Commonwealth v. Berry

Decision Date09 October 1970
Citation440 Pa. 154,269 A.2d 921
PartiesCOMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Harold BERRY, Appellant.
CourtPennsylvania Supreme Court

Calvin S. Drayer, Jr. (submitted), White & Williams Philadelphia, for appellant.

Arlen Specter, Dist. Atty. (submitted), James D. Crawford, Asst Dist. Atty., Chief, Appeals Division, Philadelphia, for appellee.

Before BELL, C.J., and JONES, COHEN, EAGEN, O'BRIEN ROBERTS and POMEROY, JJ.

OPINION OF THE COURT

ROBERTS Justice.

In 1952 appellant pleaded guilty to nine of thirty-two bills of indictment charging him with burglary, and to one bill charging him with use and possession of narcotics. A hearing was then held at which the Commonwealth presented evidence only as to those bills to which appellant pleaded guilty; at the close of the hearing the Commonwealth's motion to nolle pros the remaining bills was granted. A sentence of six to twenty years was imposed on each of the nine burglary charges, the sentences to run concurrently, and sentence on the narcotics charge was suspended. No appeal was taken.

In January of 1967 appellant filed the present PCHA petition, claiming that his pleas were involuntary since they were motivated by coerced confessions, and that he had been denied the effective assistance of counsel. An evidentiary hearing was held, with counsel, and relief was denied. This denial was affirmed by the Superior Court per curiam without opinion, see 213 Pa.Super. 770, 247 A.2d 247 (1968), and we granted allocatur. We now affirm.

Initially it is conceded by the Commonwealth that appellant's confessions were coerced. Appellant, a narcotics addict at the time of his arrest, began suffering withdrawal symptoms when taken into custody and the police administered morphine to him several times, thereby inducing his confessions. Of course, the fact that his confessions were involuntary does not, without more, invalidate his guilty pleas. Appellant must still prove, inter alia, that the involuntary confessions were the primary motivation for the plea. See McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 90 S.Ct. 1441, 25 L.Ed.2d 763 (1970). See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Copeland, 439 Pa. 293, 268 A.2d 751 (1970). And, despite the fact that this is a 'silent record' case, the burden of proof still rests with appellant, his plea having been taken before our decision in Commonwealth ex rel. West v. Rundle, 428 Pa. 102, 237 A.2d 196 (1968). Accord Commonwealth v. McBride, Pa., 269 A.2d 737 (1970).

The hearing court fund as a fact that appellant did not carry this burden. The evidence produced at the PCHA hearing indicates that appellant and counsel discussed the thirty-two burglary charges which were pending, and that appellant told counsel that he remembered committing nine of them. Accordingly, appellant pleaded guilty to only those nine. In addition, the transcript of appellant's preliminary hearing shows that there were eye-witnesses to at least several of the burglaries. Given this evidence, we cannot say that the hearing court abused its discretion in finding that appellant had not proven that his plea was primarily motivated by the coerced confessions.

Appellant also alleges that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel at his trial. 'Our task in cases of this nature * * * encompasses both an independent review of the record * * * and an examination of counsel's stewardship of the now challenged proceedings in light of the available alternatives. * * * The test is Not whether other alternatives were more reasonable, employing a hindsight evaluation of the record. Although weigh the alternatives we must, the balance tips in favor of a finding of effective assistance as soon as it is determined that trial counsel's decisions had any reasonable basis.' Commonwealth ex...

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