Commonwealth v. Calhoun
| Decision Date | 06 January 1913 |
| Docket Number | 328 |
| Citation | 238 Pa. 474,86 A. 472 |
| Parties | Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Calhoun, Appellant |
| Court | Pennsylvania Supreme Court |
Argued October 28, 1912
Appeal, No. 328, Jan. T., 1912, from judgment of Court of Oyer and Terminer of Huntingdon County, May Sess., 1912, No 1, on verdict of guilty of murder in the first degree in case of Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Frank M. Calhoun. Affirmed.
Indictment for murder. Before WOODS, P.J.
The circumstances of the killing are stated in the opinion of the Supreme Court.
During the examination of jurors on their voir dire the following questions were asked:
Q. (Mr Henderson.) Mr. Brown, murder is defined to be as follows: "Murder is where a person of sound memory and discretion unlawfully killeth another human creature in being against the King's Peace with malice aforethought, either express or implied." What do you understand by the words "A person of sound memory and discretion."
Mr. Williamson: This question is objected to as improper.
The Court: I don't think it is a proper question. The court will explain this. Bill sealed for the defendant. [1]
Q. (Mr. Bailey.) Mr. Zeigler, if the testimony by its weight will satisfy you that at the time this homicide was committed that the accused was laboring under a mental disease of insanity, either partially or general, creating in his mind an irresistible impulse or desire to take life, and while under the controlling force or power of that impulse he did take life, would you deem him legally responsible for his act?
Question objected to by Mr. Williamson.
The Court: Objection sustained, question overruled, and seal a bill for the defendant. [2]
Errors assigned were (1 and 2) rulings in the examination of jurors; (4-7, 9, 10) portions of charge; (11-15) answers to points.
The assignments are all overruled, the judgment is affirmed and the record is remitted for the purpose of execution.
Thomas F. Bailey and Howard L. Henderson, for appellant. -- The questions to the jurors on their voir dire should have been allowed: Hall v. Com., 22 W.N.C. 25; Com. v. Curcio, 218 Pa. 327.
The evidence of the experts on the question of insanity was improperly admitted when they had not a full knowledge of the facts: Yardlely v. Cuthbertson, 108 Pa. 395; Coyle v. Com., 104 Pa. 117; McDyer v. Eastern Penna. Railways Co., 227 Pa. 641.
The instruction of the court on the question of insanity was erroneous: Ford v. State, 35 L.R.A. 117 (73 Miss. 734); Shaver v. McCarthy, 110 Pa. 339; Com. v. Molten, 230 Pa. 399; Com. v. Gerade, 145 Pa. 289; Com. v. Greene, 227 Pa. 86; Com. v. Deitrick, 221 Pa. 7; Com. v. Sayars, 21 Pa.Super. 75; Com. v. Frucci, 216 Pa. 84.
The instruction with regard to his defense was erroneous: Com. v. Lee, 226 Pa. 283; Com. v. Molten 230 Pa. 399.
Charles C. Brewster, District Attorney, and Richard W. Williamson, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee. -- The exclusion of the questions asked the jurors on their voir dire was proper: Hall v. Com., 22 W.N.C. 25.
The rulings and instructions of the court on the question of insanity were correct: Com. v. Barner, 199 Pa. 335; Com. v. Wireback, 190 Pa. 138; Rouch v. Zehring, 59 Pa. 74; Rambler v. Tryon, 7 S. & R. 90; Bricker v. Lightner, 40 Pa. 199; Com. v. Mosler, 4 Pa. 264; Com. v. Lewis, 222 Pa. 302; Com. v. Hallowell, 223 Pa. 494; Com. v. Woodley, 166 Pa. 463; Sayres v. Com., 88 Pa. 291.
Before BROWN, MESTREZAT, POTTER, ELKIN and MOSCHZISKER, JJ.
