Commonwealth v. Arthur

• Citation: 62 A.3d 424,2013 PA Super 28
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant v. Curtis D. ARTHUR, Appellee. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Appellant v. Jasmine Demi Thompson, Appellee. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Appellant v. Ryan J. Ladson–Singleton, Appellee.
• Decision Date: 20 February 2013
• Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania

62 A.3d 424
2013 PA Super 28

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant
v.
Curtis D. ARTHUR, Appellee.
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Appellant
v.
Jasmine Demi Thompson, Appellee.
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Appellant
v.
Ryan J. Ladson–Singleton, Appellee.

Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued Dec. 5, 2012.
Filed Feb. 20, 2013.

[62 A.3d 425]

Adrienne D. Jappe, Assistant District Attorney, Norristown, for Commonwealth, appellant.

Leigh P. Narducci, Blue Bell, for Arthur, appellee.

BEFORE: MUNDY, J., OTT, J., and PLATT, J.^*

OPINION BY PLATT, J.

The Commonwealth appeals from the Order of March 16, 2012, which granted Appellees', Curtis D. Arthur, Jasmine Demi Thompson, and Ryan J. Ladson–Singleton,¹ motion to suppress the results

[62 A.3d 426]

of a Global Positioning System (GPS) device.² We reverse and remand.

In March 2011, the Montgomery County Detectives' Bureau received information from two confidential informants that Appellee Arthur was selling drugs in the Norristown area. One of the informants, who had purchased drugs from Appellee Arthur, participated in a controlled buy. During the buy, the police observed that Appellee Arthur drove to the meet location in a blue Ford Taurus ³, with a Pennsylvania registration of HSD–8740.⁴ Following the drug sale, the police observed Appellee Arthur return to the address listed on his driver's license, 528 Stanbridge Street, Norristown, Pennsylvania.

Based upon this information, Detective Michael Fedak sought an order pursuant to section 5761 ⁵ of the Pennsylvania Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance Control Act (Wiretap Act), 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5701– 5728, authorizing the installation and use of a mobile tracking device (GPS) on the blue Ford Taurus. On March 11, 2011, the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County issued an order authorizing the placement and use of a GPS on the blue Ford Taurus. The GPS was installed on March 16, 2011.

In late March 2011, there was a second controlled buy from Appellee Arthur. Appellee Arthur drove to the buy in the blue Ford Taurus. This time he departed from 627 Sandy Street, Norristown, (an address at which Appellee Arthur was staying) and returned there after the buy. A few hours later, Appellee Arthur returned to the 528 Stanbridge Street address. As a result of both the second controlled buy and information obtained from the GPS device, the police obtained and executed search warrants for both addresses and for the blue Ford Taurus.

During the March 24, 2011 search of the Stanbridge Street address, the police seized numerous bags of marijuana found throughout the residence, a large amount of drug paraphernalia (several digital scales, empty plastic baggies, and a plate containing a razor blade and cocaine residue), five guns, and ammunition. At the time of the search, Appellee Ladson–Singleton was found at the residence. During the search of the Sandy Street address,

[62 A.3d 427]

the police seized eight bags of marijuana, various papers concerned with the drug business, three boxes of empty plastic baggies, almost $20,000.00 in cash, and a loaded gun. Appellee Arthur's girlfriend, Appellee Thompson, was found at the Sandy Street residence at the time of the search.

The police arrested and charged Appellees with criminal conspiracy, various firearms offenses, and various drug offenses. The Commonwealth joined the three cases prior to arraignment pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 582. Appellees filed multiple motions to suppress. On February 13, 2012, the suppression court held a hearing, during which the Commonwealth presented the testimony of Detective Fedak. Appellees did not present any evidence. By Order of March 16, 2012, the suppression court granted the motions to suppress. The instant, timely appeal followed.⁶

On appeal, the Commonwealth raises the following issues for our review:

I. Whether the trial court erred in ruling that the [GPS] search in this case was unconstitutional under United States v. Jones [––– U.S. ––––, 132 S.Ct. 945, 181 L.Ed.2d 911 (2012) ], even though it was conducted in full compliance with § 5761 of Pennsylvania's Wiretap Act?

II. In any event, whether the trial court erred in concluding that the warrantless GPS search in this case was unconstitutional under Jones, even though it was supported by probable cause?

