Commonwealth ex rel. Fair Hous. Bd. v. Windsor Plaza Condo. Ass'n, Inc.

Decision Date31 December 2014
Docket Number131817.,Record Nos. 131806
Citation768 S.E.2d 79,289 Va. 34
CourtVirginia Supreme Court
PartiesCOMMONWEALTH of Virginia, ex rel. FAIR HOUSING BOARD v. WINDSOR PLAZA CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION, INC., et al. Michael Fishel, et al. v. Windsor Plaza Condominium Association, Inc.

Frank W. Pedrotty, Senior Assistant Attorney General (Mark R. Herring, Attorney General; Cynthia E. Hudson, Chief Deputy Attorney General; Linda L. Bryant, Deputy Attorney General; R. Thomas Payne, II, Assistant Attorney General, on brief), for appellant.

Raymond J. Diaz (Marla J. Diaz ; David S. Mercer ; Michael L. Zupan ; Whiteford, Taylor & Preston; Falls Church, MercerTrigiani, on brief), for appellees.

Michael G. Allen (Relman, Dane & Colfax, on briefs), for appellant.

PRESENT: All the Justices.

Opinion

Opinion by Justice S. BERNARD GOODWYN.

In these consolidated appeals, we consider various issues arising under the Virginia Fair Housing Law, Code § 36–96.1 et seq. (VFHL), and the Federal Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq. (FHAA).

Background

On March 4, 2009, Michael Fishel (Fishel) filed complaints with the Virginia Fair Housing Board (FHB) and the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), alleging that Windsor Plaza Condominium Association (Windsor Plaza) had discriminated against him in violation of the VFHL and the FHAA. HUD transferred Fishel's complaint to the FHB.

On May 28, 2010, the FHB, after an investigation, determined that reasonable cause existed to believe that Windsor Plaza had engaged in a “discriminatory housing practice ... in violation of ... Code § 36–96.3(B)(ii).” Pursuant to Code § 36–96.14, the FHB referred the charge to the Attorney General on June 1, 2010.

On June 30, 2010, the Office of the Attorney General, on behalf of the Commonwealth, filed a complaint against Windsor Plaza in the Circuit Court of Arlington County. The complaint alleged that Windsor Plaza had violated Code § 36–96.3(B)(ii) by failing “to make reasonable accommodations in rules, practices, policies, or services [that were] necessary to afford [Fishel] equal opportunity to use and enjoy [his] dwelling.”

On November 23, 2010, Fishel and his wife Eleanor (collectively “Fishels”) moved to intervene in the Commonwealth's lawsuit pursuant to Code § 36–96.16(B). They also lodged a “Complaint in Intervention” with the court on the same date. In their Complaint in Intervention, the Fishels alleged, as had the Commonwealth, that Windsor Plaza had violated the VFHL by refusing their request for a reasonable accommodation.

The Fishels also alleged additional causes of action. They alleged that Windsor Plaza had discriminated against them in violation of Code §§ 36–96.3(A)(8) and (9), and 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604(f)(1), (2) and (3)(B). The circuit court granted the Fishels' motion to intervene and deemed their Complaint in Intervention filed on January 28, 2011.

Windsor Plaza filed a plea in bar to the Fishels' intervening complaint, arguing that the Fishels' new state and federal fair housing claims were barred by the applicable statutes of limitations.

On April 5, 2012, pursuant to a court order granting the Commonwealth leave to join “as additional defendants to this action the ... persons vested with the right to use the four limited common element parking spaces in the Windsor Plaza Condominium residential parking garages that are labeled ‘HC’ [i.e., handicapped] on the Windsor Plaza site plan and any person that has a security interest in those four ‘HC’ parking spaces,” the Commonwealth filed a second amended complaint. It added eight individuals who owned interests in the four parking spaces as defendants (collectively “individual parking space owners”).1 Not only did the Commonwealth add these individuals as owners of the controverted parking spaces, it also alleged that the individual parking space owners had violated the VFHL by parking in the disabled parking spaces that had been deeded to them with the purchase of their condominiums in a manner inconsistent with the parking spaces' designations on the site plan. The complaint stated, “This non-conforming use contributes to the Defendant Association's refusal to make a reasonable accommodation as requested by the Fishels.”

Lois Ann Rossi (Rossi), one of the individual parking space owners, filed a plea in bar to the Commonwealth's second amended complaint, asserting that the statute of limitations in Code § 36–96.16(A) barred the Commonwealth's claim against her and the other individual parking space owners.

The circuit court scheduled a hearing to address Windsor Plaza's special plea concerning the Fishels' complaint and Rossi's special plea concerning the Commonwealth's second amended complaint. After a hearing on the pleas in bar, the circuit court sustained Windsor Plaza's plea in bar to the Fishels' complaint. It also sustained Rossi's plea in bar and dismissed the Commonwealth's claims against all of the individual parking space owners as being barred by the applicable statute of limitations.

On March 4, 2013, the parties proceeded to trial on the claim that Windsor Plaza violated Code § 36–96.3(B)(ii) by failing to make reasonable accommodations in rules, practices, policies or services that were necessary to afford Fishel equal opportunity to enjoy his dwelling. At the close of the Commonwealth's case-in-chief, Windsor Plaza moved to strike the Commonwealth's evidence and for summary judgment. The circuit court granted the motion.

