Commonwealth Of Pa. v. Ruffin
| Decision Date | 25 February 2011 |
| Docket Number | No. 3353 EDA 2009,3353 EDA 2009 |
| Citation | 2011 PA Super 38 |
| Parties | COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, Appellee v. LAWRENCE RUFFIN, Appellant |
| Court | Pennsylvania Superior Court |
Lawrence Ruffin ("Ruffin") appeals from his judgment of sentence imposed in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County following his conviction for fleeing or attempting to elude police ("fleeing or eluding"). Because we conclude that Ruffin's sentence of 3-12 months' house arrest is illegal, we vacate and remand.
At 2:30 a.m. on September 17, 2008, police observed Ruffin driving the wrong way down a one-way street. When police attempted to stop Ruffin, he fled. A car chase ensued, during which Ruffin stopped his car and then reversed, causing it to collide with the police car behind him.1 At that point, Ruffin's car stalled and he fled on foot. After a brief foot chase, police apprehended Ruffin.
Police charged Ruffin with recklessly endangering another person, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2705, fleeing or eluding, 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3733(a), and two counts of simple assault, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2701(a). On April 29, 2009, Ruffin waived his right to a jury trial and proceeded to a bench trial. The trial court found him guilty of fleeing or eluding and acquitted him of the remaining offenses. This was Ruffin's second section 3733(a) conviction.
On July 8, 2009, the court sentenced Ruffin to 3-12 months' house arrest to be followed by one year of reporting probation. The conditions of Ruffin's house arrest allowed him to continue to work, to attend his place of worship, and to care for his six children. See Sentencing Order, 7/8/2009. On July 16, 2009, Ruffin filed a post-sentence motion alleging that his sentence was illegal; the court held a hearing and denied the motion. Ruffin timely filed this appeal raising the following issue for our review:
Do not binding precedent and the principles of statutory interpretation dictate that a court is prohibited under 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 6503 from imposing a sentence of incarceration that exceeds six months for a second or subsequent conviction of 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3733?
Vehicle Code section 3733(a)(1) grades the crime of fleeing or eluding, generally, as a second-degree misdemeanor. Under the Crimes Code, a person convicted of a second-degree misdemeanor may be sentenced to a period ofimprisonment of up to two years.2 Nonetheless, Vehicle Code section 6503(a) clearly directs that a second or subsequent section 3733(a) offender, like Ruffin, be sentenced to a fine or to imprisonment for not more than six (6) months, or both.
In his appellate brief, Ruffin notes the conflict between the grading of fleeing or eluding as a second-degree misdemeanor under section 3733(a) and the sentencing of a second or subsequent fleeing or eluding offender under section 6503(a). Ruffin advances a lengthy statutory analysis of the two sections and then concludes that section 6503(a) must be read as an exception to section 3733(a). Under section 6503(a), Ruffin contends that a second-time section 3733(a) offender may not be sentenced to more than 6 months' imprisonment. Ruffin, therefore, argues his sentence of 3-12 months' house arrest is illegal.
The Commonwealth conducts no statutory construction analysis. Rather, it contends that Ruffin's statutory construction, even if correct, is irrelevant because the court sentenced Ruffin to house arrest, not imprisonment. Because Ruffin was not sentenced to imprisonment, the Commonwealthconcludes that Ruffin's house arrest sentence of 3-12 months, following a section 3733(a), second-degree misdemeanor conviction, is legal.3 We disagree.
In Pennsylvania, county intermediate punishment is a statutorily authorized sentencing alternative. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(a)(6); Commonwealth v. Williams, 941 A.2d 14, 21 (Pa. Super. 2008) (en banc). House arrest or home confinement is a form of county intermediate punishment.4 See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9763(b)(16) (); 37 Pa.Code § 451.51(a)(1) (); 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9801-9812 (County Intermediate Punishment Act).5 Section 9763(a) states the general rule regarding county intermediate punishment as follows:
Id. (emphasis added).
Here, the plain language of section 9763(a) proves fatal to the Commonwealth's argument. According to section 9763(a), the maximum term of county intermediate punishment may not exceed the maximum term for which a defendant could be confined, i.e. imprisoned. See id. Therefore, despite the Commonwealth's contention to the contrary, our determination ofwhether section 6503(a) controls sentencing for a second or subsequent section 3733(a) offender is central to our resolution of Ruffin's appeal. If the court could not sentence Ruffin to more than six months' imprisonment under section 6503(a), then it could not, per section 9763(a), sentence Ruffin to more than six months' county intermediate punishment, i.e., house arrest. In this respect, we conclude for the following reasons that section 6503(a) dictates sentencing for a second or subsequent section 3733(a) offender and that, therefore, the court could not sentence Ruffin to a period of house arrest beyond six months.6 See id.
When interpreting a statute, our standard of review is plenary. Commonwealth v. Baird, 856 A.2d 114, 115 (Pa. Super. 2004). "The object of all interpretation and construction of statutes is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the General Assembly." 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1921(a); Commonwealth v. Cox, 983 A.2d 666, 703 (Pa. 2009). "In general, the best indication of legislative intent is the plain language of the statute." Commonwealth v. Segida, 985 A.2d 871, 874 (Pa. 2009); Commonwealth v. Bradley, 834 A.2d 1127, 1132 (Pa. 2003). "When the words of a statute are clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit." 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1921(b). It is onlywhen the words of a statute are ambiguous that we may attempt to ascertain the legislature's intent by considering the factors set forth in 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1921(c)(1)-(8).7 Commonwealth v. Shiffler, 879 A.2d 185, 189 (Pa. 2005). We presume that that legislature "intends the entire statute to be effective and certain." 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1922(2).
When a general provision, 8 like section 3733, conflicts with a special provision, like section 6503, in the same statute, the two provisions shall be construed, if possible, so that effect may be given to both. See 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1933. Where an irreconcilable conflict exists, like here, the special provision prevails and must be construed as an exception to the general provision, unless: (1) the general provision is enacted later, and (2) the legislature manifests its intent that the general provision must prevail. Id. "Manifest intent" is intent that is "apparent or obvious." See Black's Law Dictionary, 7th Ed. 1990.
Vehicle Code section 3733 provides in pertinent part:
In its entirety, section 6503 provides:
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