Whether, to the extent that Pennsylvania law does not allow for a “good faith” exception to the exclusionary rule, the law should be changed to allow for a limited “good faith” exception where law enforcement acted in good faith reliance on 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5761?

(Commonwealth's Brief, at 4).

The Commonwealth challenges the suppression court's grant of Appellees' motions to suppress. When the Commonwealth appeals from a suppression order, this Court follows a clearly defined scope and standard of review. We consider only the evidence from the defendant's witnesses together with the evidence of the prosecution that, when read in the context of the entire record, remains uncontradicted. See Commonwealth v. Henry, 943 A.2d 967, 969 (Pa.Super.2008), appeal denied,598 Pa. 787, 959 A.2d 928 (2008). This Court must first determine whether the record supports the factual findings of the suppression court and then determine the reasonableness of the inferences and legal conclusions drawn from those findings. See id. In appeals where there is no meaningful dispute of fact, as in the case sub judice, “our duty is to determine whether the suppression court properly applied the law to the facts of the case.” Commonwealth v. Ruey, 586 Pa. 230, 892 A.2d 802, 807 (2006).

In reaching its decision to grant the motions to suppress, the suppression court relied on the United States Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Jones, ––– U.S. ––––, 132 S.Ct. 945, 181 L.Ed.2d 911 (2012). ( See Suppression Court Opinion, 4/17/12, at 4–11). In Jones, a joint task force of federal and District of Columbia law enforcement was investigating the defendant for trafficking in narcotics. See Jones, supra at 948. The task force sought and received a warrant authorizing the installation of a GPS device on the defendant's car in the District of Columbia within ten days of the warrant's issuance.

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See id. However, the GPS device was not installed until the eleventh day and was installed in Maryland, not the District of Columbia. See id. The defendant was ultimately indicted, convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment based, in part, on information obtained via the GPS device. See id. at 948–49. On appeal, the United States District Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed the conviction, finding that admission of evidence obtained from the warrantless ⁷ use of the GPS device violated the Fourth Amendment. See id. at 949. The United States Supreme Court agreed. The Supreme Court held that the placement of a GPS device on the defendant's car constituted a search. See id. at 949. Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia held that the formulation of what constitutes a search, as delineated in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967), was incomplete. See id. at 953. In Katz, the Supreme Court stated that “the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places.” See Katz, supra at 351, 88 S.Ct. 507. Justice Scalia explained that Katz supplemented but did not replace traditional jurisprudence that linked Fourth Amendment rights to property rights and thus protects individuals from government actions that constitute a trespass. See Jones, supra at 949–53. Thus, the majority held that while not all trespassory searches offend the Fourth Amendment, those that involve “persons, houses, papers, and effects” do invoke that protection, whether or not the individual had a reasonable expectation of privacy under Katz in the item at the time the trespass took place. Id. at 953–54.

Keeping these principles in mind, we now turn to our analysis of the merits of the instant matter. Initially, we note that the suppression court treated Appellees Arthur and Thompson identically in analyzing the merits of their claim. ( See Suppression Ct. Op., 4/17/12, at 4–11). This was error. To prevail on a motion to suppress, the defendant must show that he or she has a privacy interest which has been infringed upon. ⁸See Commonwealth v. Burton, 973 A.2d 428, 434 (Pa.Super.2009) ( en banc).Burton provides that:

[t]he law relating to a defendant's standing and expectation of privacy in connection with a motion to suppress has been explained by our courts. A defendant moving to suppress evidence has the preliminary burden of establishing standing and a legitimate expectation of privacy.... A defendant must separately establish a legitimate expectation of privacy in the area searched or thing seized. Whether defendant has a legitimate expectation of privacy is a component of the merits analysis of the suppression motion. The determination whether defendant has met this burden is made upon evaluation of the evidence presented by the Commonwealth and the defendant.
Id. at 435 (citations omitted). However, with respect to the search of an automobile, “a defendant charged with a possessory offense has automatic standing to challenge a search. However, in order to prevail, the defendant, as a preliminary

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matter, must show that he had a privacy interest in the area searched.” Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted). The Burton Court explained that:

An expectation of privacy is present when the individual, by his conduct, exhibits an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and that the subjective expectation is one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. The constitutional legitimacy of an expectation of privacy is not dependent on the subjective intent of the individual asserting the right but on whether the expectation is reasonable in light of all the surrounding circumstances.

Id. (citation omitted). While the Pennsylvania courts have not addressed the concept of legitimate...