Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Maroney

• Decision Date: 30 June 1965
• Docket Number: No. 14960.,14960.
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA ex rel. George W. CRAIG, Appellant, v. James F. MARONEY, Superintendent, State Correctional Institution, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit

348 F.2d 22 (1965)

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA ex rel. George W. CRAIG, Appellant, v. James F. MARONEY, Superintendent, State Correctional Institution, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.

No. 14960.

United States Court of Appeals Third Circuit.

Submitted January 18, 1965.

Decided June 30, 1965.

George W. Craig, pro se.

John H. Brydon, Dist. Atty. of Butler County, Robert F. Hawk, Asst. Dist. Atty., Butler, Pa., for appellee.

Before McLAUGHLIN, FORMAN and GANEY, Circuit Judges.

FORMAN, Circuit Judge.

George W. Craig, presently confined in the State Correctional Institution at Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, under a life sentence for murder, pursuant to his conviction on September 27, 1960, appeals from the order of May 28, 1964 of the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania denying his application for a writ of habeas corpus.

A certificate of probable cause and permission to prosecute his appeal in forma pauperis were granted by order of this court.

In his application for the writ Craig proffered thirty-six grounds for relief. Each is phrased in a Socratic form raising trial errors and violations of his state and federal constitutional rights. The District Court entered a rule to show cause why the writ should not be granted and appointed counsel to represent Craig. A preliminary hearing on the rule was held on the return of which an order was filed fixing a date for an evidentiary hearing. The order further directed that Craig be limited at the hearing to a showing:

"(1) that a confession was elicited from him while he was under the influence of narcotics, and that such a confession was used adversely and unconstitutionally against him;

"(2) that he was not present at all stages of the proceedings as required by law; and

"(3) that he was not represented by counsel at all stages of the proceedings."¹

In its opinion filed subsequent to the evidentiary hearing the District Court characterized the issues raised by Craig thus: "With the exception of two, his Craig's numerous objections refer to trial matters not presenting constitutional questions."² Two of the three issues which the District Court had isolated for attention at the evidentiary hearing — whether Craig was present at all stages of the proceedings and whether Craig had the adequate representation of counsel — were never disposed of in the District Court's opinion. Of the two problems with which the opinion dealt — involuntary confession and double jeopardy — only the former had been included among the three points for consideration at the evidentiary hearing.

The thirty-six issues raised by Craig in his application may be classified in the following manner: Nineteen³ are clearly of a non-constitutional nature and thus are not cognizable via habeas corpus. Even if these alleged errors were shown to be meritorious and were thus to rise in their aggregate to the level of a due process issue,⁴ it appears that Craig never made such an argument to the state courts. The remaining seventeen issues do sound in terms of constitutional violations, but twelve⁵ are of insufficient merit to warrant textual discussion. The remaining five⁶ issues raised in Craig's application to the District Court crystallize into two weighty questions for our present consideration — (1) whether the introduction of Craig's confession at his trial was violative of due process and (2) whether the fruits of an illegal search and seizure were admitted into evidence also violating Craig's right to due process?

— I —

A brief statement of the relevant facts is set forth below.⁷ Certain of them will be later emphasized and supplemented when necessary to maintain clarity in the forthcoming discussion of the issues in this case.

Craig sets forth four grounds upon which he claims his confession should have been rendered inadmissible. Initially, Craig argues that the physical and psychological pressure of the police, including extensive questioning for long periods of time, the influence of narcotics consumed while he was detained by the police, his despondency and resultant suicide attempt, all created an atmosphere in which his will was overborne and his confession coerced. The District Court dealt with the conflict in testimony on this issue and found that the evidence would not sustain Craig's allegation of physical and psychological pressure. The District Judge also found that evidence was lacking to show that Craig's confession was influenced by narcotics. If narcotics were in fact consumed during the first days of his detention, we do not see it reflected in any portion of the record apart from his statements thereof. As to the charge that the confession was extracted from Craig at a point of time almost immediately subsequent to the suicide attempt when he was in a weakened condition, the District Court concluded that he had received only minor first aid, permitting his release from the hospital in a matter of a few hours, and that his actions prior to and during the dictation of the confession indicated an adequate physical capacity and mental alertness. The District Judge's opinion reflects a careful weighing of the evidence relating to the above allegations, and is amply supported by the record. We, therefore, find no reason to overturn the ruling on this initial issue raised by Craig.

