Commonwealth ex rel. Riccio v. Dilworth
| Decision Date | 21 July 1955 |
| Citation | 115 A.2d 865,179 Pa.Super. 64 |
| Parties | COMMONWEALTH ex rel. Nicholas RICCIO, Appellant, v. Richardson DILWORTH, District Attorney, Philadelphia County, and Robert J. Beveridge, Warden, Philadelphia County Prison. Appeal of Nicholas RICCIO. COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Nicholas RICCIO Appellant. |
| Court | Pennsylvania Superior Court |
Petition for special relief, treated as petition for writ of habeas corpus, and petition for writ of error coram nobis brought by petitioner to gain his freedom. From an order of the Court of Quarter Sessions, Philadelphia County, at No 1371, March Sessions, 1952, Charles A. Waters, J., dismissing petition for special relief and a second order of the Court of Quarter Sessions, Gerald F. Flood, J., dismissing petition for writ of error coram nobis the petitioner appealed. The Superior Court, No. 260, October Term, 1954, and No. 24 October Term, 1955, Ross, J., held that where petition for writ of error coram nobis was based on the recanted confessions of petitioner's accomplices that stated petitioner was not involved in crime of robbery of which he was convicted, and such confessions were acquired after conviction, the petitioner presented neither after-discovered evidence nor facts which if known at time of trial would have prevented the rendition of the judgment and writ of error coram nobis would not lie.
Orders affirmed.
Ivan Michaelson Czap, Philadelphia, for appellant.
Victor Wright, Jr., William T. Gennetti, Asst. Dist. Attys., Samuel Dash, Acting Dist. Atty., Philadelphia, for appellee.
Before RHODES, P. J., and ROSS, GUNTHER, WRIGHT, WOODSIDE and ERVIN, JJ.
Nicholas Riccio, appellant in this consolidated appeal, sought in the court below to gain his freedom or a new trial by virtue of a petition for special relief and a petition for a writ of error coram nobis. The petition for special relief, treated as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, was dismissed after full argument. The petition for writ of error likewise was dismissed after a full hearing. This appeal followed.
Appellant and Larry Mooney were tried on April 9, 1952, before a jury on a charge of robbery. At the same trial Larry Mooney and his brother, Charles Mooney, were tried on another charge of robbery. A Henry Myers, who was also tried at this time, was acquitted. Appellant and the Mooneys were convicted. Appellant pleaded not guilty and has consistently maintained his innocence. His motion for new trial was dismissed after argument, and no appeal was taken from the dismissal. Two years later the petitions for special relief and writ of error were filed.
The petition for special relief is a stranger to our procedural system. It was treated as a petition for writ of habeas corpus by the court below, and since appellant makes no objection we will so treat it on this appeal. It sets forth as the basis for relief: First, that Riccio was convicted as a result of a mistaken identity by one of the victimes; second, that Charles Mooney has since the trial confessed that he, not Riccio, was the accomplice of Larry Mooney in the robbery; third, that Riccio has been steadfast in his denial of guilt; and fourth, that he has repeatedly requested a lie detector or polygraph test to prove his inocence.
The question of the victim's identification and the appellant's steadfast denial of guilt art clearly matters which should have been raised on an appeal from the conviction. They are purely matters of sufficiency of the evidence and cannot be raised in a habeas corpus proceeding. Com. ex rel. Fox v. Tees, 175 Pa.Super. 453, 106 A.2d 878.
Appellant stresses the Mooney confessions in his proceeding for writ of error coram nobis; hence it is not incumbent upon us to discuss it under this habeas corpus proceeding. Moreover, habeas corpus is not the proper procedure for raising questions of after-discovered evidence, since the writ is designed to grant the relief of discharge from illegal confinement, not a new trial.
The request for a lie detector is quite unusual. Appellant urges us to hold that the polygraph test has now reached that stage of scientific reliability that it should be so recognized in our law of evidence. Yet he does not bring this contention before us in the usual manner. He has not attempted to introduce the results of a polygraph test in any proceeding and been refused. Had that been the case, we would be squarely called upon to determine the reliability and admissibility of the test. Instead, however, we are merely called upon to determine whether the lower court erred in refusing to give the test to appellant. Clearly it did not. Appel...
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