Commonwealth v. Cristina

Decision Date14 April 2015
Docket NumberNo. 601 WDA 2013,601 WDA 2013
Citation114 A.3d 419,2015 PA Super 74
PartiesCOMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant v. Jeffrey CRISTINA, Appellee.
CourtPennsylvania Superior Court

114 A.3d 419
2015 PA Super 74

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant
v.
Jeffrey CRISTINA, Appellee.

No. 601 WDA 2013

Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

Submitted Feb. 2, 2015.
Filed April 14, 2015.


114 A.3d 419

Rebecca G. McBride, Assistant District Attorney, Pittsburgh, for Commonwealth, appellant.

114 A.3d 420

Steven C. Townsend and Diana L. Stavroulakis, Pittsburgh, for appellee.

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., MUNDY, J., and STABILE, J.

Opinion

OPINION BY BENDER, P.J.E.:

The Commonwealth appeals from the PCRA1 court's order granting Jeffrey Cristina a new sentencing hearing. Because the PCRA court lacked jurisdiction to entertain Cristina's untimely PCRA petition, we reverse.

In 1976, Cristina was convicted by a jury of second degree murder for the killing of Frank Slazinski during a home invasion. Cristina, a juvenile when the homicide occurred, was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole (LWOP) on March 29, 1977. On October 5, 1978, our Supreme Court affirmed his judgment of sentence. Commonwealth v. Cristina, 481 Pa. 44, 391 A.2d 1307 (1978). The Supreme Court of the United States subsequently denied his Petition for Writ of Certiorari on February 21, 1979. Cristina v. Pennsylvania, 440 U.S. 925, 99 S.Ct. 1255, 59 L.Ed.2d 479 (1979) (table).

On March 15, 1984, Cristina filed a counseled petition under the Post Conviction Hearing Act (PCHA), the statutory predecessor of the PCRA.2 Cristina's PCHA petition was denied by order of the PCHA court on April 3, 1985. This Court affirmed that order on May 12, 1986, and our Supreme Court denied Cristina's subsequent petition for allowance of appeal on January 7, 1987. Commonwealth v. Cristina, 356 Pa.Super. 615, 512 A.2d 1288 (1986) (unpublished memorandum), appeal denied, 514 Pa. 616, 521 A.2d 931 (1987) (table).

Cristina filed his second post-conviction petition for collateral relief on June 16, 2010. Counsel was appointed and filed an amended PCRA petition on September 14, 2011. Following a hearing, Cristina's amended petition was denied by order of the PCRA court dated October 28, 2011. Cristina did not appeal from that order.

Cristina filed his third post-conviction petition for collateral relief, the subject of the instant appeal, on July 27, 2012, 32 days after the United States Supreme Court's decision in Miller v. Alabama, ––– U.S. ––––, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 2469, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012) (holding that “the Eighth Amendment forbids a sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison without possibility of parole for juvenile offenders”). On August 14, 2012, current PCRA counsel was appointed. He filed an amended PCRA petition (hereinafter “the Petition”) on Cristina's behalf on December 3, 2012, alleging that, under the rubric of Miller, Cristina's LWOP sentence constituted cruel and unusual punishment under the 8th Amendment. By order dated March 20, 2013, the PCRA court granted the Petition and set a date for resentencing Cristina. The Commonwealth then timely filed the instant appeal, as well as a timely Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement. Subsequently, the PCRA court issued its Rule 1925(a) opinion on September 9, 2014. Therein, the PCRA court changed course, recommending that this Court reverse its March 20, 2013 order. PCRA Court Opinion (PCO), 9/9/14, at 2.

The Commonwealth now presents the following question for our review:

Whether the PCRA court erred in granting [Cristina] post-conviction relief
114 A.3d 421
in the form of resentencing where the [Petition] was untimely filed?

Commonwealth's Brief, at 4.

This Court's standard of review regarding an order granting or denying a petition under the PCRA is whether the determination of the PCRA court is supported by the evidence of record and is free of legal error. Commonwealth v. Ragan, 592 Pa. 217, 923 A.2d 1169, 1170 (2007). The PCRA court's findings will not be disturbed unless there is no support for the findings in the certified record. Commonwealth v. Carr, 768 A.2d 1164, 1166 (Pa.Super.2001). “However, this Court applies a de novo standard of review to the PCRA court's legal conclusions.” Commonwealth v. Spotz, 610 Pa. 17, 18 A.3d 244, 259 (2011).

We must begin by addressing the timeliness of the Petition, because the PCRA time limitations implicate our jurisdiction and may not be altered or disregarded in order to address the merits of a petition. Commonwealth v. Bennett, 593 Pa. 382, 930 A.2d 1264, 1267 (2007) (stating PCRA time limitations implicate our jurisdiction and may not be altered or disregarded to address the merits of the petition); Commonwealth v. Johnson, 803 A.2d 1291, 1294 (Pa.Super.2002) (holding the Superior Court lacks jurisdiction to reach merits of an appeal from an untimely PCRA petition). Under the PCRA, any petition for post-conviction relief, including a second or subsequent one, must be filed within one year of the date the judgment of sentence becomes final, unless one of the exceptions set forth in 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii) applies. That section states, in relevant part:

(b) Time for filing petition.
(1) Any petition under this subchapter, including a second or subsequent petition, shall be filed within one year of the date the judgment becomes final, unless the petition alleges and the petitioner proves that:
(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of interference by government officials with the presentation of the claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of the United States;
(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence; or
(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time period provided in this section and has been held by that court to apply retroactively.

42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii). Any petition attempting to invoke one of these exceptions “shall be filed within 60 days of the date the claim could have been presented.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(2).

Here, it is undisputed that the Petition is untimely and, therefore, that Cristina had to avail himself of at least one of the exceptions to the timeliness requirements set forth in Section 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii) in the Petition. There is also no dispute that Cristina has not alleged the applicability of either Section 9545(b)(1)(i) or (ii). Accordingly, our inquiry is focused on whether Cristina can rely on Section 9545(b)(1)(iii) to overcome the PCRA's time limitations.

Subsection (iii) of Section 9545 [ (b)(1) ] has two requirements. First, it provides that the right asserted is a constitutional right that was recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or [the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania] after
114 A.3d 422
the time provided in this section. Second, it provides that the right “has been held” by “that court” to apply retroactively. Thus, a petitioner must prove that there is a “new” constitutional right and that the right “has been held” by that court to apply retroactively. The language “has
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