Commonwealth v. Crispell
| Decision Date | 21 September 2018 |
| Docket Number | No. 723 CAP,No. 722 CAP,722 CAP |
| Citation | 193 A.3d 919 |
| Parties | COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee v. Daniel CRISPELL, Appellant Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Appellant v. Daniel Crispell, Appellee |
| Court | Pennsylvania Supreme Court |
William Ross Stoycos, Esq., Pennsylvania Office of Attorney General, Amy Zapp, Esq., for Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Appellee
Victor J. Abreu, Esq., Samuel J. B. Angell, Esq., Federal Community Defender Office, Eastern District of PA, for Daniel Crispell, Appellant.
OPINION
In June 1990, Daniel Crispell was convicted of first-degree murder and related offenses and sentenced to death. Thereafter, Crispell filed a petition for relief pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act ("PCRA").1 After many years and multiple hearings, the PCRA court denied relief on Crispell's guilt phase claims, but granted Crispell a new penalty phase after determining that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate and present mitigating evidence. Crispell and the Commonwealth have filed cross-appeals from the PCRA court's order.
While his PCRA petition was pending before the PCRA court, Crispell sought leave from the PCRA court to amend his PCRA petition to add a claim pursuant to Brady v. Maryland , 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), premised upon evidence disclosed by the Commonwealth during discovery. The PCRA court denied leave to amend, concluding on jurisdictional grounds that it lacked discretion to entertain the amendment. In reaching this conclusion, the PCRA court erred as a matter of law. Accordingly, we vacate the order of the PCRA court to the extent that it denied leave to amend to add the new Brady claim. We remand for reconsideration of Crispell's request for leave to amend to add this claim. As to all other guilt phase claims, we affirm the PCRA court's denial of relief. With respect to the Commonwealth's cross-appeal from the grant of a new penalty phase, we affirm the PCRA court's order as its findings are supported by the record and free from legal error.
We set forth the facts of this case in our opinion affirming the judgment of sentence. Commonwealth v. Crispell , 530 Pa. 234, 608 A.2d 18 (1992). As we explained therein, on October 26, 1989, Crispell and his accomplice, Christopher Weatherill, kidnapped Ella M. Brown in her own car from a mall parking lot in Dubois. Crispell and Weatherill "took [Brown] to a deserted area where she was stabbed to death." Id. at 20. Following the murder, Crispell and Weatherill fled in Brown's car to Tucson, Arizona, where they were arrested after Crispell attempted to steal a woman's purse. At the time of the murder, Crispell was eighteen years old.
Following their apprehension in Arizona, Crispell and Weatherill were extradited to Pennsylvania. The duo was charged with murder, kidnapping, robbery, theft by unlawful taking, and conspiracy. Crispell and Weatherill were tried separately. The Commonwealth sought the death penalty for Crispell.
At Crispell's trial, the main point of contention between the prosecution and the defense was who stabbed Brown. As the prosecutor asserted to the jury in closing arguments, the answer to this question would determine whether Crispell was guilty of first-degree or second-degree murder.2 See Notes of Testimony ("N.T"), 6/21/1990, at 57; Reproduced Record ("R.R.") 552a.3 The prosecution's evidence that Crispell stabbed Brown was limited to the testimony of a jailhouse informant, Donald Skinner, whose testimony contradicted Crispell's version of events. Skinner, who shared a cell with Crispell for little more than a week, testified that Crispell had confessed that he was the one who stabbed Brown. Crispell , 608 A.2d at 23. Crispell testified in his defense that Weatherill devised the plan to obtain money and a car, targeted Brown, incapacitated Brown, drove away in Brown's car with Crispell following in another vehicle, and stabbed Brown to death in a secluded area. According to Crispell's testimony, Crispell and Weatherill then dragged Brown's body into the woods.
On June 22, 1990, a jury convicted Crispell of first-degree murder and the related offenses. The case proceeded to the penalty phase, which occurred on that same afternoon. The defense presentation lasted a few minutes, filling only fifteen pages of the transcript, and consisted solely of Crispell's testimony. Crispell briefly recited his age, expressed remorse, and denied being the killer. The defense submitted Crispell's age and remorse as mitigating factors, as well as his sorrow for putting his parents through the aftermath of the murder. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(e)(4), (e)(8). The Commonwealth incorporated the evidence presented in the guilt phase to establish the aggravating circumstance that Crispell committed the killing while in the perpetration of a felony. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(d)(6). At the close of the penalty phase, the jury determined that the aggravating circumstance outweighed the mitigating circumstances. The jury unanimously recommended a sentence of death, which the trial court subsequently imposed. Crispell , 608 A.2d at 20.
