Commonwealth v. Chambers, 29 EAP 2017

• Decision Date: 18 July 2018
• Docket Number: No. 29 EAP 2017,29 EAP 2017
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee v. Richard A. CHAMBERS, Appellant
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

188 A.3d 400

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee

v.Richard A. CHAMBERS, Appellant

No. 29 EAP 2017

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued: March 6, 2018

Decided: July 18, 2018

Karl Baker, Esq., Robin S. Forrest, Esq., Owen W. Larrabee, Esq., Philadelphia, Leonard Sosnov, Esq., Defender Association of Philadelphia, for Appellant.

Lawrence Jonathan Goode, Esq., Kelly Brittney Wear, Esq., Philadelphia District Attorney's Office, for Appellee.

SAYLOR, C.J., BAER, TODD, DONOHUE, DOUGHERTY, WECHT, MUNDY, JJ.

OPINION

JUSTICE WECHT

In this appeal, we consider whether the trial evidence sufficed to support a conspiracy conviction, as well as derivative convictions for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon and possessing instruments of crime. The case involves a street fight into which additional persons entered. We hold that, under the particular circumstances of this case, the Commonwealth did not meet its evidentiary burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

On May 15, 2014, Calvin Wilson drove his girlfriend, Carol Mitchell, and her two grandchildren to his apartment complex on North 15th Street in Philadelphia. As Wilson approached the driveway to the complex, he noticed Richard Chambers standing next to a white Jeep. Wilson recognized Chambers as a resident of one of the buildings within the apartment complex. Chambers was leaning into the driver's side window, having a conversation with the occupants of the Jeep. The driveway is a narrow strip of pavement that is wide enough for only one vehicle to pass at a time. The Jeep was partially blocking the driveway, preventing Wilson from passing freely into the complex.

Wilson honked his vehicle's horn at Chambers and the occupants of the Jeep. He then rolled down his window and yelled to Chambers, "Why are you blocking the driveway? Can you move from the driveway?" Notes of Testimony ("N.T."), 3/23/2015, at 13. After receiving no response, Wilson "hollered out" to the occupants of the Jeep, "Can you back up so I can get up into the driveway?" Id. Chambers remained silent, but gave Wilson a "nasty look." Id.

Unsuccessful in his efforts, Wilson drove up on the curb and squeezed his vehicle past the Jeep without making contact with it. However, as he passed Chambers, "words were exchanged." Id. at 14. Wilson parked his car and approached Chambers, continuing to press Chambers as to why he and the Jeep were impeding access to the driveway. The two men walked toward each other as their verbal spat escalated. As Wilson got closer to the Jeep, he noticed at least two women inside. Finally, Wilson and Chambers met, and "fists were flying." Id. at 18. According to Wilson, Chambers threw the first punch and Wilson retaliated in kind to defend himself. Id. at 34.

Early in the fight, one of Chambers' blows struck Wilson in the face. Once the altercation became physical, Carol Mitchell attempted to intervene in an effort to stop the fight. However, as she did, "everybody jumped in." Id. at 48. Mitchell observed that "[t]hey came from that [Jeep]. It was one male in that car and it was a bunch of thick women." Id. at 49. Someone then approached Wilson from behind, tore the eyeglasses from his face, and began scraping and scratching Wilson's cheek and forehead. Wilson continued to throw aimless punches in an attempt to defend himself from the now multi-assailant attack, but to little (or no) avail. He then was taken to the ground. Chambers climbed on Wilson's back, pinned Wilson down, and began striking Wilson repeatedly in the ribs and midsection. While Wilson was underneath Chambers, a woman wearing floral-patterned shoes sprayed mace in Wilson's face. Mitchell could not identify the woman spraying the mace, but she observed that the person was macing Wilson continuously as he struggled with Chambers. Other than the mace, Mitchell did not see any other weapons wielded during the fight.

Philadelphia Police Officer Henry Schoch arrived on the scene of the fight in response to a "911 complaint for a person with a weapon," whereupon he encountered a "pile of people." Id. at 58. The officer exited his marked police cruiser and approached the ongoing scrum. As he got closer, the officer observed Chambers kneeling on Wilson's chest, punching a flailing Wilson in the face. Officer Schoch did not observe any of the other people hitting or striking Wilson. In fact, when he arrived, the females in the group were yelling at Chambers to get off of Wilson. Officer Schoch immediately grabbed Chambers and pulled him off of Wilson. Wilson started to walk away in the direction of his vehicle. Officer Schoch went after Wilson, grabbed him, and placed him in handcuffs. The officer then returned to Chambers, who was "enraged," repeatedly shouting that he "was going to kill" Wilson. Id. at 59. Officer Schoch then handcuffed and detained Chambers.

