Commonwealth v. Bumbarger

• Decision Date: 16 March 2020
• Docket Number: No. 878 MDA 2019,878 MDA 2019
• Citation: 231 A.3d 10
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Dameon Lydell BUMBARGER, Appellant
• Court: Pennsylvania Superior Court

231 A.3d 10

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania

v.Dameon Lydell BUMBARGER, Appellant

No. 878 MDA 2019

Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

Submitted October 28, 2019

Filed March 16, 2020

Elizabeth M. Ramos, Public Defender, Bellefonte, for appellant.

Joshua M. Bower, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.

BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., STABILE, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.^*

OPINION BY SHOGAN, J.:

Appellant, Dameon Lydell Bumbarger, appeals from the judgment of sentence entered on May 20, 2019, in the Court of Common Pleas of Centre County. We affirm.

This appeal stems from a case involving a motor vehicle stop on April 1, 2018. As a result of that stop, Appellant was arrested and charged with multiple drug and firearm violations. Prior to trial, Appellant filed a motion to suppress evidence. A hearing on the motion was held on August 24, 2018, following which the trial court denied Appellant's motion and made the following findings of fact:

1. Trooper [Shane] Murarik was traveling eastbound on Route 322 while on patrol duties on April 1, 2018 around approximately 9:30 p.m. when he observed a White Chevy Impala driving westbound on 322.

2. Trooper Murarik has previous experience with [Appellant] and [Appellant] was known to drive a White Chevy Impala. Trooper Murarik believed there was an outstanding warrant for [Appellant's] arrest. Trooper Murarik knew [Appellant] was a suspected drug user.

3. Trooper Murarik looked up [Appellant] in his mobile computer system which returned a warrant out of Colorado saying "full extradition."

4. Trooper Murarik turned his vehicle around, and followed the White Chevy Impala onto East Presqueisle Street in Philipsburg Borough. Trooper Murarik ran the vehicle registration, which came back identifying [Appellant] as the owner.

5. Trooper Murarik followed the vehicle and observed a white male with short hair approximately matching [Appellant's] description driving the vehicle. Trooper Murarik then stopped the vehicle, and approached it.

6. Trooper Murarik identified the driver as [Appellant], asked him to step out of the vehicle, and took him into custody. Backup troopers arrived, so Trooper Murarik had Trooper Ramstine put [Appellant] in the back of his vehicle.

7. Trooper Murarik approached the passenger side of the vehicle to speak with the passenger. The passenger identified herself as Roberta Sheaffer (Sheaffer).

8. Trooper Murarik was previously aware of Sheaffer from a prior stop, and was aware she was known to be involved with drugs. Sheaffer appeared zoned out to Trooper Murarik and appeared to be under the influence of drugs.

9. Based on Trooper Murarik's observations and his belief that she was under the influence of drugs, Trooper Murarik asked Sheaffer to step out of the vehicle to question her.

10. While Sheaffer was exiting the vehicle Trooper Murarik observed two syringes partway under the passenger seat of the vehicle. Trooper Murarik has previous experience with this type of syringe and knows they are used to inject drugs.

11. The syringes were not in a case or secured in any manner.

12. Trooper Murarik then conducted a probable cause search of the vehicle and found numerous drugs and a Colt 45 revolver in a box on the rear seat.

13. Trooper Murarik mentioned the Colt 45 revolver to [Appellant] who in turn discussed a 9 millimeter pistol, which Trooper Murarik found under the driver's seat. Both firearms were within reach of the driver's seat where [Appellant] had been sitting prior to the stop.

14. The 9 millimeter pistol was loaded and had an additional loaded magazine with it. There were fifty-one (51) bags of methamphetamines and marijuana in the vehicle.

15. Trooper Murarik spoke with Sheaffer about the firearms. She stated they belonged to [Appellant], and she knew about the firearms because [Appellant] told a third party about the firearms.

16. [Appellant] has previously been convicted of burglary and is not permitted to carry firearms in the Commonwealth.

Trial Court Opinion, 9/28/18, at 1-3.

On May 20, 2019, following a stipulated-fact nonjury trial, the trial court found Appellant guilty of one count each of possession with intent to deliver ("PWID"), 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30), and Persons Not to Possess a Firearm, 18 P.S. § 6105(a)(1). Appellant was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of two to four years in a State Correctional Institution, with credit for 415 days served in the Centre County Correctional Facility. Order, 5/21/19, at 1. Appellant filed an appeal on May 29, 2019. Appellant and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

On appeal, Appellant presents the following issues for our review:

A. Did the Trial Court err in denying Appellant's Motion to Suppress, which argued that there was no basis for the stop of [Appellant] as the only reason given for the stop, an alleged arrest warrant from Colorado, was not a valid extradition warrant and was not to be executed outside Colorado?