In 1992, this Court affirmed Crispell's judgment of sentence. Id. at 25. On January 3, 1997, Crispell filed a timely, pro se petition for post conviction relief.4 On July 20, 1999, Crispell filed an amended, counseled PCRA petition. On November 21, 2000, the Commonwealth filed an answer and moved to dismiss the PCRA petition. On February 20, 2002, Crispell filed a motion for discovery. The PCRA court, with Judge John K. Reilly presiding, heard argument on the motion on April 8, 2003. Judge Reilly granted the motion in part, denied it in part, and reserved judgment as to three discovery requests.
As part of the ensuing discovery, on August 5, 2004, the Commonwealth disclosed to Crispell an eleven-page police report, a portion of which had been withheld prior to trial. The police report was authored by Detective Deeming of the Tucson Police Department, who had apprehended Weatherill in Tucson. Detective Deeming prepared the eleven-page report detailing his discussions with, and observations of, Weatherill. Weatherill had provided a statement to Detective Deeming exculpating himself of Brown's murder and blaming Crispell. Weatherill admitted that the two men kidnapped Brown and robbed her, but insisted that Crispell was the killer. In the portion of the report that was withheld from Crispell prior to trial, and as discussed below, Detective Deeming noted that he did not believe Weatherill's assertion that Crispell stabbed Brown. Because this portion of the police report had not been disclosed prior to trial, Crispell had been unaware of Detective Deeming's suspicions of Weatherill and disbelief of Weatherill's statements.
On October 23, 2006, the Commonwealth filed a supplemental motion to dismiss Crispell's PCRA petition. One year later, on October 2, 2007, Crispell moved to supplement his PCRA petition to add a claim pursuant to Brady ,5 premised upon the portion of Detective Deeming's police report that the Commonwealth withheld prior to trial.6
On December 8, 2008, Crispell filed a recusal motion requesting Judge Reilly to remove himself from presiding over the PCRA petition. Judge Reilly granted the motion, and the Administrative Office of Pennsylvania Courts appointed an out-of-county judge to preside over the PCRA proceedings. On May 22, 2009, Senior Judge Joseph Rehkamp heard argument on the Commonwealth's motion to dismiss, but issued no ruling.
Thereafter, the case was reassigned to Judge John B. Leete. The Commonwealth moved for an independent examination of Crispell's mental health. On August 5, 2010, Crispell filed a motion to have his counsel present at this examination. In an attempt to resolve the outstanding motions and to move the case forward, the PCRA court scheduled argument on all pending motions, which the court heard on September 8, 2010. By opinion and order dated January 24, 2011, the PCRA court granted Crispell's outstanding discovery requests, subject to in camera review. Turning to the Commonwealth's motion to dismiss, the PCRA court dismissed many of Crispell's claims as previously litigated, waived because they were not raised on direct appeal, waived for failure to plead sufficient facts, or meritless. The PCRA court identified certain claims or portions of claims that warranted further review at an evidentiary hearing, reserved judgment on three claims pending further discovery, and denied Crispell's request to have counsel present during the Commonwealth's mental health evaluation.
Turning to Crispell's outstanding motion for leave to amend the PCRA petition to add the new Brady claim, the PCRA court denied leave to amend, relying upon jurisdictional grounds. In particular, the PCRA court was under the misapprehension that Crispell's new Brady claim independently was subject to the time constraints of the PCRA,7 notwithstanding the pending, timely PCRA petition. Based upon this flawed jurisdictional analysis, the PCRA court believed that it was constrained to deny Crispell leave to amend.
On July 7, 2011, Crispell moved to supplement the pending PCRA petition to address the deficiencies identified by the PCRA court in its January 24, 2011 opinion. On October 7, 2011, the PCRA court denied that motion in part and granted it in part. Also on October 7, 2011, the PCRA court directed Crispell to make all final amendments to his PCRA petition within thirty days.
On August 24, 2012, the PCRA court issued an opinion and order clarifying which claims would be heard on the merits at the upcoming hearing. Over several months, from March through June 2014, the PCRA court held a seven-day hearing on the merits of eight of Crispell's claims. Much of the hearing concerned Crispell's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel during the penalty phase. Following the...
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