The defendant, Frank M. Calhoun, a man about fifty years old, shot and killed Benjamin Galloup on the night of December 16, 1911. Calhoun had been a boarder in the home of the deceased, who had ordered him out of the house a short time before the homicide. Several days prior to the shooting the defendant borrowed a gun from a member of the Galloup family, and on the afternoon of December 16th he returned to the residence of the deceased and deposited the gun on the porch; that evening a rap came at the door, and as soon as Galloup opened it he was shot in the head by the defendant, who stood on the outside with this weapon in his hand; Calhoun was arrested; at first he refused to make any admissions, but soon made what the Commonwealth proved to be a voluntary confession, in which he said that he committed the deed because Galloup had treated his wife (Mrs. Galloup) badly and had threatened his, the defendant's life. The theory of the Commonwealth was that a breach had occurred between the murdered man and his slayer, caused by the discovery of the latter's improper relations with the former's wife; and there is positive testimony in the case that late in September or early in October, 1911, the defendant accompanied Mrs. Galloup to a neighboring town, where they stayed over night occupying a room together as man and wife.
The prisoner took the stand in his own behalf and told a long detailed story of his life from boyhood down to the time of the killing, but when he came to that important event he stated, He was then asked the question, "What is your first recollection now after picking up the gun?" and he replied, The defendant later said that his first realization that he had killed Galloup came when told by the mayor of Huntingdon that seven or eight people had seen him do the deed; the witness was then asked what he had in his mind when he entered the yard just prior to the killing, and said, "I don't know just what I had in mind when I entered the yard . . . ." On cross-examination he said that he went in the back way and picked up the gun, and then the question was put to him, "There your mind ends?" and he replied, The defense, as we understand it from the contentions of counsel, was insanity in the form of delusions of oppression and threats against the defendant's life which produced homicidal mania; but Colhoun when upon the stand testified that the so-called threats all antedated December 16th, 1911, and he did not say that at the time of the homicide he had any immediate hallucinations or that he was forced by an irresistible impulse to kill Galloup; as just shown, his testimony was that he did not realize the nature of the act he was committing, -- that he actually did not know that he was doing the deed at the time of the shooting. The evidence depended upon to show insanity was that of the prisoner himself and the written depositions of five persons in the west who had known him before he came to Huntingdon in August, 1911, together with the testimony of two doctors called as experts. The lay witnesses testified that the defendant was peculiar and melancholy by nature and from time to time imagined that others wanted to harm or to kill him; but that he was normally a mild-mannered man who did not attempt harm, and when he suspected that anyone was going to injure him he habitually moved to another neighborhood. One of the witnesses, a relative who had known the defendant for about fifteen years, said, Another relative who had known the defendant all his life stated, "At times he was apparently perfectly sane." None of the witnesses from the west had any personal knowledge through contact with Calhoun for about eighteen months before the date of the murder, and no one was called to prove insanity who had associated with him after he came east. There was no testimony that the alleged delusion that others wanted to kill the defendant had in the past ever impelled him to attempt to punish, much less to kill, his supposed enemies; and when his chief medical expert was asked, "Is this disease of such a nature and are the delusions of such a character as might readily produce a homicidal mania?" he replied, "Many cases of paranoia have homicidal tendencies." This reply is the nearest and practically the only testimony we find in the case concerning homicidal tendencies in any direct connection with the defendant. When this witness was asked specifically whether the alleged disease from which he said the defendant suffered would be diagnosed as "partial insanity" or "total insanity," he did not give a responsive answer. In point of fact, the evidence would not justify a finding that the defendant had in the past suffered from total insanity (sometimes described as general, habitual or fixed insanity) or from partial insanity accompanied by a homicidal tendency. In rebuttal, the Commonwealth produced a number of persons who had worked or associated with the defendant since his arrival in Huntingdon, and who testified that they believed him to be sane; medical testimony to the same effect was also produced.
The first two assignments of error concern the examination of proposed jurors on their voir dire. Counsel for the defendant stated the common law definition of murder to one of the jurors, and then asked, "What do you understand by the words, a person of sound memory and discretion?" another was asked, if the testimony satisfied him that the accused was insane at the time of the crime and had committed the deed while under the control of an irresistible impulse to take life, "Would you deem him legally responsible for his deed?" The trial judge was clearly right in refusing to allow either of these questions. Counsel may not examine a proposed juror upon his understanding of the law, and that is what these interrogations amounted to. One called to the book as a juror may be asked the broad question, whether,...
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