B. Did the Trial Court err in denying Appellant's Motion to Suppress, which argued that there was no basis for the stop of [Appellant] as the Trooper who stopped [Appellant] was not able to determine if it was [Appellant] in the vehicle and instead merely assumed he was in the vehicle and merely assumed that the warrant was valid?

C. Did the Trial Court err in denying Appellant's Motion to Suppress, which argued that the continued detention of [Appellant's] passenger was unlawful as it lacked a renewed showing of reasonable suspicion and it was only after the Trooper had the passenger step out of the vehicle that he alleged he had probable cause to then search the vehicle?

D. Did the Trial Court err in denying Appellant's Motion to Suppress, which argued that the two syringes the Trooper claimed he observed when he had the passenger step out of the vehicle did not possess an incriminating character that was immediately apparent, and thus, would not have justified a probable cause search of the vehicle?

E. Did the Trial Court err in denying Appellant's Motion to Suppress, which argued that the items the Trooper alleged he saw and that the Trooper then relied on to justify the search of the vehicle - namely, the two syringes - could not possibly have been immediately apparent from a proper vantage point as required under the plain view exception, and thus, no vehicle search should have ensued?

Appellant's Brief at 7-8.

With respect to an appeal from the denial of a motion to suppress, our Supreme Court has stated the following:

Our standard of review in addressing a challenge to a trial court's denial of a suppression motion is whether the factual findings are supported by the record and whether the legal conclusions drawn from those facts are correct. When reviewing the ruling of a suppression court, we must consider only the evidence of the prosecution and so much of the evidence of the defense as remains uncontradicted when read in the context of the record. ... Where the record supports the findings of the suppression court, we are bound by those facts and may reverse only if the legal conclusions drawn therefrom are in error.

Commonwealth v. Eichinger , 591 Pa. 1, 915 A.2d 1122, 1134 (2007) (citations omitted). "It is within the suppression court's sole province as factfinder to pass on the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony." Commonwealth v. Gallagher , 896 A.2d 583, 585 (Pa. Super. 2006). Moreover, our scope of review from a suppression ruling is limited to the evidentiary record that was created at the suppression hearing. In re L.J. , 622 Pa. 126, 79 A.3d 1073, 1087 (2013).

In his first issue, Appellant argues that because the warrant was not a valid, proper extradition warrant, there was no justification for Trooper Murarik to stop Appellant. Appellant's Brief at 21. Appellant states that the warrant "was never intended to be an out-of-state warrant requiring extradition, but instead, was only to be an active arrest warrant to be executed within the State of Colorado." Id. at 23-24. Thus, Appellant maintains that because the extradition warrant was the sole basis for the stop, and it was invalid, Trooper Murarik lacked authority to stop Appellant. Id. at 22-24.

The evidence presented at the suppression hearing established that on the date in question Trooper Murarik observed a white Chevy drive past him. N.T., Suppression Hearing, 8/24/18, at 5. Trooper Murarik testified that he and other officers were on the lookout for a white Chevy Impala "due to us becoming aware of [Appellant] driving it and him having active arrest warrants."¹ Id. Upon observing Appellant, Trooper Murarik turned his car around in order to follow Appellant. Id. While Trooper Murarik was following behind Appellant's vehicle, he ran Appellant's registration number through National Crime Information Center ("N.C.I.C."). Id. N.C.I.C. indicated that the plate was registered under Appellant's name and to a white Chevy Impala. Id. at 5-6. N.C.I.C. also indicated that there was an active arrest warrant for Appellant, indicating that it was a Colorado warrant "with full extradition." Id. at 9, 24.

Trooper Murarik testified that upon approaching the white Chevy Impala, he was able to discern that a male with short hair was driving the vehicle. N.T., 8/24/18, at 7. Trooper Murarik stopped the white Chevy Impala, and upon approaching the vehicle, confirmed that Appellant was the driver. Id. at 12.

Thus, there was no dispute that on April 1, 2018, N.C.I.C. alerted Trooper Murarik to an outstanding, active arrest warrant for Appellant. Because of his prior involvement with Appellant, Trooper Murarik was familiar with Appellant and his vehicle. The driver of the vehicle resembled Appellant. The registration reflected that the white Chevy Impala was registered to Appellant. Thus, Trooper Murarik had probable cause to stop Appellant's vehicle and arrest Appellant. As this Court has explained:

We have previously held that the information contained in a[n] N.C.I.C. report is so inherently reliable that such

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