Commonwealth v. Bonomo

• Decision Date: 16 September 1958
• Citation: 144 A.2d 752,187 Pa.Super. 521
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH v. Ralph BONOMO, Appellant.
• Court: Pennsylvania Superior Court

144 A.2d 752

187 Pa.Super. 521

COMMONWEALTH v. Ralph BONOMO, Appellant.

Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

September 16, 1958.

Concurring Opinion Sept. 25, 1958.

Application for Allocatur Granted Nov. 20, 1958. [Copyrighted Material Omitted]

Rocco C. Falvello, Conrad A. Falvello Hazleton, for appellant.

Albert H. Aston, Dist. Atty., John A. Gallagher, Wilkes-Barre, for appellee.

Before RHODES, P. J., and GUNTHER, WRIGHT WOODSIDE, ERVIN and WATKINS, JJ.

WATKINS, Judge.

The appellant, Ralph Bonomo, was tried and convicted on four indictments. The first, charged that he committed incestuous adultery with Marion Holliday, his niece, on the 30th of December, 1956; the second, that he committed statutory rape on the said Marion Holliday on the same date; the third, that on May 19, 1957, he did tend to corrupt the morals of minors under the age of eighteen years, the minors being Marion Holliday, then age 14, and Donald Meier, then 15 years of age, by having them pose in the nude for a photograph and having them pose for photographs while having intercourse and the fourth, that on January 2, 1957 he did tend to corrupt the morals of minor children under the age of eighteen years, the minor children being the aforesaid Marion Holliday and Donald Meier, by having them engage in the act of intercourse in his presence. The defendant moved for a new trial and in arrest of judgment, the court en banc below denied the motions and the defendant was sentenced to 2 to 5 years on the rape conviction; other sentences were suspended and defendant ordered to pay the costs. These appeals followed.

At the trial, Bernard J. McCole, the prosecutor, a state policeman, and Wilbur Nauman, Chief of Police of White Haven, were permitted to testify in detail as to statements made by Donald Meier, a commonwealth witness who was later called and testified on behalf of the commonwealth. These statements were allegedly made by Meier in the course of the investigation, in a police car outside of White Haven, in the presence of the boy's father but in the absence of the defendant.

The statements were to the effect that the boy, Donald Meier, told the officers he was the boy in the pictures, and Marion Holliday was the girl; that eight pictures were taken, five were of them in the act of intercourse in different poses and three of Marion Holliday in the nude, where, when and by whom the pictures were taken. Donald Meier, when later called as a witness, contradicted these statements in many details.

The testimony, which was clearly hearsay, was permitted allegedly not to establish the truth of the facts contained therein, but merely to show that the statements were made to the officers, and thereby show that the prosecution was brought in good faith, and based upon a thorough investigation. A reading of this record indicates that this was certainly not the result of this testimony. The net result of admitting this testimony was to permit the commonwealth to impeach their own witness, Donald Meier, for whose credibility they vouched by calling him, and who was not a surprise or hostile witness. They were aware of what his testimony would be far in advance of the trial. Also the court created a new exception to the hearsay rule, in that it admitted such testimony to fortify a presumption; for it is presumed that a prosecution is brought in good faith.

The hearsay rule and the reasons therefor, together with the well established exceptions thereto, are hornbook law in this commonwealth, and will not be discussed in detail. The courts, however, in several specific instances have relaxed the rule and allowed exceptions which in every case were supported by the rational justification of a circumstantial probability of trustowrthiness and a necessity for the evidence. There existed here no impelling reason to admit the testimony.

The court below relied upon the following line of cases to support the admission of this testimony: Com. v. Storey, 1912, 49 Pa.Super. 282; Com. v. Ricci, 1939, 332 Pa. 540, 3 A.2d 404; Wagner v. Wagner, 1945, 158 Pa.Super. 93, 43 A.2d 912; Com. v. Douglass, 1958, 185 Pa.Super. 269, 138 A.2d 193. We do not believe these cases are in point, although in none of them has the court relaxed the rule to the extent done here. Com. v. Markwich, 1955, 178 Pa.Super. 169, 113 A.2d 323. Nor in any of these cases does the hearsay testimony admitted into evidence go to the issue of the guilt or innocence of the defendant. Com. v. Bartell, 1957, 184 Pa.Super. 528, at page 541, 136 A.2d 166.