Craig's second contention is that his confession was a reaction to his fear for the safety of his family, a fear based on their being abused by the police. Craig also alleged that his awareness that a friend, Dave Duffy, innocent of the crime, was also detained by the police, aided in forcing the confession. As to this second contention of Craig's the District Court found that the state of apprehension claimed by him is not borne out by the record, no circumstances appearing which would indicate the existence of such a disturbed state of mind at the time of the taking of the confession.

Craig relies on Rogers v. Richmond⁸ as support for his contention. In Rogers a new trial was ordered on the ground that the trial court had applied a constitutionally impermissible standard in determining the admissibility of a confession. The defendant in Rogers confessed shortly after being told his arthritic wife would be brought down to headquarters if a statement were not given. Craig alleges a parallel situation in this case, a position in which we cannot acquiesce. First of all, the Rogers court was never faced with the question of the application of a proper constitutional standard to a set of given facts. The reversal in Rogers was based on the impropriety of the standard, itself. The trial court had considered the trustworthiness of the resultant confession rather than limiting its consideration to the question of whether the behavior of the police was such as could reasonably be expected to have overborne the defendant's will. In the case at hand, no issue is made of the constitutional standard applied in measuring and weighing the factual allegations raised by Craig. In this case there is evidence that the District Attorney informed Craig that his wife would be subpoenaed for the trial and that his wife and children would be brought in to testify against him. The record also indicates that the police told Craig that statements had been taken from his family concerning the events on account of which he was being detained. The District Court in its examination of the record, as reflected in its opinion, notes these facts, but is unable to find any relationship between Craig's awareness of them and his final decision to confess. Our examination of the record indicates that applying the appropriate constitutional standards to the evidence, there is no other conclusion to be reached, and as our subsequent discussion will indicate, Craig's confession was peculiarly independent of the circumstances he alleges taint that incriminatory statement.

The third ground upon which Craig relies in attacking the admissibility of his confession is the alleged illegal arrest from which it flows.⁹ We neither have the benefit of an analysis by the District Court on the issue of illegal arrest, nor do we find it clear that probable cause, a prerequisite to the legality of the actions taken by the police, existed for the arrest. However, we need only reach that issue if we first conclude that the arrest, if illegal, would have ruled out the admissibility of Craig's confession.

The leading case concerning the effect of an illegal arrest on the admissibility of a subsequent confession is Wong Sun v. United States.¹⁰ There the determinative issue was "whether granting establishment of the primary illegality the illegal arrest, the evidence to which instant objection is made has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint."¹¹ It was also made clear that the concept of the fruit of the illegality invited no logical distinction between physical and verbal evidence. In Wong Sun the admission of four items into evidence was contested, all but one being found to have been a fruit of an illegal arrest. As to that remaining one, an unsigned confession, the Supreme Court found it admissible. Wong Sun had been released on his own recognizance after a lawful arraignment, and had returned voluntarily several days later to make the challenged statement. As to this confession, the Supreme Court ruled "that the connection between the arrest and the statement had `become so attenuated as to dissipate the taint.'"¹² Does Craig's confession fall into this exception as outlined in Wong Sun?

There are two factors which seem to be of major significance in determining the relationship between an illegal arrest and, as here, the subsequent confession:

(a) the proximity of an initial illegal custodial act to the procurement of the confession; and

(b) the intervention of other circumstances subsequent to an illegal arrest which...