ct. 607, 66 L.Ed.2d 494 (1980), to consider the important issues raised. We now affirm.
As an initial matter, appellants assert that the Montana Supreme Court erred in concluding that the Montana tax is not subject to the strictures of the Commerce Clause. In appellants' view, Heisler's "mechanical" approach, which looks to whether a state tax is levied on goods prior to their entry into interstate commerce, no longer accurately reflects the law. Appellants contend that the correct analysis focuses on whether the challenged tax substantially affects interstate commerce, in which case it must be scrutinized under the Complete Auto Transit test.
We agree that Heisler's reasoning has been undermined...
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