Commonwealth of Pa. v. Martin

• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
• Writing for the Court: BAER
• Citation: 5 A.3d 177
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee v. Bradley MARTIN, Appellant. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Appellant v. Bradley Martin, Appellee. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Appellee v. Bradley Martin, Appellant.
• Decision Date: 17 August 2010

5 A.3d 177

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee
v.
Bradley MARTIN, Appellant.
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Appellant
v.
Bradley Martin, Appellee.
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Appellee
v.
Bradley Martin, Appellant.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Submitted June 2, 2005.
Decided Aug. 17, 2010.

5 A.3d 180

Caroline Adrienne Flotron, Christopher K. Walters, Charles Lyman Becker, Reed Smith, L.L.P., Philadelphia, for Bradley Martin.

Robert William McAteer, Amy Zapp, William Ross Stoycos, Jonelle Harter Eshbach, PA Office of Attorney General, for Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.

CASTILLE, C.J., and SAYLOR, EAKIN, BAER, TODD, McCAFFERY and ORIE MELVIN, JJ.

OPINION

Justice BAER.¹

This capital case involves cross-appeals from the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Lebanon County, which denied Bradley Martin's guilt phase claims under the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546, but granted a new penalty hearing on the grounds that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate and present mitigating evidence. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

On September 15, 1993, while serving a sentence at the Lebanon County Correctional Facility, Martin was granted a two-hour pass to leave the prison. Upon leaving the correctional facility, he met Carolyn King, with whom Martin was romantically involved. Martin and King went to the home of Guy Goodman, who was a 74-year-old, homosexual male, who had written, telephoned, and visited Martin in prison. When Martin asked Goodman for money, Goodman responded that he would give Martin money in exchange for sex. Martin hit Goodman over the head with a vase and bound his wrists, ankles, and neck so he could not escape. Martin and King placed a bathrobe and plastic bag over Goodman's head and sealed the bag with duct tape. They took Goodman to

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the basement, tied him securely, and left him to suffocate.

Martin and King then looted Goodman's home, stealing his checkbook and credit cards, and drove away in his car. They used Goodman's checks and credit cards to fund their westward travel. Police apprehended Martin and King in Arizona. Martin had Goodman's credit card on his person, and Goodman's blank checks and social security card were found inside his vehicle. After being advised of her rights, King gave a statement inculpating herself and Martin in Goodman's murder. Similarly, after being advised of his constitutional rights, Martin gave an incriminating statement to FBI Special Agent Paul Vick. While still in custody in Arizona, and after have been given Miranda² warnings, Martin also gave a statement to Lebanon County detectives in which he asserted that he and King were responsible for Goodman's death. Martin made an additional incriminating statement to a corrections officer at the Lebanon County Prison, admitting to the murder.

Martin and King were tried jointly, after a severance motion was denied. Martin also filed a motion to suppress incriminating statements made to Lebanon County Detectives, asserting that had been under the influence of drugs when the statements were given. The trial court denied the suppression motion. The jury subsequently found Martin and King guilty of first degree murder, aggravated assault, robbery, theft by unlawful taking, flight to avoid apprehension, escape, and conspiracy.

At the penalty phase, the jury found three aggravating circumstances-perpetration of the homicide during the commission of a felony,³ commission of the offense by means of torture,⁴ and significant history of felony convictions involving the use or threat of violence.⁵ The jury found no mitigating circumstances.⁶ Both Martin and King were sentenced to death. This Court affirmed December 2, 1998. Commonwealth v. King, 554 Pa. 331, 721 A.2d 763 (1998).⁷ The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari January 18, 2000. Martin v. Pennsylvania, 528 U.S. 1120, 120 S.Ct. 943, 145 L.Ed.2d 819 (2000).

On February 14, 2000, Martin filed the instant pro se PCRA petition and an emergency motion for stay of execution. The Commonwealth filed a motion to dismiss Martin's PCRA petition. Martin's motion for stay of execution was denied, and the PCRA court issued a notice of intent to dismiss Martin's pro se PCRA petition, pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. No. 909(B)(2)(a), allowing 20 days to amend. PCRA Court Opinion, 1/3/02, at 10.

Martin appealed the denial of his motion for stay of execution; this Court vacated the denial and granted a stay pending review of Martin's amended PCRA petition. See Commonwealth v. Martin, 561 Pa. 145, 748 A.2d 1233 (2000). Counsel for

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Martin entered his appearance on April 13, 2000, and filed an amended petition. Martin filed a supplemental PCRA petition on June 1, 2000, which the Commonwealth unsuccessfully sought to have dismissed.

