Commonwealth v. Cramer
| Decision Date | 06 September 2018 |
| Docket Number | No. 436 MDA 2017,436 MDA 2017 |
| Citation | 195 A.3d 594 |
| Parties | COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Ronald Paul CRAMER III, Appellant |
| Court | Pennsylvania Superior Court |
Sean P. Audley, Pittsburgh, for appellant.
Michael M. Osterberg, Assistant District Attorney, Bellefonte, for Commonwealth, appellee.
Appellant, Ronald Paul Cramer III, appeals from the Judgment of Sentence of three to six years' incarceration followed by two years' probation entered by the Centre County Court of Common Pleas following his convictions for Sexual Assault and Indecent Assault.1 After careful review, we affirm.
The relevant facts, as gleaned from the certified record and the trial court's Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) Opinion, are as follows. The Victim met Appellant at a bar. The Victim and her roommate, Tiffany Rivera, went to Appellant's studio apartment. After arriving at the apartment, the Victim went to the bathroom. Appellant followed her into the bathroom. She was washing her hands and Appellant undid his pants. He started penetrating her from behind. The Victim told Appellant "he didn't want to do that." N.T. Trial, 11/8/16, at 96. Appellant did not stop until the Victim "turned around and told him that she didn't want to do this again and that I wasn't on the pill." Id. at 96-97. Appellant then started kissing her again. Appellant wanted to have oral sex and the Victim "went along with it ...." Id. at 144. She stopped giving him oral sex and told him Id. at 147. She then left the bathroom. Tiffany Rivera testified that she heard the Victim say "no stop, you don't want to do this." Id. at 184.
When they left the apartment, a man she met in the hallway, Erik Frasca, asked her if she was alright. Id. at 149-50, 232-33. He had noticed one of them "appeared rattled." Id. at 233. The Victim and Tiffany went into his apartment and when Tiffany went to the bathroom, the Victim told Frasca and his girlfriend about the incident. Id. The Victim then started crying. Id. They stayed in the apartment long enough for Tiffany to use the restroom. Id. When they got on the bus, she told Tiffany about the incident. Id. at 151.
At trial, the jury heard testimony from, inter alia , Dr. Veronique Valliere, who testified as an expert regarding the manner in which a victim's response to sexual violence may be counterintuitive. N.T. Trial, 11/9/16, at 271-318. On November 10, 2016, the jury convicted Appellant of Sexual Assault and Indecent Assault.2 The trial court sentenced Appellant to a term of three to six years' imprisonment followed by two years' probation.
Appellant filed a Post-Trial Motion challenging, inter alia , the exclusion of DNA evidence, the admissibility of Dr. Valliere's testimony under Frye , and the weight of the evidence. The court denied the Motion and Appellant filed a timely Notice of Appeal. Both Appellant and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
Appellant presents seven issues for our review:
Appellant first contends that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence because Appellant presented convincing evidence that he and the Victim had engaged in consensual activity, the Victim fabricated her claim that the encounter was not consensual to preserve her relationship with her ex-boyfriend, and the Victim's high blood alcohol level made her observations and recollection about the incident unreliable.
When considering challenges to the weight of the evidence, we apply the following precepts. "The weight of the evidence is exclusively for the finder of fact, who is free to believe all, none or some of the evidence and to determine the credibility of the witnesses." Commonwealth v. Talbert , 129 A.3d 536, 545 (Pa. Super. 2015), appeal denied , 635 Pa. 773, 138 A.3d 4 (2016) (citation omitted). "Resolving contradictory testimony and questions of credibility are matters for the factfinder." Commonwealth v. Hopkins , 747 A.2d 910, 917 (Pa. Super. 2000). It is well-settled that we cannot substitute our judgment for that of the trier of fact. Talbert , 129 A.3d at 546.
Moreover, when a trial court finds that the evidence was not against the weight of the evidence, we must give the gravest consideration to the trial court's conclusion because it is the trial court, and not the appellate court, that "had the opportunity to hear and see the evidence presented." Id. at 546 (citation omitted). Furthermore, a defendant will only prevail on a challenge to the weight of the evidence when the evidence is "so tenuous, vague and uncertain that the verdict shocks the conscience of the court." Id. (citation omitted).
In particular, Appellant argues that the only evidence from which the jury could infer that the Victim did not consent was the Victim's testimony about what she was thinking. Appellant highlights evidence that supports his own narrative that the Victim did consent. Appellant's Brief at 21-23. Our review of the record contradicts this assertion. The Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that the Victim did not consent. Just because the jury chose to disbelieve Appellant's narrative does not mean that the jury only relied upon the Victim's thoughts to determine that the Victim did not consent.
Similarly, Appellant argues that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence because, according to Appellant's narrative, the Victim fabricated her testimony that she did not consent because the Victim "regretted her alcohol-fueled actions and [was] concerned about her former boyfriend's reaction to her infidelity." Appellant's Brief at 21. Once again, the jury, who observed the Victim testify, rejected this proposition and it is not for this court to disregard the jury's credibility determination.
Appellant finally argues that the Victim's testimony about the incident is unreliable because the Victim's blood alcohol level was so high that she could not accurately observe and recall the incident. Appellant's Brief at 22. Defense counsel, however, cross-examined the Victim about her intoxication and thus, the jury was aware of it; the jury, however, still chose to give weight to her testimony. It is not for us to re-weigh this evidence.
Appellant essentially asks us to reassess the credibility of the Victim and reweigh the evidence presented at trial. We cannot do so. See Talbert , 129 A.3d at 546. Our review of the record leads to the conclusion that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it held that the verdict was not so contrary to the evidence as to shock the court's conscience. We, thus, conclude that Appellant is not entitled to relief on his weight of the evidence claim.
Appellant argues that the evidence was not sufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant engaged in sexual activity without the Victim's consent. Appellant's Brief at 24. Appellant further argues that the evidence was insufficient to establish that Appellant knew that the Victim did not consent to the sexual activities. Id. at 26, 28.
We review claims regarding the sufficiency of the evidence by considering whether, "viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Commonwealth v. Melvin , 103 A.3d 1, 39 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation omitted). Further, the court may sustain a conviction wholly on circumstantial evidence, and the trier of fact—while passing on the credibility of the witnesses and the weight of the evidence—"is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence." Id. at 40 (citation omitted).
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