They are based upon the reasoning set forth by Chief Justice Stern in Com. v. Ricci, supra, 332 Pa. at page 545, 3 A.2d at page 406, 'This objection is based upon a not uncommon misapprehension of the hear-say rule. The testimony of a witness as to what some other person said is properly excluded when offered as evidence of the truth of the fact asserted, but the rule does not apply where the testimony is offered merely to prove that the statement was made.' In the Ricci case the hearsay testimony was admitted to show the reason for the vacillation of a witness in making the identification of the defendant. It is the authority that supports the admission of hearsay evidence to explain why a witness failed to identify a defendant at a prior hearing and analogous situations. The extension of this rule beyond strictly limited use as set forth in the above cases is fraught with such inherent danger that should force appellate courts to carefully restrict its use to prevent grave injustice.

It is indeed an anomalous situation that the court permitted the testimony of the prosecuting officers as to the statements of the boy, Donald Meier, and sustained the objections of the appellant counsel as to the statements of Marion Holliday, when offered for the same allegedly limited purpose.

The statements made to the prosecuting officers by a commonwealth witness plainly indicated that the defendant was guilty of the crimes for which he was on trial. The testimony, thus, stands as an unsworn out-of-court declaration and even if, as alleged, solely for the purpose of proving that the statement was made and not as evidence of the commission of the crime, its very source and the official positions of those who related it, must certainly influence the jury in determining the guilt of this defendant. It was obviously prejudicial hearsay testimony; its admission goes far beyond the exceptions; and the defendant was deprived of his right to a fair trial. This assignment of error is sustained.

The court below excluded testimony offered by the appellant of the ill repute of the minor female in her former place of residence. Judge Pinola said: 'She was not living at Hamburg when this thing happened and you've got to show the reputation in the community where she lived at the time this happened. * * * This is an entire different community, it's not where she was living.'

Among the charges for which the defendant was indicted, and tried, was statutory rape under Act of June 24, 1939, P.L. 872, Section 721, 18 P.S. § 4721. This act includes the following: 'Upon the trial of any defendant charged with the unlawful carnal knowledge and abuse of a woman child under the age of sixteen (16) years, if the jury shall find that such woman child was not of good repute, and that the carnal knowledge was with her consent, the defendant shall be acquitted of rape, and be convicted of fornication.' This, then, constitutes the bad reputation of the woman child for chastity and her consent to the intercourse a complete defense to the charge of rape, if shown by the appellant. This opportunity should not be denied the appellant, except in very clear cases.

The good repute of the child will be presumed, and the burden of showing the bad reputation for chastity rests on the defendant. Com. v. Howe, 1908, 35 Pa.Super. 554. The word repute means the reputation of the person for chastity in the community in which she lives, at or about the time of the commission of the offense charged. Com. v. Calvery, 1938, 130 Pa.Super. 575, 198 A. 450; Com. v. San Juan, 1938, 129 Pa.Super. 179, 195 A. 433; Com. v. Howe, supra.

A reading of the authorities regarding evidence of this nature will indicate the above rules are not hard and fast. The definitions of community and time depend largely on the circumstances of each case, and whether to admit such testimony under particular circumstances is largely a matter of discretion of the trial judge. Com. v. White, 1922, 271 Pa. 584, 115 A. 870. This discretion will not be disturbed unless it is abused.

The testimony in this case showed that the woman child lived in Hamburg in 1955, late in that year she moved to the City of Bethlehem and in 1956 moved to the City of Allentown. The offense charged was allegedly committed in December, 1956, when she was living in Allentown. The defendant sought to show the bad reputation for chastity late in 1955 in the Borough for...