Commonwealth v. Chruscial

• Decision Date: 20 March 1972
• Citation: 447 Pa. 17,288 A.2d 521
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee, v. Edward CHRUSCIAL, Appellant.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

288 A.2d 521

447 Pa. 17

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee, v. Edward CHRUSCIAL, Appellant.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

March 20, 1972.

John J. Dean, Sallie Ann Radick, Pittsburgh, for appellant.

Robert W. Duggan, Dist. Atty., Carol Mary Los, Asst. Dist. Atty Pittsburgh, for appellee.

Before JONES, EAGEN, O'BRIEN, ROBERTS and POMEROY, JJ.

OPINION

EAGEN Justice.

On March 4 1968, the appellant, Edward Chruscial, with the assistance of counsel, entered a general plea of guilty to murder in Allegheny County. Following an evidentiary hearing, he was adjudged guilty by the court of murder in the second degree and was sentenced to imprisonment for a term of 10 to 20 years. This direct appeal ^[1] challenges the validity of the guilty plea. It is claimed the plea should have been rejected by the court, because it was accompanied by testimony on the part of Chruscial during the hearing to determine the degree of guilt which constituted a complete defense to the charge.

The pertinent law is clear. If a criminal defendant enters a plea of guilty and then asserts facts which, if true, would establish he is not guilty, such a plea is of no effect and should be rejected, since it is not entered knowingly and intelligently. Commonwealth v. Roundtrees, 440 Pa 199, 269 A.2d 709 (1970). Our inquiry then is directed to the record and an examination of Chruscial's testimony to determine if his testimony manifested he was not guilty of the charge to which he admitted guilt.

The prosecution stemmed from the fatal shooting of a Mrs. Zenuh with whom Chruscial had lived on-and-off for a period of two years.

Before accepting the guilty plea, the court questioned Chruscial to make certain he understood the nature of the charge, and that the plea was voluntarily entered and with a knowledge of its impact. No questions were asked concerning the details of the shooting. After the Commonwealth introduced its testimony as to the circumstances of the fatal event, ^[2] Chruscial testified on his own behalf. The significant portions of his testimony are as follows.

On the day involved, Chruscial consumed a quantity of intoxicants; during the afternoon he borrowed a shotgun and some shells from his brother because he intended to hunt groundhogs the next day; that evening he went to Mrs. Zenuh's residence to seek reconciliation and he took the gun along to scare her; as he approached the front entrance of Mrs. Zenuh's residence, she came out and proceeded up the street without speaking to him; when she entered a neighbor's house he followed; inside this house he set the gun down and tried to talk to her but she only sneered at him; he then picked up the gun 'to keep her from getting around the table so she wouldn't run,' but 'she started to run around the table . . . until she could run out of the house'; Mrs. Zenuh then said 'get the gun out of here and it went off.' Chruscial specifically stated he did not 'want' to kill Mrs. Zenuh, but merely 'to frighten her' and was not 'conscious' of pulling the trigger. He also said he did not 'shoot' the gun but it 'went off' when it was 'hit' by Mrs. Zenuh. The crucial question is, did Chruscial's testimony establish an accidental killing which would be a complete defense to the killing. We conclude not.

In Commonwealth v. Flax, 331 Pa. 145, 156--157, 200 A 632, 637--638 (1938), we pertinently said:

'Homicide by misadventure (which is...