Commonwealth v. Bennett

Decision Date12 April 1973
Citation303 A.2d 220,224 Pa.Super. 238
PartiesCOMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee, v. Rebecca BENNETT, Appellant.
CourtPennsylvania Superior Court

Nelson M. Galloway, Harrisburg, for appellant.

Grainger Bowman, Asst. Dist. Atty., Marion E. MacIntyre, Deputy Dist Atty., Harrisburg, for appellee.

Before WRIGHT, P.J., and WATKINS, JACOBS HOFFMAN, SPAULDING, CERCONE and SPAETH, JJ.

CERCONE, Judge:

Defendant who was acquitted of the charge of larceny but found guilty of receiving stolen property (an automobile) contends, inter alia, that the lower court erred in refusing to direct a verdict in her favor with regard to the charges brought against her, including that upon which she was found guilty.

Defendant had been a passenger in the stolen automobile while it was being driven by one Harry Jones. Later she had been found driving the vehicle in Philadelphia with Jones as a passenger. Jones after denials, confessed to the automobile's theft and it was on his testimony that the Commonwealth relied in its proof of charges against defendant. Defendant contends that his testimony was so inconsistent and contradictory as to be insufficient to support a finding of her guilt. We agree.

Jones (who had been contradictory with respect to his own perpetration of the larceny) sought to implicate the defendant by giving several wholly different, conflicting and inconsistent versions of when and how he had told her that the car had been in fact stolen by him. On a previous occasion Jones had denied he had ever conveyed to defendant knowledge of the car's theft. With each new version Jones would recant the previous one and protest that the newest version was in fact the true one. This situation presented the jury not with a mere conflict or contradiction in testimony which was reasonably reconcilable by them, but a situation falling within the rule: '. . . a case should not go to the jury where the party having the burden offers testimony of a witness, or of various witnesses, which is so contradictory on the essential issues that any finding by the jury would be a mere guess . . . When the testimony is so contradictory on the basic issues as to make any verdict based thereon pure conjecture the jury should not be permitted to consider it': Comm. v. Bartell, 184 Pa.Super. 528, 537, 538, 136 A.2d 166, 172 (1957). (emphasis added)

In Comm v. Rex, 147 Pa.Super. 121, 24 A.2d 98 (1942), the prosecutrix's inconsistent statements were held insufficient to permit a jury's finding of defendant's guilt, the court saying: 'In the interests of...

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