Commonwealth v. Cuevas, 13–P–1792.
| Court | Appeals Court of Massachusetts |
| Writing for the Court | BLAKE, J. |
| Citation | 27 N.E.3d 411,87 Mass.App.Ct. 205 |
| Parties | COMMONWEALTH v. Eagle Eyes CUEVAS. |
| Docket Number | No. 13–P–1792.,13–P–1792. |
| Decision Date | 24 March 2015 |
87 Mass.App.Ct. 205
27 N.E.3d 411
COMMONWEALTH
v.
Eagle Eyes CUEVAS.1
No. 13–P–1792.
Appeals Court of Massachusetts, Hampden.
Argued Dec. 9, 2014.
Decided March 24, 2015.
Edward B. Fogarty, Springfield, for the defendant.
Deborah D. Ahlstrom, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth.
Present: CYPHER, WOLOHOJIAN, & BLAKE, JJ.
Opinion
BLAKE, J.
After a jury trial in the Superior Court, the defendant, Eagle Eyes Cuevas, was found to be a sexually dangerous person and committed to the Massachusetts Treatment Center at Bridgewater for between one day and life. On appeal, Cuevas argues that it was reversible error to admit prior out-of-State convictions, claiming that the records were not properly authenticated and did not demonstrate that he was represented by counsel. He also claims that it was error to deny his request for fourteen peremptory jury challenges. We affirm.
Background. At trial, the Commonwealth presented the reports and testimony of two qualified examiners, Dr. Katrin Rouse–Weir
and Dr. Michael Murphy. Both examiners interviewed Cuevas and reviewed his treatment records, his Department of Correction records, and his criminal history, which included both sexual and drug offenses. As a result of their work, both opined that Cuevas was a pedophile who was likely to reoffend and therefore met the statutory definition of a sexually dangerous person as set forth in G.L. c. 123A.2 Cuevas presented no expert evidence of his own.
The jury could have found the following regarding Cuevas's history of offenses. In 1995, in New York, he pleaded guilty to attempted sexual abuse in the first degree for touching a girl's breast.3 Cuevas received a committed sentence of eighteen months to three years in prison. In 2004, in Massachusetts, Cuevas was convicted of rape of a child and indecent assault and battery on a child under the age of fourteen for sexual assaults that occurred on diverse dates between 1999 and 2003.4 Cuevas received a sentence of not less than five but no more than seven years in prison with lifetime community parole.
Discussion. 1. Admission of the New York convictions. It is the Commonwealth's burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Cuevas is a sexually dangerous person. Commonwealth v. Mazzarino, 81 Mass.App.Ct. 358, 365, 963 N.E.2d 112 (2012). To do so, the Commonwealth must prove “(1) a conviction of a sexual offense; (2) the existence of a mental abnormality or personality disorder; and (3) whether the mental abnormality or personality disorder makes the person likely to engage in sexual offenses if not confined to a secure facility.” Commonwealth v. Blake, 454 Mass. 267, 271, 909 N.E.2d 532 (2009) (Ireland, J., concurring). See G.L. c. 123A, § 1.
As proof of the prior conviction in New York, the Commonwealth
offered a certified copy of two documents provided by New York: a “certificate of disposition indictment” and a “CRIMS appearance history” (CRIMS records).5 The CRIMS records include attorney data, charges, and appearance dates.
a. Proper attestation. Cuevas first contends the documents were not properly attested. See G.L. c. 233, § 76. We disagree. “[A]n ‘attested’ copy of a document is one which has been examined and compared with the original, with a certificate or memorandum of its correctness, signed by the persons who have examined it.” Commonwealth v. Deramo, 436 Mass. 40, 47, 762 N.E.2d 815 (2002), quoting from Black's Law Dictionary 127–128 (6th ed. 1990). “In New York, a Certificate of Disposition is a judicial record of the offense of which a defendant has been convicted.” United States v. Green, 480 F.3d 627, 632 (2d Cir.2007). See People v. Smith, 258 A.D.2d 245, 248, 697 N.Y.S.2d 783 (1999). Moreover, “[a] certificate issued by a criminal court, or the clerk thereof, certifying that a judgment of conviction against a designated defendant has been entered in such court, constitutes presumptive evidence of the facts stated in such certificate.” N.Y.Crim. Proc. Law § 60.60(1) (McKinney 1970).
b. Representation by counsel. Cuevas contends that the Commonwealth failed to establish that he was represented by counsel or that he waived his right thereto when he pleaded guilty to the charge in New York.
In Commonwealth v. Proctor, 403 Mass. 146, 148, 526 N.E.2d 765 (1988), the Supreme Judicial Court held that when the Commonwealth seeks to introduce a prior
conviction in a G.L. c. 123A...
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Commonwealth v. Faherty, 16–P–1486
...v. McMullin, 76 Mass. App. Ct. 904, 905, 923 N.E.2d 1062 (2010), and to out-of-State convictions. See Commonwealth v. Cuevas, 87 Mass. App. Ct. 205, 207–208, 27 N.E.3d 411 (2015). Here, the defendant was unable to rebut the presumption of regularity; the New Hampshire court documents say no......
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Commonwealth v. Montville, 15–P–1579.
...904, 904–905 (2010). The rationale in Saunders was clear and explicit, and was properly applied. See Commonwealth v. Cuevas, 87 Mass.App.Ct. 205, 207 n. 6 (2015) ("[A]pplication of the presumption of regularity is not limited to the factual circumstances present in Saunders "). The evidence......
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Commonwealth v. Montville, 15–P–1579.
...904, 904–905 (2010). The rationale in Saunders was clear and explicit, and was properly applied. See Commonwealth v. Cuevas, 87 Mass.App.Ct. 205, 207 n. 6 (2015) ("[A]pplication of the presumption of regularity is not limited to the factual circumstances present in Saunders "). The evidence......