Commonwealth v. Blanchard

• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
• Writing for the Court: STERN, Justice
• Citation: 26 A.2d 303
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH v. BLANCHARD.
• Decision Date: 11 May 1942

26 A.2d 303

COMMONWEALTH
v.
BLANCHARD.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

May 11, 1942.

Reargument Denied June 29, 1942.

26 A.2d 304

Appeal No. 157, January term, 1942, from judgment and sentence of Court of Oyer and Terminer, Philadelphia County, February Sessions, 1940, Nos. 619, 620; Frank Smith, Judge.

Walter Blanchard was convicted of murder in the first degree, and he appeals.

Affirmed.

Before SCHAFFER. C. J, and MAXEY, DREW, LINN, STERN, PATTERSON, and PARKER, JJ.

Milton S. Leidner and Joseph F. M. Baldi, 2nd, both of Philadelphia, for appellant.

Ephraim Lipschutz, Asst. Dist. Atty., and John H. Maurer, Dist. Atty., both of Philadelphia, for appellee.

STERN, Justice.

Defendant was convicted of murder of the first degree and the jury fixed death as the penalty. The assignments of error on the present appeal relate mostly to alleged inadequacies of the charge to the jury in regard to the presumption of innocence, the character and force of circumstantial evidence, the probative value of confessions, the elements of second degree murder, and the sufficiency of the proof of alibi; there is also a criticism of what the trial judge said concerning the presumption arising from the use of a deadly weapon.

A careful reading of the charge reveals no such inadequacies or other justification for complaint. The jury were instructed that defendant "carries with him the presumption of innocence" and that the burden was upon the Commonwealth to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. There was no need to charge upon the nature of circumstantial evidence because the Commonwealth did not rely upon such evidence but upon a confession. The charge in reference to the various confessions which were introduced in evidence was more than sufficient; the jury were told that the burden was on the Commonwealth to prove the conditions under which they were made, and that it must be shown they were made voluntarily; the evidence was reviewed as to the manner in which they were obtained, and the question was submitted for the determination of the jury as to whether they were voluntary and what amount of consideration should be given to them; once it is established that a confession was freely made it is not, is defendant's counsel suggests, the weakest, but, on the contrary, the strongest evidence of guilt. The charge concerning the elements of murder in the second degree was also adequate; it was phrased substantially in the language used in Commonwealth v. Drum, 58 Pa. 9, 17, which has long been accepted as the model in Pennsylvania courts for charges in homicide cases; although the murder for which defendant was convicted was perpetrated in the course of an attempt to commit robbery, and therefore, under the statute, was murder of the first degree, the court did not deprive the jury of its right to find a lesser verdict; on the contrary, they were told it was their duty to fix the degree of the crime. In regard to defendant's attempt to prove an alibi, the trial judge not only charged that such a defense could be established by the mere preponderance of the evidence, but he added that an alibi "is the most perfect defense in the world"; he did not need specifically to state, although it is true, that the evidence offered in support of an alibi may be sufficient of itself to raise a reasonable doubt. Concerning the presumption of intent arising from the use of a deadly weapon, the trial judge again resorted to the language in the Drum case; the jury could not have failed to understand that the presumption was a rebuttable one and that the burden was at all times upon the Commonwealth to prove the actual intent; in view of the fact that the murder here was committed as part of an attempt to rob, the intent with which the fatal shot was fired is at best an academic matter.

The real grievance of defendant is with the verdict of the jury; he contends that the evidence was not sufficient, as a matter of law, to warrant a finding of guilt.

The Commonwealth admits that the case has its peculiarities. On the night of May 27, 1938, some person or persons attempted to commit a robbery at a drug store at the corner of 17th Street and Montgomery Avenue, Philadelphia. In the course of this attempt the proprietor of the store, William Heim, was shot and instantly killed. Mrs. Heim, his wife, rushing into the store from the living quarters in the rear, saw a colored man crouching down along the counter on his way out, but she did not see his face and could not identify him. After he reached the street another shot was fired back into the store either by him or a confederate. A person passing at the time in an automobile heard two shots and saw three men running, two from the

26 A.2d 305

store and one from the curb; he purported to identify one of these as a negro named...