At a later hearing to consider Windsor Plaza's requests for attorney's fees, the circuit court determined that sovereign immunity did not bar Windsor Plaza's request for attorney's fees and costs against the Commonwealth pursuant to Code § 36–96.16(D). Nevertheless, the court exercised its discretion and declined to award Windsor Plaza attorney's fees against the Commonwealth. The court also declined to award Windsor Plaza attorney's fees against the Fishels.

The Commonwealth and the Fishels filed separate appeals, which are both addressed in this opinion. Windsor Plaza assigns cross errors to the circuit court's denial of its request for the award of attorney's fees against the Commonwealth and the Fishels.

Facts

Windsor Plaza Condominium is located in Arlington County and is comprised of two condominium buildings, each with underground parking garages. When the condominium was first built, parking spaces in these garages were general common elements.2 The site plan for the buildings notes four parking spaces for use by disabled persons.

Those parking spaces were designated as “HC” on the site plan.

In 1995, the developer of Windsor Plaza Condominium executed an Amendment to Condominium Instruments” document. The amendment allowed the developer to assign the previously general common element parking spaces as limited common element3 parking spaces. Pursuant to the amendment, the developer deeded every parking space in the condominium's underground garages, including the four parking spaces designated for use by disabled persons (hereinafter “disabled parking spaces”), to individual unit owners “as a limited common element for the exclusive use of the unit owner of such condominium unit.”

Fishel suffers from “severe osteoarthritis

” and must use a wheelchair. In July 2007, the Fishels purchased a condominium unit in the Taylor Street Building of Windsor Plaza Condominium. The Fishels received a “resale package,” which they reviewed carefully for two days before purchasing their unit. In the resale package, a diagram of the parking garages showed four disabled parking spaces. The documents in the resale package also indicated that garage parking spaces at the condominium were limited common elements and that the developer had already assigned all of the parking spaces to individual unit owners.

Before buying their condominium unit, the Fishels visited the site and looked at the unit and underground parking garage. The Fishels saw the parking space that would be purchased with their condominium. They testified at trial that they knew the space was not a disabled parking space and that [it] wasn't going to meet [their] needs.” The Fishels did not inquire about the availability of disabled parking spaces in the garage before purchasing their condominium unit.

Soon after purchasing their condominium unit, the Fishels contacted Joseph Tilton (Tilton), Windsor Plaza's building manager, and informed him that Fishel was unable to park his van in their parking space. Tilton advised the Fishels to park in one of the disabled parking spaces, which they did “a couple times,” but the Fishels were soon informed that they could not park in that space because it belonged to another condominium unit owner.

On July 30, 2007, the Fishels emailed Tilton, asking for “a larger parking space” in a better location. Windsor Plaza's Board of Directors (the Board) considered their request at a board meeting, and Tilton relayed the Board's response to the Fishels by email on August 23, 2007:

The Board of Directors reviewed your request for a larger parking space at last night's meeting. As all existing garage spaces are individually owned by unit owners, assigning a different parking space to your residence is beyond the authority of the Board. This does not preclude you from advertising your interest in trading parking spaces with another owner. If you would like to draft a flyer announcing your need for a larger space, we would be happy to post copies on both bulletin boards. Such a notice may facilitate an exchange of spaces, either as a casual agreement or as a permanent reassignment, based on the preferences of all parties involved.
Please contact us should you have any further concerns.

The Fishels responded to Tilton's August 23, 2007 email and asserted Fishel's “right ... to park in a handicapped-designated space,” but they indicated that they were reluctant to “go this route.” The Fishels' email concluded, “Please ask the Board to review this issue again in an...

To continue reading

Request your trial
11 cases
  • Patterson v. City of Danville
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Virginia
    • 7 Julio 2022
    ...id.Since then, the sovereign-immunity doctrine in Virginia has persevered "alive and well," Commonwealth ex rel. Fair Hous. Bd. v. Windsor Plaza Condo. Ass'n , 289 Va. 34, 56, 768 S.E.2d 79 (2014) (citation omitted),1 though not without substantial debate over its permissible scope and the ......
  • Forest Lakes Cmty. Ass'n, Inc. v. United Land Corp. of Am.
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Virginia
    • 16 Febrero 2017
    ...any reasonable inferences that could be drawn from the evidence before the factfinder. See Commonwealth ex rel. Fair Hous. Bd. v. Windsor Plaza Condo. Ass'n , 289 Va. 34, 59, 768 S.E.2d 79, 91 (2014).A.Created in the 1960s, the Hollymead residential subdivision lies just east of Route 29 in......
  • Forest Lakes Cmty. Ass'n, Inc. v. United Land Corp., Record No. 151779
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Virginia
    • 16 Febrero 2017
    ...that could be drawn from the evidence before the factfinder. See Commonwealth ex rel. Fair Hous. Bd. v. Windsor Plaza Condo. Ass'n, 289 Va. 34, 59, 768 S.E.2d 79, 91 (2014).A. Created in the 1960s, the Hollymead residential subdivision lies just east of Route 29 in Albemarle County. The sub......
  • Canales v. Torres Orellana
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of Virginia
    • 20 Junio 2017
    ...Court reviews a trial court's statutory interpretation de novo , as a question of law." Commonwealth ex rel. Fair Hous. Bd. v. Windsor Plaza Condo. Ass'n , 289 Va. 34, 51, 768 S.E.2d 79, 87 (2014). Jurisdictional issues are also questions of law reviewed de novo . Harvey v. Flockhart , 65 V......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT