Commonwealth of Pa. v. Brown

• Decision Date: 11 March 2011
• Citation: 26 A.3d 485,2011 PA Super 47
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appelleev.Jordan Anthony BROWN, Appellant.
• Court: Pennsylvania Superior Court

26 A.3d 485
2011 PA Super 47

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee
v.
Jordan Anthony BROWN, Appellant.

Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued Jan. 25, 2011.Filed March 11, 2011.

[26 A.3d 489]

Lourdes M. Rosado, Philadelphia, for appellant.Christopher D. Carusone, Office of the Attorney General, Harrisburg, for Commonwealth, appellee.BEFORE: ALLEN, OLSON, and COLVILLE,^* JJ.OPINION BY ALLEN, J.:

Jordan Anthony Brown (“Appellant”), a juvenile, appeals from the trial court's order denying his motion to decertify the criminal proceedings and transfer the case to the juvenile division. Appellant contends that the trial court committed an error of law in applying a provision of the decertification statute, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6355(a)(4)(iii), in a manner that infringed upon his Fifth Amendment rights against self-incrimination. Upon review, we conclude that the Fifth Amendment is applicable to decertification proceedings. We further conclude that the trial court's application of 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6355(a)(4)(iii) violated (or, at least, needlessly chilled) Appellant's rights against self-incrimination. Accordingly, we vacate the trial court's order and remand for a new decertification hearing.

The relevant facts and procedural history of this case are as follows. On February 20, 2009, Appellant, who was 11 years old at the time, allegedly murdered Kenzie Marie Houk and her unborn baby. Houk was 26 years old and the fiancée of Appellant's father. Houk died of a single gunshot wound to the back of her head, and her unborn baby died due to lack of oxygen. The Commonwealth charged Appellant with homicide, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2501, and homicide of an unborn child, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2603, in the criminal division of the Court of Common Pleas.

On October 6, 2009, Appellant filed a petition pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6322(a) to transfer his case from the criminal division to the juvenile division. On January 29, 2010 and March 12, 2010, the trial court held hearings on the petition.

At the hearings, Appellant, inter alia, presented the expert testimony of Dr. Kirk Heilbrun, a clinical and forensic psychologist. Dr. Heilbrun administered several standard psychological tests on Appellant, and opined that Appellant was amenable to treatment in the juvenile system. R.R. at 66–75; 88–89.

On cross-examination, the Commonwealth asked Dr. Heilbrun if Appellant admitted that he committed the crimes. R.R. at 92. Dr. Heilbrun testified that during the examinations, Appellant stated that he was innocent. R.R. at 92. The Commonwealth then asked Dr. Heilbrun if Appellant's denial of guilt had any effect on his conclusion that Appellant was amenable to treatment. R.R. at 92–93. Dr. Heilbrun responded that it was “impossible at [the] pre-trial stage” to consider Appellant's assertion of innocence as indicating that Appellant could not be rehabilitated. R.R. at 93. Dr. Heilbrun, nonetheless, conceded in a hypothetical scenario that if a defendant were convicted of a crime, and still maintained his innocence, then there would be “a problem for treatment” and rehabilitation. R.R. at 93.

In response, the Commonwealth called Dr. John O'Brien to testify as an expert in the field of psychiatry. Dr. O'Brien conducted a psychiatric evaluation of Appellant, and noted that Appellant “was very avoidant” in talking about “the evidence that was presented at the preliminary hearing” and also “the factual allegations

[26 A.3d 490]

of the offense.” R.R. at 277–78. Dr. O'Brien testified that Appellant stated he did not commit the crime, and opined that Appellant could not be rehabilitated. R.R. at 277–78; 280–81. In particular, Dr. O'Brien concluded:

... [Appellant] tends to avoid or reacts by avoiding taking responsibility, which, in my opinion, complicates the process of rehabilitation, because ... in order to be rehabilitated as a result of a conviction for a serious crime, you have to take responsibility for your behavior ...

And [Appellant cannot] make the first step [towards rehabilitation] if [he] ... doesn't take responsibility for [his] behavior ...

R.R. at 280–81. Dr. O'Brien further noted that in his experience, a great majority of the defendants that he encountered would not take responsibility for their criminal actions following their convictions. R.R. at 280–81. ¹

On March 29, 2010, the trial court denied Appellant's petition. The trial court, inter alia, concluded that Appellant was not amenable to treatment within the juvenile system and could not be rehabilitated by the age of 21. Trial Court Opinion (T.C.O.), 3/29/10, at 9. In making its determination, the trial court credited Dr. O'Brien's opinion that “the first step towards rehabilitation cannot be taken unless [Appellant] would come forward and take responsibility for his actions[.]” Id. at 14. The trial court found “persuasive reasoning from Dr. O'Brien” that Appellant would not take responsibility for his actions, and thus, “the prospects of rehabilitation within the juvenile court jurisdiction [was] likely to be unsuccessful.” Id. at 15. For this reason, the trial court found that Appellant failed to establish that he was amenable to treatment.

Appellant then filed an Application to Amend the March 29, 2010 Order to Include the Statement Specified in 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 702(b). Appellant contended that the trial court, by requiring him to admit guilt or accept responsibility to prove that he was amenable to treatment, violated his Fifth Amendment rights against self-incrimination.

By order dated May 12, 2010, the trial court granted Appellant's application. The trial court amended its March 29, 2009 order to include a statement that the order “involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the matter.” R.R. at 20; see 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 702(b). In addition, the trial court found “that there exists no Pennsylvania appellate authority that has ever addressed a defendant's right against self-incrimination in the context of a proceeding to decertify a criminal case to juvenile court.” R.R. at 20.

In its May 12, 2010 order, the trial court also elaborated on its reasoning for finding that Appellant was not amenable to treatment. The trial court stated that it “was not concluding as a matter of law [that] a child must confess in order to be decertified to juvenile court, and that any discussion by the court of the relationship between taking responsibility for the underlying offense and rehabilitation was solely in reference to addressing and evaluating the evidence on that issue[.]” R.R. at 20. Although the trial court accepted Dr. O'Brien's expert testimony, the trial court insisted that it did not find, as a

[26 A.3d 491]

matter of law, “that [Appellant] must confess in order to be rehabilitated[.]” R.R. at 20.

On June 11, 2010, Appellant filed a Petition for Permission to Appeal from an Interlocutory Order in this Court. R.R. at 42–54. On July 27, 2010, this Court issued a per curiam order permitting an interlocutory appeal in this matter.²

On appeal, Appellant raises the following issues for review:

1. At the pre-adjudicative stage, is it an abuse of discretion for the Trial Court to base a decision under 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6322 that a child is not amenable to treatment and therefore that the case should not be transferred to the juvenile system, on the fact that the child has not admitted to committing the offense prior to the decertification hearing?

2. At a pre-adjudicative stage, did the Trial Court's finding that a child's assertion of innocence demonstrated a lack of amenability to treatment constitute a misinterpretation of 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6322 that violates Due Process and Fundamental Fairness as guaranteed by the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions?

3. At a pre-adjudicative stage, did the Trial Court's finding that a child's assertion of innocence demonstrated a lack of amenability to treatment constitute a misinterpretation of 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6322 that violates the presumption of innocence and right against self incrimination guaranteed by the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions?

Brief for Appellant at 5.³

Here, the Commonwealth charged Appellant with homicide and homicide of an unborn child.

The Juvenile Act, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6301 et seq. , is designed to effectuate the protection of the public by providing children who commit “delinquent acts” with supervision,

[26 A.3d 492]

rehabilitation, and care while promoting responsibility and the ability to become a productive member of the community. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6301(b)(2). The Juvenile Act defines a “child” as a person who is under eighteen years of age. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6302. Typically, most crimes involving juveniles are tried in the juvenile court of the Court of Common Pleas.

Our legislature, however, has deemed some crimes so heinous that they are excluded from the definition of “a delinquent act.” Pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6322(a) and § 6355(e), when a juvenile is charged with a crime, including murder or any of the other offenses excluded from the definition of “delinquent act” in 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6302, the criminal division of the Court of Common Pleas is vested with jurisdiction. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6302 (stating that a “delinquent act” shall not include the crime of murder); Commonwealth v. Ramos, 920 A.2d 1253, 1258 (Pa.Super.2007).

When a case involving a juvenile goes directly to the criminal division, the juvenile can request treatment within the juvenile system through a transfer process called “decertification.” Commonwealth v. Sanders, 814 A.2d 1248, 1250 (Pa.Super.2003). To obtain decertification, it is the juvenile's burden to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that transfer to the juvenile court system best serves the public interest. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6322(a); Commonwealth v. Smith, 950 A.2d 327, 328 (Pa.Super.2008).

Pursuant to § 6322(a), the...