Commonwealth v. Cockfield
| Citation | 431 Pa. 639,246 A.2d 381 |
| Parties | COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Charles COCKFIELD, Appellant. |
| Decision Date | 03 October 1968 |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Pennsylvania |
Cecil B. Moore, Philadelphia, for appellant.
Arlen Specter, Dist. Atty., Michael J. Rotko, Gordon Gelfond Benjamin J. Levintow, Paul R. Michel, Asst. Dist. Attys Richard A. Sprague, First Asst. Dist. Atty., Philadelphia for appellee.
Before BELL, C.J., and MUSMANNO, JONES, COHEN, EAGEN, O'BRIEN and ROBERTS, JJ.
On April 7, 1960, Ida Quattlebaum and her two young children lost their lives from carbon monoxide poisoning and severe burns suffered in a fire which substantially damaged their dwelling house in the City of Philadelphia. Charles Cockfield was arrested for deliberately setting the fire. On March 31, 1964, after a jury trial, he was convicted of arson and three separate counts of murder. On the murder convictions, the jury fixed the penalty at life imprisonment. Post trial motions were dismissed and sentences imposed on the murder convictions as the jury directed. An appeal from these judgments is now before us.
We conclude that Cockfield was denied due process of law, because evidence admitted, over objection, at trial was obtained by unlawful searches and seizure and should have been excluded. [1] Consequently, we reverse and order a new trial.
The existence of the fire was discovered at about 2:30 a.m. by two police officers cruising in a police car in the neighborhood. Firemen were summoned and arrived shortly, but the intensity of the fire prevented immediate entry into the house. When entry was gained, the bodies of the three dead victims were found. There was a strong odor of gasoline or kerosene on the premises.
Two police detectives and a police lieutenant arrived on the scene at about 3:40 a.m. They were advised by fire department officials that the fire was probably of incendiary origin. They also learned through questioning a neighbor that Mrs. Quattlebaum had been 'keeping company' with a tall slim negro called 'Bill,' later ascertained to be Cockfield. Lately the relationship had become strained and, on an occasion about a month before the fire, 'Bill' had assaulted Mrs. Quattlebaum, threatening to cut her throat with a knife. They also were informed that 'Bill' owned or operated 'a 1953 or 1954 Dodge or Plymouth car that was supposedly bluish at the top and dirty white or gray at the bottom.'
Shortly after 5 a.m., these police detectives, joined by another police officer named Merriweather and a lieutenant of the fire department attached to the Fire Marshal's office, proceeded to the neighborhood where 'Bill' was thought to reside. A resident of the neighborhood directed them to a specific address where 'Bill' lived. After ringing the doorbell and knocking on the door without receiving a response, the officers decided to walk through the area to see if they could find an automobile matching the description given them. About three-fourths of a block away, they came upon an unoccupied automobile parked in the street which the officers thought 'possibly was the car we were hunting for.' The hood was quite warm, indicating that the motor had recently been operated. The license number was taken and Officer Merriweather was dispatched to police headquarters to ascertain the identity of the registered owner. Within minutes, Merriweather returned to the scene without the registration information, but with a sister of Mrs. Quattlebaum who identified the automobile as 'Bill's.' The unlocked trunk was then opened. A two gallon empty can marked 'gulf' and a roll of charred toilet paper were observed therein. The interior of the trunk also smelled strongly of gasoline.
The officers kept the automobile and 'Bill's' residence under surveillance until about 8 a.m. When 'Bill' failed to appear, the automobile was taken to a nearby police station where it was parked and disabled by removing the distributor and disconnecting certain electrical wiring.
Later that day, Cockfield discovered his automobile in front of the police station. Upon inquiring, Cockfield was informed by an officer on duty that he did not understand why the car was in the possession of the police, and that it was all right to take it. Cockfield then purchased and installed the necessary parts and drove the car away.
On April 8, 1960, at about 1 a.m., Cockfield was taken into custody by the police and questioned concerning the fire. On the early morning of April 9th, he signed an incriminating statement. Shortly thereafter, his automobile was again sought out, taken into custody by the police and removed to police headquarters. At 10 a.m., Cockfield was arraigned before a committing magistrate on the criminal charges involved. At 11--30 a.m., the unlocked trunk of the automobile again was opened and the gasoline can and charred toilet paper were seized. This search and seizure and the original search of the automobile on April 7th were conducted without a search warrant. The seized evidence was used at trial by the Commonwealth.
Whenever practicable, the police must obtain advance judicial approval of searches and seizures through warrant procedure, and the failure to comply with the warrant procedure 'can only be excused by exigent circumstances.' Terry v. State of Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1879, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968).
One permissible exception from the warrant procedure exists for searches which are incident to a lawful arrest. A search incident to a lawful arrest and without a warrant is justified in part by the need to prevent the disappearance or destruction of evidence. Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 84 S.Ct. 881, 11 L.Ed.2d 777 (1964). Thus, such a search may extend to things under the accused's immediate control, such as an automobile, Carroll v United States, 267 U.S. 132, 45 S.Ct. 280, 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925), but only if the search is substantially contemporaneous with the arrest, Preston v. United States, supra; James v. State of Louisiana, 382 U.S. 36, 86 S.Ct. 151, 15 L.Ed.2d 30 (196...
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