Commonwealth of Pa. v. Travaglia

• Decision Date: 28 September 2011
• Citation: 28 A.3d 868
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appelleev.Michael J. TRAVAGLIA, Appellant.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

28 A.3d 868

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee

v.Michael J. TRAVAGLIA, Appellant.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued Sept. 15, 2009.Decided Sept. 28, 2011.

Ned J. Nakles, Nakles & Nakles, Latrobe, Dante G. Bertani, Greensburg, for Michael J. Travaglia.Thomas R. Grace, John W. Peck, Westmoreland County District Attorney's Office, Greensburg, Amy Zapp, PA Office of Attorney General, Harrisburg, for Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.BEFORE: CASTILLE, C.J., SAYLOR, EAKIN, BAER, TODD, McCAFFERY, GREENSPAN, JJ.

OPINION

Justice TODD.

Michael J. Travaglia appeals the sentence of death imposed by the Westmoreland County Court of Common Pleas following a penalty hearing held pursuant to a grant of federal habeas corpus relief. For the reasons that follow, we affirm Appellant's judgment of sentence.

In the early morning hours of January 3, 1980, Apollo Police Officer Leonard Miller was on duty when a silver-colored Lancia sports car containing three men—Appellant, John Lesko, and Richard Rutherford—sped past his position at the Apollo Stop–and–Go convenience store several times. Officer Miller radioed for assistance, then pursued and stopped the sports car. When back-up officers arrived, they found Officer Miller lying on the highway, dead from two bullets fired from a .38 caliber handgun. His service revolver had been drawn, and all six rounds had been fired. Police subsequently located the sports car, which had been abandoned. The windows were shattered and the car had bullet holes in it. It was determined that the car was registered to a William Nichols of Pittsburgh, who had recently disappeared.

Prior to Officer Miller's homicide, state police received information indicating that Appellant may have been involved in a number of armed robberies and killings in Pittsburgh and surrounding counties. Pursuant to their investigation, the state police found a vehicle owned by a homicide victim abandoned near a motel where Appellant and Daniel Keith Montgomery had been staying.

Pittsburgh police located Montgomery in the early evening hours of January 3, 1980 in the downtown area of Pittsburgh. While questioning him, they discovered a .38 caliber handgun on his person. Montgomery told police Appellant gave him the weapon and that Appellant and Lesko had at that time talked about killing a police officer. Montgomery then told police that Appellant and Lesko were staying in a room at the Edison Hotel in downtown Pittsburgh. The police proceeded immediately to the Edison Hotel, where they arrested Appellant and Lesko. After having been given their Miranda warnings, the men were individually interrogated. Both gave statements implicating themselves in the killing of Officer Miller, as well as in the killings of William Nichols, Peter Levato, and Marlene Sue Newcomer.¹

Following various delays caused by two changes of venue and a mistrial, a joint trial of Appellant and Lesko for the murder of Officer Miller commenced in Westmoreland County on January 21, 1981, before Westmoreland County Common Pleas Court Judge Gilfert Mihalich and a jury that had been selected in Berks County. On January 30, 1981, the jury convicted both men of first-degree murder and conspiracy for the killing of Officer Miller, and, on February 3, 1981, both men were sentenced to death. On direct appeal, this Court affirmed the convictions. See Commonwealth v. Travaglia, 502 Pa. 474, 467 A.2d 288 (1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1256, 104 S.Ct. 3547, 82 L.Ed.2d 850 (1984). Subsequently, Appellant filed a petition for relief under the Post Conviction Hearing Act (“PCHA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541 et seq. ,² which the PCHA court denied on October 4, 1985. The PCHA court's order was affirmed on appeal. See Commonwealth v. Travaglia, 359 Pa.Super. 630, 515 A.2d 620 (1986), appeal denied, 518 Pa. 639, 542 A.2d 1368 (1987), cert. denied, 491 U.S. 910, 109 S.Ct. 3200, 105 L.Ed.2d 707 (1989).

On June 8, 1990, Governor Robert Casey signed a warrant for the execution of Appellant; on September 9, 1990, however, a stay of execution was issued to allow Appellant to file a petition for habeas corpus. Appellant filed another petition for collateral relief, this time under the PCRA, 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541–9546, the successor to the PCHA. Appellant's PCRA petition was denied, and, on appeal, this Court affirmed Appellant's sentence of death. Commonwealth v. Travaglia, 541 Pa. 108, 661 A.2d 352 (1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1121, 116 S.Ct. 931, 133 L.Ed.2d 858 (1996).