Wilson emerged from the fight with a gash across his face. Wilson told Officer Schoch that the gash had been inflicted by a knife. Someone described the weapon to Officer Schoch as a silver knife. Officer Schoch did not find any knife at the scene. Jeffrey Jones, a defense witness at trial, testified that he was in his apartment when the fight broke out. From his window, he saw Wilson, whom Jones described as "a huge gentleman," N.T. at 76, aggressively approach Chambers. According to Jones, Chambers grabbed Wilson by the legs and took him to the ground. Jones exited his residence and, as he ran toward the fight, heard Chambers screaming repeatedly that Wilson had a knife. Jones testified that Chambers yelled at him to find the knife. Jones searched the area, but found nothing resembling a knife.

Back-up police units arrived shortly thereafter. Officer Schoch placed Wilson in the back of a police wagon and splashed water on Wilson's face in an attempt to flush the pepper spray from his eyes.¹ Still handcuffed, Wilson was placed in an ambulance and driven to a local hospital. At the hospital, Wilson was diagnosed with three broken ribs

, a burned retina, a concussion, and a laceration above his eye that required sutures. As a result of the pepper spray, Wilson suffered sustained "drooling" from his eye. N.T. at 24.

Based upon his observations and his investigation, Officer Schoch opted not to charge Wilson with any crime, and instead charged Chambers with aggravated assault, 18 Pa.C.S. § 2702(a), criminal conspiracy, 18 Pa.C.S. § 903, possessing instruments of crime, 18 Pa.C.S. § 907(a), terroristic threats, 18 Pa.C.S. § 2706(a)(1), simple assault, 18 Pa.C.S. § 2701(a), and recklessly endangering another person, 18 Pa.C.S. § 2705. Chambers waived his right to a jury trial, and proceeded to a bench trial on March 23, 2015, before the Honorable Sierra Thomas Street. Following presentation of the evidence, Chambers' counsel argued in closing that Chambers' actions constituted, at most, misdemeanor simple assault. See 18 Pa.C.S. § 2701(b)(1) ("fight or scuffle entered into by mutual consent"). Judge Street rejected this argument, and informed Chambers' counsel that the trial court viewed the criminal liability determination as amounting to a decision between aggravated assault—serious bodily injury, a first-degree felony, 18 Pa.C.S. § 2702(a)(1), (b), and aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, a second-degree felony, 18 Pa.C.S. § 2702(a)(4), (b). In response to this judicial direction, Chambers' counsel argued that Wilson suffered no serious injury, and that Wilson sustained only bodily injury (which is all that is necessary for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon), because Wilson spent only a brief time in the hospital and suffered no permanent or long-lasting harm. The Commonwealth argued that, at a minimum, Chambers attempted to cause seriously bodily injury, which suffices to prove aggravated assault as a first-degree felony.

For purposes of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, the trial court determined that the mace—not the alleged knife—deployed by one of Chambers' female companions constituted a deadly weapon. This conclusion was essential to the theories upon which the trial court's verdicts could rest. For purposes of aggravated assault—serious bodily injury, the trial court could only have convicted Chambers as a principal actor. However, because it was one of the women, and not Chambers, who wielded the deadly weapon (the mace), the trial court could not convict Chambers as a principal actor on the offenses of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon and possessing instruments of crime. For these convictions, the court had to be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt either: (a) that Chambers was an accomplice; or (b) that Chambers was a conspirator with the mace-deploying woman, and thus was guilty based upon the theory of conspiratorial liability, which permits vicarious criminal liability for the substantive offenses committed by other members of the conspiracy that are undertaken in furtherance of the conspiracy.² The Commonwealth did not seek a verdict based upon either of these theories. The Commonwealth did not charge Chambers as an accomplice. See Criminal Information, 6/9/2014, at 1. Instead, the Commonwealth argued that Chambers should be convicted as a principal actor who either inflicted serious bodily injury or attempted to cause serious bodily injury by his own actions.

The trial court found Chambers guilty of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, conspiracy, possessing instruments of crime, terroristic threats, simple assault, and recklessly endangering another person.

As the trial court later explained in its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion, for both aggravated assault with a deadly weapon and possessing an instrument of crime, because Chambers never used or possessed the mace, his convictions were premised upon a theory of conspiratorial liability. That is, the trial court found that Chambers was criminally liable for the acts of his co-conspirators, which acts were undertaken in furtherance of the criminal objective. The trial court did not...