Commonwealth v. Campbell

• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: Lowrie
• Citation: Commonwealth v. Campbell, 33 Pa. 380 (Pa. 1859)
• Decision Date: 01 January 1859
• Parties: Commonwealth versus Campbell.

Page 380

33 Pa. 380

Commonwealth versus Campbell.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

ERROR to the Common Pleas of Perry county.

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Knox, Attorney-General, for the Commonwealth.—This tax is sought to be imposed upon the defendant under the 11th section of the Act of April 22d 1846. There are two descriptions of persons subjected to the tax in the above section. First, dealers in certain goods, wares, and merchandise. Secondly, persons concerned or interested in the manufacture of such goods, who keep a store or warehouse for the purpose of vending or disposing of them.

Without here inquiring whether or how far these two descriptions embrace the same persons, is the defendant included in either of them? It is thought that he is a dealer. His being chiefly a manufacturer does not prevent him from being also a dealer. If a man confines himself to "making to order," and habitually only selling thus, he would be solely a manufacturer; but when he habitually vends his manufactures, either by peddling them around the country, or from a permanent place of sale, he becomes to that extent also a dealer in his own manufactures, follows an occupation other than that of a manufacturer, encroaches upon the business of those who are solely dealers, interferes with their sales, and should, and was intended by the legislature, to be subject to the same tax. The method by which a man comes by his goods constitutes no essential part of the definition of a dealer. He may, besides buying, either make, find, procure by gift, or steal them, if he likes; but if, after getting possession, he habitually disposes of them as dealers usually do, he is a dealer.

But, granting that he is not a dealer, he comes in spirit and meaning, if not in letter, under the second description of persons taxed. He is concerned and interested in the manufacture of leather, and vends and disposes of the same. Thus far is not disputed. But does he keep a store or warehouse for the sale of it? The defendant sells it at his yard, sends it to, and sells it at Philadelphia, &c., and consigns it to commission merchants at Philadelphia, who sell it for him. Is not the yard, or bark-house, or shop in which he has it, when he sells it at home, his store or warehouse for the time? Is not the car or warehouse, from which he sells it at Philadelphia, or the store of the merchant, to whom he consigns it at Philadelphia, and from which he sells it, to be considered his store or warehouse?

If the defendant is included in either of the above descriptions of persons, he is to be taxed. The ground will not be taken that he is a mechanic who confines his sales of his own manufactures to his shop or manufactory, and therefore comes within the proviso of the act; for, granting that he is a mechanic, which is by no means clear, the case stated concedes that he sells elsewhere, viz., at Philadelphia and Baltimore.

The case of Berks County v. Bertolet, 1 Harris 522, rules this case. There the man sought to be taxed was a manufacturer of flour — here he is a manufacturer of leather. There he sold at his mill, and sent to, and sold at Reading. Here he sells at his yard, and sends to, and sells at Philadelphia, &c. The only difference is, that here he also sends to commission merchants in Philadelphia who sell for him.

The court below says that Norris Brothers v. The Commonwealth, 3 Casey 495, impairs, if not overrules, Berks County v. Bertolet. But in Norris Brothers v. The Commonwealth, the plaintiffs in error were clearly within the proviso of the act, being strictly mechanics in every sense of the word, making their engines only to order, and confining the sale of them exclusively to their own shop or manufactory; and the learned judge, who writes the opinion of the Supreme Court in Norris Brothers v. The Commonwealth, thinks and says that it does not.

Junkin, for the defendant in error.—The following propositions are self-evident: 1. That a tanner, or manufacturer of leather, is not a dealer. 2. That the defendant is a manufacturer. He buys hides, and by a skillful application of bark, &c., he produces an article of leather. Then the defendant, if liable, must be so under the clause — "persons concerned or interested in the manufacture of such goods: who keep a store, or warehouse, for the purpose of vending or disposing of them." This expression is significant. Just such words are used to express the interest of a partner, or owner of stock in a joint company. These words are never used, when speaking of a sole owner.

The object was, to reach the case of a person, who might have an interest, to the extent of but $10, in a factory, and who would escape the tax under that plea. But did the legislature mean that where a man was...