Commonwealth v. Ansell
| Decision Date | 15 July 2016 |
| Docket Number | No. 1051 WDA 2015,1051 WDA 2015 |
| Citation | 2016 PA Super 151,143 A.3d 944 |
| Parties | COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee v. William ANSELL, Appellant. |
| Court | Pennsylvania Superior Court |
Thomas J. Michael, Sewickley, for appellant.
Amy E. Constantine, Assistant District Attorney, Pittsburgh, for Commonwealth, appellee.
Appellant, William Ansell, appeals from the judgment of sentence entered on June 10, 2015 in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County following his two summary convictions for unlawful parking in violation of 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3353(a)(3)(ii). We affirm.
The relevant facts are as follows. On August 20, 2012, Ross Township enacted Ordinance No. 2321, which created a no parking zone on Fairley Road within the municipality. Thereafter, on October 4, 2014, Officer Jonathan Killmeyer of the Ross Township Police Department responded to a complaint from Appellant's neighbor regarding an illegally parked vehicle along Fairley Road. Officer Killmeyer traveled to the scene and observed Appellant's car parked unlawfully where “No Parking” signs were erected pursuant to Ordinance No. 2321. Officer Killmeyer issued a citation and had the vehicle towed. The following day, October 5, 2014, Office Killmeyer returned to the area and found Appellant's vehicle parked in the same location. He again issued a citation and mailed it to Appellant.
Appellant pleaded not guilty to both citations and appeared before a magistrate on November 12, 2014. The magistrate found Appellant guilty of parking in a no parking zone in violation of 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3353(a)(3)(ii). Thereafter, Appellant filed a summary appeal from the magistrate's determination. At a de novo hearing on February 23, 2015, the Commonwealth called Officer Killmeyer to testify, inter alia, that he observed Appellant's vehicle parked illegally on October 4th and 5th, 2014. Appellant did not dispute that he was parked in a no parking area on both occasions. Instead, he called Robert Ansell, his brother and the owner of Appellant's Fairley Road residence, to testify that Ross Township never acquired ownership of Fairley Road and that it remained private land. After the parties concluded their examination of the witnesses, the Commonwealth argued that Fairley Road was open to the public for purposes of vehicular traffic and, therefore, subject to regulation under the Motor Vehicle Code. Appellant argued that Fairley Road had not been dedicated and was not open to the public. Accordingly, Appellant asserted that Fairley Road was not subject to regulation enacted by Ross Township. The trial court took the matter under advisement and directed the parties to submit briefs.
After the parties submitted briefs, the court reconvened Appellant's hearing de novo on June 10, 2015. At the commencement of the hearing, the Commonwealth moved the court to reopen the record so that it could introduce the testimony of Officer Thomas of the Ross Township Police Department, who conducted a traffic study of Fairley Road.1 Appellant objected to the Commonwealth's motion and the trial court sustained his objection. After argument by both sides, the court found that Fairley Road was a public highway subject to regulation under the Motor Vehicle Code. The court also determined that Appellant waived his challenge asserting the lack of a traffic or engineering study because he failed to raise the issue at the February 23, 2015 de novo hearing. Consequently, the court dismissed Appellant's appeal and sustained the judgment finding him guilty of two summary violations of 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3353(a)(3)(ii). Additionally, the court imposed two fines in the amount of $100.00 plus costs. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal from the court's June 10, 2015 order. Both Appellant and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P.1925.
Appellant raises the following questions for our review:
Appellant's first three claims purport to challenge the sufficiency of the Commonwealth's evidence introduced against him. Appellant's claims are unique, however, in that he does not object to the sufficiency of the factual proof of his guilt.2 Instead, Appellant argues that the Commonwealth's evidence was insufficient because it failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Ross Township completed a traffic study finding that parking on Fairley road constituted a safety hazard or unduly interfered with vehicular movement before passing Ordinance No. 2321. Alternatively, Appellant contends that the Commonwealth failed to prove that Fairley Road constituted a highway such that it was subject to regulation under the Motor Vehicle Code. We address these claims separately.
Citing 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3353(d),3 Appellant's first and second claims treat Ross Township's performance of a traffic study as an element of the offense set forth in section 3353(a)(3)(ii). Specifically, Appellant's first claim asserts that the Commonwealth had the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that Ross Township conducted a traffic study prior to enacting Ordinance No. 2321. Appellant's second claim emphasizes that the Commonwealth needed to prove that the traffic study concluded that, “stopping, standing or parking would constitute a safety hazard or [that] stopping, standing or parking of vehicles would unduly interfere with the free movement of traffic.” See Appellant's Brief at 18, quoting 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3353(d).
Appellant is not entitled to relief on his claim that the Commonwealth failed to meet its burden of proving that Ross Township performed a traffic study prior to the enactment of Ordinance No. 2321. Section 102 defines official traffic-control devices in the following manner:
“Official traffic-control devices. ” Signs, signals, markings and devices not inconsistent with this title placed or erected by authority of a public body or official having jurisdiction, for the purpose of regulating, warning or guiding traffic.
75 Pa.C.S.A. § 102. Under the Motor Vehicle Code, official traffic-control devices are presumed to comply with lawful requirements unless competent evidence establishes the contrary. Section 3111 of the Motor Vehicle Code, which governs the legal presumption that attaches to official traffic-control devices, provides:
75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3111(d). Applying section 3111, this Court has consistently held that, “it is not the Commonwealth's initial burden to offer into evidence the results of an engineering and traffic study[ ]” and that “[where official traffic-control signals are] posted so as to [be] readily observable by the motoring public[, t]he Commonwealth [is] entitled to the presumption that they were lawfully authorized.” Commonwealth v. Kerns, 278 Pa.Super. 283, 420 A.2d 542, 543 (1980) ; see also Commonwealth v. Gernsheimer, 276 Pa.Super. 418, 419 A.2d 528, 530 (1980).
At his hearing de novo, Appellant came forward with no evidence to establish that Ross Township failed to perform the traffic study required under section 3353(d). Thus, the presumption of validity codified at section 3111(d) defeats Appellant's claim that the Commonwealth failed to meet its burden of proving the performance of a traffic study.
We are unpersuaded by Appellant's reliance on our decision in Commonwealth v. Kittelberger, 420 Pa.Super. 104, 616 A.2d 1 (1992). In Kittelberger, the trial court found the defendant guilty of traveling in excess of a posted speed limit. On appeal, the defendant questioned whether the Commonwealth met its burden of proving that a speed timing device was approved by the Department of Transportation, which was an element of his offense. We noted in our decision that the Commonwealth was not limited to the production of a certificate expressly indicating the Department's approval of a particular timing device. Instead, the Commonwealth enjoyed the option of asking the court to take judicial notice of the Department's approval, if the approval had been published in the Pennsylvania Bulletin. Kittelberger, 616 A.2d at 3. At trial, the Commonwealth offered only a certificate of accuracy to demonstrate the Department's approval of the device used to detect the defendant's speed. We held this evidence to be insufficient and discharged the defendant.
Appellant's attempt to equate the absence of proof of a traffic study to the Commonwealth's failure in Kittelberger to adduce sufficient evidence of the Department's approval of a speed timing device is...
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