Commonwealth v. Boyd

• Decision Date: 26 October 1914
• Docket Number: 268
• Citation: 246 Pa. 529,92 A. 705
• Parties: Commonwealth v. Boyd, Appellant
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

92 A. 705

246 Pa. 529

Commonwealth v. Boyd, Appellant

No. 268

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

October 26, 1914

Argued September 28, 1914

Appeal, No. 268, Jan. T., 1914, by defendant, from judgment of O. & T., Philadelphia Co., October Sessions, 1913, No 642, on verdict of guilty of murder of the first degree, in case of Commonwealth v. James Boyd. Affirmed.

Indictment for murder. Before KINSEY, J.

The opinion of the Supreme Court states the facts.

The jury found a verdict of guilty of murder of the first degree upon which sentence of death was passed. Defendant appealed.

Errors assigned were various assignments referred to in the opinion of the Supreme Court and the fifth assignment which was as follows:

5. That the learned trial judge erred in his charge to the jury wherein he stated . . . as follows:

"The law is that one who so uses upon the body of another, at some vital part, with a manifest intention to use it upon him, of a deadly weapon, such as a pistol, must, in the absence of qualifying facts, know that his action is likely to kill, and, knowing this, must be presumed to intend the death, which is the probable and ordinary consequence of such an act. And he who so uses a deadly weapon, without sufficient cause of provocation, must be presumed to do it wickedly and from a bad heart. Therefore, one who takes the life of another with a deadly weapon, and with a manifest design thus to use it upon him, with sufficient time to deliberate and fully to form the conscious purpose of killing, without any sufficient reason or cause of extenuation, is guilty of murder in the first degree."

Upon a review of the whole case we find no error which would justify a reversal of the judgment. The assignments are overruled; the judgment is affirmed, and the record is remitted of purpose of execution.

Edwin M. Abbott, for appellant.

Wm. Findlay Brown, Assistant District Attorney, with him Samuel P. Rotan, District Attorney, for appellee.

Before FELL, C.J., BROWN, MESTREZAT, POTTER, ELKIN and STEWART, JJ.

OPINION

MR. JUSTICE STEWART:

At the solicitation of the defendant -- a colored man and married -- a young colored woman, Bertha Ann Fisher, with whom the defendant had for some time maintained illegal relations, accompanied him to a drinking saloon in the City of Philadelphia on the afternoon of 26th August, 1913. While the two were there seated at a table, drinks having been ordered and served, the defendant discharged five pistol shots in rapid succession into the person of Bertha Ann Fisher from the effect of which she died almost instantly. The defendant forthwith proceeded to reload his pistol, and having done this walked out of the saloon. He then started to run and was pursued. When about to be seized he fired at the officer in pursuit some two or three times, wounding him seriously. He was subsequently overtaken and captured, and when taken to the station, upon being asked why he had killed the girl, replied that he was crazy in love with her and had been drinking all day. Such in brief was the testimony on part of the Commonwealth, and it was the only testimony offered, the defendant himself declining to take the stand. Upon this state of the evidence any other verdict than the one rendered of murder in the first degree would have been in plain disregard of legal requirements. The offense committed was clearly murder, and just as clearly murder of the highest degree.

The assignments of error when considered in the light of the established facts are too unsubstantial to call for serious discussion. The first two relate to the conduct of the trial. It is complained in the first, that the court refused upon request to require the district attorney to occupy a place upon the floor of the court room where other counsel sat, and permitted him to sit in the space between the bench and the bar, while conducting the trial; and in the second, that the court denied defendant's request that he, the prisoner, be allowed to sit with his counsel at the counsel table during the trial. As to the first, it is only necessary to say that there is nothing in the record which informs us as to the position occupied by the respective counsel in the court room; with the further observation, that accepting the statement in illustration made by counsel upon the argument, we see nothing in the fact that would tend in any way to disturb orderly procedure, or work prejudice to the defendant. Upon the argument appellant's counsel disclaimed, in emphatic way, any purpose to charge by the assignment that the prosecuting officer was guilty of any unfair or improper conduct, whether by taking advantage of his position near the bench, (if any advantage resulting from such circumstances can be conceived), or otherwise. This reduces the assignment to a mere complaint against a custom which admittedly has long obtained in the criminal courts of...