Commonwealth v. Barron

• Decision Date: 01 December 1975
• Citation: 237 Pa.Super. 369,352 A.2d 84
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Herman BARRON, Appellant.
• Court: Pennsylvania Superior Court

352 A.2d 84

237 Pa.Super. 369

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Herman BARRON, Appellant.

Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

December 1, 1975.

John J. Poserina, Jr., Philadelphia, (Court appointed) for appellant.

Steven H. Goldblatt, Asst. Dist. Atty., Chief Appeals Div., Philadelphia, for appellee.

Before WATKINS, President Judge, and JACOBS HOFFMAN, CERCONE, PRICE, VAN der VOORT and SPAETH, JJ.

PRICE, Judge.

The appellant, Herman Barron, pleaded guilty to charges of aggravated assault and possessing an instrument of crime based upon charges related to the stabbing of his girlfriend Barbara Lyons. Following his guilty plea on April 10, 1974 appellant was ordered to undergo a psychiatric examination with a view toward mental health commitment. The examining physicians recommended that appellant be placed in a psychiatric ward, rather than a penal institution.

Appellant was sentenced on June 4, 1974, to 5--10 years imprisonment. In lieu of serving this sentence, however, appellant was ordered to be committed to the Philadelphia State Hospital at Byberry. Appellant filed this appeal on July 10, 1974, but before the appeal could be heard, appellant escaped from the hospital. On October 23, 1974, a bench warrant was issued for appellant's arrest. The bench warrant is still outstanding.

On July 29, 1975, appellant's counsel, without consulting his client, who is still at large, filed a brief challenging his commitment to Byberry. Counsel for the Commonwealth answered the brief, and, in addition, requested that the appeal be quashed. Because appellant is a fugitive, we will not consider the merits of his appeal. Rather, we will grant the Commonwealth's motion to quash.

In Commonwealth v. Galloway, 460 Pa. 309, 311, 333 A.2d 741, 743 (1975), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated:

'The Commonwealth presses its motion to dismiss the appeal, citing Molinaro v. New Jersey, supra, for its position. However, Molinaro is inapposite. In that case, the Supreme Court of the United States dismissed an appeal before that Court on writ of error from the New Jersey state courts, because the appellant therein, who had been free on bail had failed to surrender himself to the state authorities and had consequently been classified by New Jersey as a fugitive from justice. The rationale behind dismissal of an appeal while a convicted defendant is a fugitive from justice rests upon the inherent discretion of any court to refuse to hear the claim of a litigant who, by escaping, has placed himself beyond the jurisdiction and control of the court, and, hence, might not be responsive to the judgment of the court. See Smith v. United States, 94 U.S. 97, 24 L.Ed. 32 (1876); Ruetz v. Lash, 500 F.2d 1225 (7th Cir. 1974); United States v. Swigart, 490 F.2d 914 (10th Cir. 1973); Johnson v. Laird, 432 F.2d 77 (9th Cir. 1970).'

(emphasis added)

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court found Molinaro v. New Jersey, 396 U.S. 365, 90 S.Ct. 498, 24 L.Ed.2d 586 (1970), inapplicable to the facts of its decision in Commonwealth v. Galloway, supra, because Galloway was apprehended before the appeal was heard. However, we find Molinaro to be on point in the instant case. As in Molinaro, the appellant herein is now a fugitive from justice and has been for approximately one year. Under such circumstances, and in view of the fact that no statutory authority exists to compel this court to hear an appeal of a person outside our jurisdiction, we will not adjudicate appellant's case.

We agree with the rationale of the Molinaro Court:

'No persuasive reason exists why this Court should proceed to adjudicate the merits of a criminal case after the convicted defendant who has sought review escapes from the restraints placed upon...