The PCRA court divided Martin's issues into three categories: (1) issues the parties agreed could be disposed of as questions of law; (2) issues the Commonwealth argued could be determined as questions of law; and (3) issues that could only be considered by the court following an evidentiary hearing. See PCRA Court Opinion, 1/3/02, at 11-13. The PCRA court dismissed all of Martin's issues in the first and second categories as being previously litigated or without merit, but deferred one ineffectiveness claim to an evidentiary hearing. See id., at 46-47.

Following an evidentiary hearing on March 4, 2004, the PCRA court dismissed all of Martin's issues, with the exception that it found merit to the claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate and present the mitigating evidence that Martin was diagnosed with a mental illness that affected him both during and after Goodman's murder. See PCRA Court Opinion, 3/4/04, at 40, 77. The court granted him a new sentencing hearing on this ground.

Martin filed a timely notice of appeal from the denial of guilt phase relief. The Commonwealth also filed a timely appeal, challenging the grant of a new sentencing hearing. Martin raises the following six issues on appeal:

1. Whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to suppress Martin's incriminating statements made during custodial interrogations where Martin invoked his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent and have counsel present during subsequent interrogations.

2. Whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate Martin's personal mental health history and present a defense of provocation during the guilt phase of trial.

3. Whether trial counsel was ineffective in other key areas of trial.

4. Whether Martin was denied effective representation by the Lebanon County Public Defender's Office and Pennsylvania's failure to maintain standards of qualified counsel.

5. Whether Lebanon County's practice of selecting jurors only from its per capita tax rolls denied Martin a jury from a fair cross-section of the community.

6. Whether it was arbitrary and capricious and a violation of the Eighth Amendment for the district attorney to reach a pre-trial plea agreement of life imprisonment for Martin, but condition the plea on King's acceptance of the same deal, which she refused.

See Martin's Brief, at 3-4. The Commonwealth raises one issue: whether the PCRA court erred in finding trial counsel ineffective for failing to investigate adequately and present mitigation evidence. Commonwealth's Brief, at 4.

"On appeal from the denial of PCRA relief, our standard of review is whether the findings of the PCRA court are supported by the record and free of legal error." Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 574 Pa. 724, 833 A.2d 719, 723 (2003) (citing Commonwealth v. Breakiron, 566 Pa. 323, 781 A.2d 94, 97 n. 4 (2001)). We must determine whether the PCRA court properly denied relief, dismissing Martin's guilt phase claims. Additionally, we must determine whether Martin was properly granted a new sentencing hearing.

In order to be eligible for PCRA relief, the petitioner must prove by a preponderance

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of the evidence that his conviction or sentence resulted from one or more of the enumerated circumstances found at 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(2)(setting forth the eligibility requirements of the PCRA). Further, the petitioner must demonstrate that the issues raised in his PCRA petition have not been previously litigated or waived. Id. at § 9543(a)(3). An issue has been previously litigated if "the highest appellate court in which the petitioner could have had review as a matter of right has ruled on the merits of the issue." Id. at § 9544(a)(2). A PCRA claim is waived "if the petitioner could have raised it but failed to do so before trial, at trial, during unitary review, on appeal or in a prior state postconviction proceeding." Id. at § 9544(b). Additionally, we no longer apply the relaxed waiver doctrine in capital PCRA appeals. Commonwealth v. Albrecht, 554 Pa. 31, 720 A.2d 693, 700 (1998).

Many of Martin's issues allege the ineffective assistance of counsel. It is well-established that counsel is presumed effective, and the defendant bears the burden of proving ineffectiveness. Commonwealth v. Cooper, 596 Pa. 119, 941 A.2d 655, 664 (2007). To overcome this presumption, Martin must satisfy a three-pronged test and demonstrate that: (1) the underlying substantive claim has arguable merit; (2) counsel whose effectiveness is being challenged did not have a reasonable basis for his or her actions or failure to act; and (3) the petitioner suffered prejudice as a result of counsel's deficient performance. Commonwealth v. (Michael) Pierce, 567 Pa.186, 786 A.2d 203, 213 (2001). A claim of ineffectiveness will be denied if the petitioner's evidence fails to meet any of these prongs. Id. at 221-222.⁸

In Commonwealth v. Grant, 572 Pa. 48, 813 A.2d 726 (2002), we abrogated the rule that ineffectiveness claims based on trial counsel's performance must be raised at the first opportunity where appellant has new counsel, see Commonwealth v. Hubbard, 472 Pa. 259, ...