Commonwealth ex rel. O'Brien v. O'Brien
Decision Date | 18 November 1957 |
Docket Number | 2884 |
Citation | 390 Pa. 551,136 A.2d 451 |
Parties | COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania ex rel. Adele T. O'BRIEN v. Robert J. O'BRIEN, Appellant. |
Court | Pennsylvania Supreme Court |
Argued May 29, 1957
Appeal, No. 274, Jan. T., 1957, from judgment of Superior Court, Oct. T., 1955, No. 212, affirming order of Municipal Court of Philadelphia County, Domestic Relations Division No. 126298, in case of Commonwealth of Pennsylvania ex rel Adele T. O'Brien v. Robert J. O'Brien. Judgment affirmed.
Same case in Superior Court: 182 Pa.Super.Ct. 584.
Proceeding upon petition of relatrix for increase of support order and for inclusion of additional child. Before SPAULDING, J.
Order entered for increased amount, to include additional child. Defendant appealed to the Superior Court, which affirmed the order of the court below. Appeal by defendant to Supreme Court allowed.
Judgment affirmed.
Irving R. Shull, with him Alfred I. Ginsburg and Bernard L. Lemisch, for appellant.
Norman R. Bradley, for appellee.
Before JONES, C.J., BELL, CHIDSEY, MUSMANNO, ARNOLD, JONES and COHEN, JJ.
We have allowed this appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court in order that we might determine whether, in an action for the support of a minor child, born during wedlock, a husband may obtain compulsory blood grouping tests in order to exclude himself from being the father of the child.
The present proceedings were instituted by the relatrix in 1954 in order to increase the amount of a support order entered in favor of herself and a daughter, and to include therein a son born before her divorce. [1] At the hearing before the Domestic Relations Division of the Municipal Court of Philadelphia, the former husband moved for compulsory blood grouping tests of his wife, the son, and himself under the Act of 1951, providing, inter alia: "In any proceeding to establish paternity, the court, on motion of the defendant, shall order the mother, her child and the defendant to submit to one or more blood grouping tests ... to determine whether or not the defendant can be excluded as being the father of the child. ..." Act of May 24, 1951, P.L. 402, § 1, 28 P.S. § 306 (Supp).
The Municipal Court denied the motion, entered an order for the support of the son, and increased the weekly payments. On appeal the Superior Court affirmed, with three judges dissenting. [2]
We are not here called upon to decide the general question of the admissibility of, or the probative weight to be accorded to, blood grouping tests offered in evidence. Nor are we required to determine the specific issue of whether a trial court might in the exercise of its discretion refuse to proceed in an action for support until the relatrix consents to undergo such an examination.
The sole question before us is whether in an action for support a husband may obtain, as a statutory right, compulsory blood grouping tests of the mother and her child born during wedlock.
At the outset we note that the legislature placed two qualifications upon the right to compulsory blood grouping tests which substantially limit the scope and application of the act: 1. Only a male defendant who is the putative father may move to have the blood grouping tests taken. 2. Such tests are permitted only in "proceedings to establish paternity."
These qualifications render the statutory procedure unavailable, among others, to the following parties who might seek blood grouping tests to negate paternity: husbands bringing an action for divorce on the ground of adultery, [3] or an action for annulment because of fraudulent representations as to parenthood; [4] mothers seeking custody of children; [5] parties seeking a determination that they are the parents of a child of whom another claims to be the father; [6] Parties disputing the claim of a child to share in an estate; [7] parties attempting to prove non-citizenship of a child; [8] or to defendants in prosecutions for rape in which the prosecuting witness testified that as a consequence of the rape she became pregnant and gave birth to a child. [9]
On the other hand, the act does apply to at least two classes of cases - prosecutions for fornication and bastardy, Act of June 24, 1939, P.L. 872, § 506, as amended, 18 P.S. § 4506 (Supp.), and actions for neglect to support a bastard, Act of June 24, 1939, P.L. 872, § 732, 18 P.S. § 4732. Thus, apparently the act was designed to aid the man who is accused by an unwed mother of being the father of her illegitimate child. Except for protestations of innocence, a blameless defendant is often helpless to refute such a charge lodged against him, and consequently is convicted of the crime. In addition to being compelled to support a child which he has not fathered, the defendant also receives the condemnation of the community. The legislature apparently believed that the occasions of injustice in these two classes of cases were so numerous as to overcome any reluctance to compel a complaining witness to submit her body to blood tests at the option of a defendant, and therefore provided this procedure whereby a defendant might successfully assert his innocence.
The husband herein, however, contends that this action for support of a child born during wedlock is also a "proceeding to establish paternity" within the meaning of the act's second qualification. [10]
We cannot agree. It is true that the present proceeding is one in which paternity is relevant or one in which paternity has been controverted, or one in which paternity is an issue, but it is not a proceeding brought to establish paternity. In actions brought by a wife against a husband for support of a minor child born during wedlock, paternity has already been established in the eyes of the law by operation of the presumption of the legitimacy of children born during wedlock. Cairgle v. American Radiator & Std. San. Corp., 366 Pa. 249, 255-56, 77 A.2d 439 (1951). The presumption of legitimacy is invoked at the very moment of birth and no further proceedings are required to establish the paternity of the child. [11] This presumption is essential in any society in which the family is the fundamental unit.
We hold, therefore, that the present proceeding is not a "proceeding to establish paternity" within the intendment of the Act of May 24, 1951, and that the defendant herein was not entitled to have compulsory blood grouping tests taken of his former wife and their child.
The majority opinion makes it quite clear that it is not concerned with the question of "the admissibility of, or the probative weight to be accorded to, blood grouping tests offered in evidence." Indeed, the question of admissibility is not an open one in Pennsylvania. The introduction and probative value of blood grouping tests in various...
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