Commonwealth v. Allegheny County

• Decision Date: 20 May 1895
• Docket Number: 21
• Citation: 168 Pa. 303,31 A. 1061
• Parties: Commonwealth v. Allegheny County, Appellant
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

31 A. 1061

168 Pa. 303

Commonwealth v. Allegheny County, Appellant

No. 21

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

May 20, 1895

Argued April 29, 1895

Appeal, No. 21, May. T., 1895, by defendant, from judgment of C.P. Dauphin Co., Jan. T., 1895, No. 507, on appeal from tax settlement. Reversed.

Appeal of the county of Allegheny from an account settled and entered against said county by the auditor general and approved by the state treasurer, on Nov. 14, 1894, for fees of county officers for the year 1893, from Jan. 2, 1893, to Jan. 1, 1894.

The case was tried before SIMONTON, P.J., from whose opinion it appeared that in the fall of 1894 the auditor general and state treasurer settled an account against the prothonotary of the court of common pleas of Allegheny county, against the register of the county, against the recorder of the county and against the clerk of quarter sessions of the county, in which these different officers were charged, for the year 1893, with the one half of the fees earned and received, less the present salary of the different officers, and the clerk hire of the offices.

The court entered judgment in favor of the commonwealth and against the county of Allegheny as follows:

Prothonotary's fees for 1893, half excess

$8,046 84

Register's fees for 1893, half excess

2,101 40

Recorder's fees for 1893, half excess

1,460 54

Clerk of quarter sessions' fees, half excess

1,589 37

Total

$13,198 15

Error assigned was entering judgment for commonwealth.

The appeal is sustained, and the judgment is reversed.

D. T Watson, Walter Lyon, W. J. Brennan and N. S. Williams with him, for appellant. -- Where the words of a statute are plain there is no need of construction: Potter's Dwarris on Statutes, 182.

The contemporaneous construction of a statute by those whose duty it is to execute it, especially when this construction has been successfully adopted by all different administrations and officers for twenty-two years, is entitled to great respect: Edwards v. Darby, 12 Wheat. 210; Potter's Dwarris on Statutes, 179; U.S. v. Recorder, 1 Blatchf., C.R.R. 218; Graham's App., 1 Dall. 136; Com. v. Grant, 2 Woodward's Cases, 379.

In Cohen v. Commonwealth, 6 Pa. 111, the Supreme Court, speaking of the act of 1810, said ". . . the law of 1810 cannot be considered as assessing or laying a tax properly so called."

The act of 1810, so far as Allegheny county is concerned, was repealed by the act of April 6, 1871, P.L. 476, entitled "An act relating to the fees and salaries and duties of certain county officers in Allegheny county:" Banks v. Com., 10 Pa. 447; Norris v. Crocker, 13 How. 429; Potter's Dwarris on Statutes, 154 and note 4; In re Bounty Accounts, 70 Pa. 96; Com v. Grier, 152 Pa. 180; McCleary v. Allegheny County, 35 W.N.C. 193.

The cases in Allegheny county where these statutes of 1871 and 1872 and 1876 have been reviewed are three in number: Bell v. Allegheny, 149 Pa. 381; Com. v. Grier, 152 Pa. 178; McCleary v. Allegheny County, 35 W.N.C. 193.

Henry C. McCormick, attorney general, Benjamin M. Nead and John P. Elkin, deputy attorney general, with him, for appellee. -- The act of 1810 was not repealed: Erie v. Bootz, 72 Pa. 199; Barber's Contested Election, 86 Pa. 392; Plum v. Lugar, 49 N.J. Law Rep. 557; McNeely v. Woodruff, 1 Green (N.J.), 352; 23 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 491; Chicago etc. R.R. v. United States, 127 U.S. 406; Homer v. Com., 106 Pa. 221; Com. v. Hutchinson, 10 Pa. 468; Com. v. Philadelphia, 157 Pa. 558; Com. v. Lehigh Coal & Navigation Co., 162 Pa. 603; Sutherland on Statutory Construction, sec. 307; Endlich on Interpretation of Statutes, sec. 361; R.R. Co's. App., 77 Pa. 429; In re Borough of Pottstown, 117 Pa. 538; Borough of Millvale v. R.R., 131 Pa. 1; R.R. v. Riblet, 66 Pa. 164; Dorsey's App., 72 Pa. 192; Ridge Ave. Pass. Ry. v. Phila., 124 Pa. 219.

Before WILLIAMS, McCOLLUM, MITCHELL, DEAN and FELL, JJ.

OPINION

MR. JUSTICE DEAN:

In 1894, the auditor general and state treasurer settled accounts against the prothonotary, register, recorder, and clerk of quarter sessions of Allegheny county, in which they charged these officers with one half the fees received by them in excess of their salaries and clerk hire for the year 1893. As they had paid all the fees pertaining to their office which had been received by them for this year to the county by agreement, the county assumed the responsibility, and was made party defendant in the suit. The case was tried before the common pleas of Dauphin county, under act of 22d of April, 1874, without a jury. Judgment having been given for the commonwealth, in the sum of $13,198.15, the amount claimed, the county presses this appeal.

Before the act of March 10, 1810, all the office fees of a county officer belonged to him exclusively. But that act, which is entitled, "An act taxing certain offices," required him to pay over to the state fifty per cent of all fees in excess of fifteen hundred dollars. Then, by the act of April 5, 1842, in addition to the fifteen hundred dollars, he was allowed to deduct his expenses for clerk hire and stationery.

When passed, the act of 1810 was a general act, applicable to all the counties of the state, and so continued to be until the passage of the act of April 2, 1868. It was then repealed, as to all counties, except Allegheny, Lancaster, Montgomery, Philadelphia, Beaver and Washington. Then, the act of April 6, 1871, a local or special law for Allegheny county was passed, which directed that all fees limited and appointed by law to be received by the county officers against whom this account was settled, as well as others designated in the act, should belong to the county of Allegheny, and that said officers should not "receive for their own use, or for any use or purpose whatever, except for the use of the county of Allegheny, any fees for any official services whatever." This was, in substance, the provision of the first section of the act; the officer no longer had title to a single dollar chargeable to litigants under the fee bill, except, by a proviso to the third section, the sheriff and coroner were allowed fees for mileage. By section four, it was expressly provided that the commonwealth's taxes on writs, and its proportion of the fees received, should be paid by warrant on the county treasurer. Section seven of the act directed that the officer, and all his deputies and clerks, should be paid fixed and specific salaries, which were either determined by the act itself, as in case of the principal officers, or, as in case of deputies and clerks, by a board designated to perform that duty. The same section directed that the commonwealth's share of the fees should be deducted from the aggregate sum received, before the salary of the principal officer was paid, and if not enough remained to cover the salary, then he should receive only such proportion as equaled the aggregate of fees earned during his term, after paying the deputies and clerks in full, and the commonwealth.

It will be noticed what a radical change was made in the relations between the commonwealth and the officer, as they had existed under the act of 1810. Before the act of 1871 the officer accounted to the commonwealth for, and paid to her, fifty per cent of the fees in excess of fifteen hundred dollars: he was her debtor, and she looked to him alone for her money; under the last named act, she peremptorily ordered him to pay all fees into the county treasury, and at the same time announced she would look to the county for payment; in effect, the officer was no longer answerable to her, and the county was.

This act was followed by a supplement to it of March 6, 1872 which expressly repealed by the fourth section of the act of 1871. The repealed section, as already noticed, directed that the state's share of the fees, instead of being paid as under the act of 1810 by the officer, should be paid by the county by warrant drawn on the county treasurer. The first section of the act of 1871 had declared all the fees should belong to the county,...