Commonwealth v. Corsino

• Citation: 261 Pa. 593,104 A. 739
• Decision Date: 11 June 1918
• Docket Number: 94
• Parties: Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Corsino, Appellant
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

104 A. 739

261 Pa. 593

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Corsino, Appellant

No. 94

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

June 11, 1918

Argued May 6, 1918

Appeal, No. 94, Jan. T., 1918, by defendant, from sentence of O. & T. Luzerne Co., April Sess., 1917, No. 79, on verdict of guilty of murder of the first degree in case of Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Angelo Corsino. Reversed.

Indictment for murder. Before STRAUSS, J.

The opinion of the Supreme Court states the case.

Verdict of guilty of murder of the first degree, on which sentence of death was passed. Defendant appealed.

Errors assigned were the charge of the court, certain rulings on evidence, and refusal of defendant's motion for new trial.

W Alfred Valentine, with him Frank L. Pinola and William H Gillespie, for appellant.

Frank P. Slattery, District Attorney, with him John H. Dando and A. L. Turner, Assistant District Attorneys, for appellee.

Before BROWN, C.J., STEWART, MOSCHZISKER, FRAZER and WALLING, JJ.

OPINION

MR. JUSTICE WALLING:

The defendant, Angelo Corsino, was convicted of murder of the first degree for the killing of Augustino Shendra. The firing of the fatal shot was admitted and defendant interposed self-defense. Evidence was offered tending to establish his good reputation as a peaceable man, and it is urged that the trial judge erred in his charge upon that question. He told the jury in brief that such evidence was not offered on the theory that a man of good reputation would not commit a crime, for frequently such a man has become involved in crimes that belied his reputation. He then explained the difference between character and reputation and said: "Evidence of reputation for good character is substantive evidence, and is to be considered with the other evidence in the case. Sometimes it is the only evidence available to a defendant, and therefore it has been said, in some instances it may of itself create a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt. Such evidence is applicable as well to the degree of the crime as to the general question of guilt under the entire indictment. It may, therefore, where the proof of guilt has been established, lead the jury to doubt whether a first degree crime was committed, and thus bring the jury to a verdict of second degree, or even manslaughter, and where it continues in the mind as to guilt in any degree, or of any crime, it should lead to general acquittal." He also affirmed without qualification defendant's twelfth and thirteenth points, where the law on this branch of the case is stated fully and as favorable to defendant as can be found in any of the authorities. Defendant had the full benefit of his character defense, and there is no error in the general charge as to that; hence, the rule that misstatement of the law in the charge cannot be cured by answers to points, does not apply. But on the question of adequacy, the points and answers are a part of the charge, and it is not necessary to repeat elsewhere principles fully stated in requests that are granted.

We find no substantial merit in the criticism of the charge as to self-defense. True, the judge did say it should be established by satisfactory proof, but thereafter clearly showed that he did not thereby mean evidence beyond a reasonable doubt; for he affirmed defendant's point that "The burden of proving self-defense is not placed heavily upon one accused of taking life. Sacred as is human life, the defendant is not bound to show beyond all doubt that he was compelled to take it, but is humanely permitted to satisfy the jury by a fair preponderance of the testimony that he killed under circumstances justifying his belief that his own life would not otherwise have been saved"; and then said, "And that brings to my mind that I failed to refer, in my general charge, to the measure of proof which is required of the defendant who sets up the defense of self-defense," and fully explained the correct rule and told the jury that such defense need not be established beyond a reasonable doubt but by what is called in law the fair preponderance or weight of the evidence. He also instructed the jury that if on the whole case they had a reasonable doubt as to defendant's guilt they should acquit him. While the term "satisfactory proof" was not happily chosen, we are sure that, taking all the judge said, the jury could not have understood him to...