On May 21, 1996, Appellant filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in federal court, and the district court issued the writ and ordered a new sentencing hearing on the basis that evidence of Appellant's guilty plea to the Nichols murder should have been excluded at trial pursuant to a plea agreement. Thereafter, Appellant filed an omnibus pre-trial motion seeking to bar resentencing pursuant to Commonwealth v. McPhail, 547 Pa. 519, 692 A.2d 139 (1997). The trial court denied the motion, but granted Appellant the right to file an immediate appeal. On December 15, 1998, the Superior Court affirmed the trial court's order. Commonwealth v. Travaglia, 723 A.2d 190 (Pa.Super.1998), appeal denied, 559 Pa. 704, 740 A.2d 232 (1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1026, 120 S.Ct. 1436, 146 L.Ed.2d 325 (2000).

Prior to the resentencing hearing scheduled for October 16, 2000, the Commonwealth filed a motion in limine seeking a ruling that it would be permitted to introduce evidence of Appellant's previous homicide convictions in rebuttal to Appellant's character evidence. The trial court denied the motion, ruling that evidence of the previous homicides could not be used unless Appellant “opened the door.” In this regard, the trial court ruled that evidence presented by the defense relating to Appellant's good behavior in prison, and character evidence relating to periods of time which did not encompass the homicides, did not constitute “opening the door.” On October 13, 2000, the Commonwealth filed a notice of appeal, and the Superior Court reversed the trial court's order, holding the trial court erred in precluding the Commonwealth from introducing evidence of Appellant's prior convictions, for purposes of rebuttal, after Appellant introduced evidence of his good prison record and his change in personality while in prison, including becoming religious. Commonwealth v. Travaglia, 792 A.2d 1261, 1264 (Pa.Super.2002), appeal denied, 572 Pa. 733, 815 A.2d 633 (2002) (table), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 828, 124 S.Ct. 55, 157 L.Ed.2d 52 (2003).

Appellant's second penalty hearing began on July 5, 2005, and concluded on July 26, 2005. On July 26, 2005, the jury returned a sentence of death, finding the one aggravating circumstance—that the victim was a police officer killed in the performance of his duty, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9711(d)(1)—outweighed the two mitigating circumstances established by Appellant under the catchall provision of Section 9711(e)(8) ³—that he had lived as a well-adjusted inmate in prison, and that he had changed his life and adopted a Christian lifestyle. Following the denial of his post-sentence motions, Appellant filed the instant appeal, wherein he raises 18 issues regarding his penalty hearing, which we have reordered for ease of discussion.

A. Challenges to Evidentiary Rulings

Appellant raises several claims relating to the trial court's evidentiary rulings at his penalty hearing. Preliminarily, we note that the admissibility of evidence is solely within the discretion of the trial court, and a trial court's evidentiary rulings will be reversed on appeal only upon abuse of that discretion. Commonwealth v. Laird, 605 Pa. 137, 168, 988 A.2d 618, 636 (2010). An abuse of discretion will not be found “merely because an appellate court might have reached a different conclusion, but requires a result of manifest unreasonableness, or partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will, or such lack of support so as to be clearly erroneous.” Id. (citation omitted). Moreover, “an erroneous ruling by a trial court on an evidentiary issue does not necessitate relief where the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (citation omitted).

1. Trial Court's Exclusion of Kenneth Miller's Testimony

Appellant first argues that the trial court erred in excluding the testimony of Kenneth Miller, the Death Penalty Unit Manager at the prison where Appellant is incarcerated, regarding Appellant's future ability to adjust to the conditions of the general population. See Appellant's Brief ⁴ at 13 (Argument I). Mr. Miller testified at length regarding his knowledge of Appellant and Appellant's discipline record and work history, but when asked whether he believed Appellant would be able to function successfully in the general population if sentenced to life imprisonment, the Commonwealth objected, and the trial court sustained the objection on the basis that the evidence was speculative. When counsel attempted to lay a further foundation, the Commonwealth objected on the basis that the evidence was not relevant, and the trial court sustained that objection. Appellant contends the trial court erred in this regard, arguing that, under Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 106 S.Ct. 1669, 90 L.Ed.2d 1 (1986), the issue of a defendant's future adaptability in prison is a potential mitigating circumstance that may be presented to a penalty phase jury. Appellant further alleges that the prosecutor exploited the absence of Mr. Miller's testimony by arguing to the jury in his closing argument:

We have shown you two aggravating circumstances. We've proven them beyond a reasonable doubt. But it doesn't end there. We've given you a picture of the defendant, Michael J. Travaglia, and the kind of person he is. He's cruel. He's brutal. He's heartless. He's a predator. And none of us know what's going to happen to him or how he will behave in the future.N.T. Trial, 7/5/05–7/26/05, at 1105.

Although at trial the court indicated it would not...