Commonwealth v. Archambault
Citation | 290 A.2d 72,448 Pa. 90 |
Parties | COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Leonard ARCHAMBAULT, Appellant. |
Decision Date | 20 April 1972 |
Court | United States State Supreme Court of Pennsylvania |
John W. Packel, Chief, Appeals Div., Vincent J. Ziccardi Defender Association of Philadelphia, for appellant.
Arlen Specter, Dist. Atty., James D. Crawford, Deputy Dist. Atty Milton M. Stein, Chief, Appeals Div., Philadelphia, for appellee.
Before JONES C.J., and EAGEN, O'BRIEN, ROBERTS, POMEROY, NIX and MANDERINO, JJ.
Appellant Leonard Archambault, after trial by jury in 1962, was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. No appeal was taken from his conviction at that time. However, in 1968 appellant filed a petition pursuant to the Post Conviction Hearing Act, [1] alleging that he had been deprived of his right to appeal, guaranteed by Douglas v California, 372 U.S. 353, 83 S.Ct. 814, 9 L.Ed.2d 811 (1963). His petition was dismissed by the common pleas court, but on appeal this Court ordered that appellant be permitted to file post trial motions as if timely filed if he could estabklish that his previous failure to prosecute an appeal was motivated by fear of the death penalty. Commonwealth v. Archambault, 433 Pa. 336, 250 A.2d 811 (1969). Such a showing was made, but after argument appellant's motion for a new trial was denied. Appellant appealed directly to this Court, and on March 25, 1971, this Court, by a vote of three to two, affirmed the judgment of if he could establish that his previous failure timely filed, and was granted on May 28, 1971. The case was then reargued before a full Court.
Appellant contends that the trial court erred in telling the jury during the charge: 'I think it would be a miscarriage of justice to find this defendant not guilty.' [2] We agree with appellant and grant him a new trial. [3] To the same effect see Commonwealth v. Motley, Pa., 289 A.2d 724 (1972) decided this day.
We believe that when a judge expresses to the jury his opinion that the accused is guilty, he invades the province of the jury and thereby violates the accused's fundamental right to trial by jury, a right that has been guaranteed by the Constitution of this Commonwealth since 1776. [4]
In a criminal case the direction of a verdict of guilty by a trial judge is not allowed. [5] For an accused has a right to trial by jury, and if a trial judge directs the jury to return a verdict of guilty, the accused has had no jury trial at all. Our constitutional system of trial by jury is founded upon the firm conviction that the peace and dignity of our society are best maintained, and the highest degree of criminal justice is achieved, if the power to convict individuals of crimes lies solely with the jury.
Justice Brandeis' observations on the question of whether a trial judge may express his opinion on the guilt of an accused, expressed over fifty years ago, still ring true today:
[6]
Justice Brandeis has not been alone in his observation that a trial judge cannot indirectly effect a directed verdict of guilty. As the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit recently noted:
[7]
The now-apparent weakness in some of our previous decisions [8] was the supposition that the trial judge could express his personal opinion on the guilt of the accused, and even tell the jury, as the trial court did here, that: 'I think it would be a miscarriage of justice to find this defendant not guilty,' and yet somehow still leave 'the ultimate decision to the jury' and not 'interfere with its responsibility.' [9] This assumption fails to recognize the actualities of the judge-jury relationship.
An expression by the judge that in his opinion the accused is guilty leaves an indelible imprint on the minds of the jury. The jury is undoubtedly going to attribute to the judge, because of his experience in criminal cases, special expertise in determining guilt or innocence. As Mr. Justice (later Chief Justice) Kephart stated for this Court:
[10]
Or, as the United States Supreme Court recognized in Bollenbach v. United States, 326 U.S. 607, 612, 66 S.Ct. 402, 405, 90 L.Ed. 350 (1946):
"The influence of the trial judge on the jury is necessarily and properly of great weight,' . . . and jurors are ever watchful of the words that fall from him. Particularly in a criminal trial, the judge's last word is apt to be the decisive word.' [11]
A judge's expression of his opinion on the guilt of an accused has an even greater coercive effect on the jury when as here the judge states that it would be a 'miscarriage of justice' to find the defendant not guilty. 'A juror may not mind disagreeing with a judge on factual matters but he would dislike very much placing himself in the category of a person who has participated in a miscarriage of justice, judicially proclaimed.' Commonwealth v. Raymond, 412 Pa. 194, 210, 194 A.2d 150, 158 (1963) (dissenting opinion). [12]
In light of the decisive effect that a jury is likely to give to a judge's statement that in his opinion the accused is guilty, it is clear that cautioning instructions to the effect that the jury is the final arbiter of the verdict are insufficient to vitiate the impact of the judge's statement. In a lengthy charge such as the one that was given to the jury at appellant's trial, the judge's statement that 'I think it would be a miscarriage of justice to find this defendant not guilty' is the one part of the charge that no juror will forget or fail to understand. Cautionary instructions will be unable to remove the indelible impact of such a statement. Cf. Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968); Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 84 S.Ct. 1774, 12 L.Ed.2d 908 (1964).
In holding as we do today, that a trial judge may not suggest a verdict of guilty or not guilty nor directly express an opinion on the guilt or innocence of the defendant, we are merely reaching a result which is in harmony with our latest decisions in this general area--Commonwealth v. Wilmer, 434 Pa. 397, 254 A.2d 24 (1969), and Commonwealth v. Holton, 432 Pa. 11, 247 A.2d 228 (1968). In both of these cases the trial judge in his charge had reminded the jurors of their responsibility to the Almighty to bring in a proper verdict. We reversed on the grounds that the "jurors Might have concluded . . . that the court was threatening them with the wrath of God should they bring in a verdict of not guilty." Commonwealth v. Wilmer, supra, 434 Pa. at 400, 254 A.2d at 25 (quoting from Commonwealth v. Holton, supra, 432 Pa. at 19, 247 A.2d at 232). Certainly a direct statement by a judge that in his opinion the accused is guilty invades the province of the jury just as much as, if not more than, a judge's statement implying that he can discern the will of the Almighty and that God's wrath will be visited upon the jury if they fail to return a verdict of guilty.
Our holding in this case also eliminates a number of anomalies that would exist under the opposite rule. For example, we recently held in Commonwealth v. Potter, 445 Pa. 284, 285 A.2d 492 (1971), that a new trial was required when the prosecutor expressed his personal opinion of the defendant's credibility in the presence of the jury. We reasoned that the prosecutor 'thereby clearly and improperly intrud(ed) upon the jury's exclusive function of evaluating the credibility of witnesses.' Id. at 287, 285 A.2d at 493. [13] If a prosecutor cannot express his personal opinion of a defendant's credibility without intruding upon the jury's function, A fortiori we cannot permit a judge, whose opinion on the guilt of an accused has a far greater impact on the jury, to express such an opinion on the guilt of an accused.
In addition we have...
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