Commonwealth v. Cushnie

• Decision Date: 15 January 1969
• Citation: 249 A.2d 290,433 Pa. 131
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Leon CUSHNIE, Appellant.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

249 A.2d 290

433 Pa. 131

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Leon CUSHNIE, Appellant.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

January 15, 1969.

Herman I. Pollock, Defender, Melvin Dildine, Chief Appeals Div., Aurelio Munoz, Asst. Defender, Defender Assn of Philadelphia, Philadelphia, for appellant.

Arlen Specter, Dist. Atty., James D. Crawford, Asst. Dist. Atty Richard A. Sprague, First Asst. Dist. Atty., Philadelphia for appellee.

Before BELL C.J., and JONES, COHEN, EAGEN, O'BRIEN and ROBERTS, JJ.

OPINION OF THE COURT

O'BRIEN Justice.

This is an appeal from the order of the Court of Oyer and Terminer of Philadelphia County, denying, after hearing, appellant's petition for post conviction relief. On July 20, 1965, appellant pleaded guilty to murder generally and was found guilty of second degree murder. On the next day he was sentenced to four to ten years imprisonment. He brought this post conviction proceeding, alleging the invalidity of his guilty plea.

Appellant asserts that his guilty plea was unknowing, as he was unaware of the nature and effect of the entry of the plea. He bolsters his claim by emphasizing that the plea must have been unknowing, for he never admitted that he was guilty of murder. The court below held the plea to be a knowing one, and we agree with that court.

We begin with the proposition that whenever the accused pleads guilty to an indictment, he is presumed to be aware of what he is doing. Therefore, the burden is ordinarily on the appellant to prove that he did not enter his guilty plea knowingly. Commonwealth v. Hill, 427 Pa. 614, 235 A.2d 347 (1967); Com. ex. rel. Crosby v. Rundle, 415 Pa. 81, 202 A.2d 299 (1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 976, 85 S.Ct. 677, 13 L.Ed.2d 567 (1964). It is a matter of credibility and the court may refuse to be lieve the appellant's version of what happened. Com. ex rel. West v. Rundle, 428 Pa. 102, 237 A.2d 196 (1968); Commonwealth v. Hill, supra.

However, this Court has a number of times indicated that the trial court should conduct an on the record inquiry as to whether the plea is intelligently entered in order to prevent the dilemma of a hearing judge who 'faced with a silent record, must either choose to disbelieve what appears to be credible and internally consistent testimony by the prisoner that he was never examined as to the consequences of his plea or grant the relief requested.' Com. ex rel. West v. Rundle, supra, at page 106, 237 A.2d at page 198. In Com. ex rel. Barnosky v. Maroney, 414 Pa. 161, at page 165, 199 A.2d 424, at page 426 (1964), this Court stated: 'Before accepting and acting upon a plea of guilty, a court must be satisfied that the plea is voluntary and intelligently entered. It would be wise for the court to make particular inquiry as to defendant's knowledge of the nature of the charge, of his right to trial by jury, and of the general consequences of his plea. It is desirable to have such matters made known to the defendant even though he be represented by counsel. When a defendant enters a plea to murder, more is required than simply his pleading orally or endorsing the indictment, as in other cases. See Act of May 15, 1895, P.L. 71, § 1, 19 P.S. § 462. Furthermore, proper administration of criminal justice Suggests that the relevant attending facts and circumstances appear of record.' (Emphasis added).

Then in Com. ex rel. West v. Myers, 423 Pa. 1, 222 A.2d 918 (1966), we stated: 'When confronted with a defendant who manifests an intention to plead guilty to a criminal charge, even though that defendant may be represented by competent counsel, the courts of this Commonwealth must be assured that the plea is the product of the defendant's own voluntary and intelligent choice.' We then went on to point out that the cases had not prescribed a fixed procedure for determining the defendant's understanding of his plea, and thus we had not disturbed convictions based upon guilty pleas merely because the court failed to examine the defendant at the time it accepted his plea. We treated defendant's understanding as a factual issue to be resolved on a case by case basis.

In the above case West was granted a hearing. At that hearing relief was denied. He then appealed again, asserting that we should reconsider our cases like Com. ex rel. Barnosky v. Maroney, supra. He advanced a prophylactic rule that failure of the trial judge to conduct an on the record colloquy with the prisoner sufficient to demonstrate a knowing plea must result in a holding that the plea does not meet constitutional requirements. We rejected the rule advanced by appellant because it did not provide sufficient flexibility. The main drawback to such a rule was that it would have invalidated numerous guilty pleas, where the defendant full well understood what he was doing, simply because there was no on the record inquiry, even though our cases had not yet required such an inquiry.

However these considerations, while valid as to retroactive application of any sort of prophylactic rule, do not apply prospectively. In the second West case, we warned: 'If these convictions are to be insulated from attack, the trial court is best advised to conduct an on the record examination of the defendant which should include, inter alia, an attempt to satisfy itself that the defendant understands the nature of the charges, his right to a jury trial, the acts sufficient to constitute the offenses for which he is charged and the permissible range of sentences (footnote omitted). See Commonwealth ex rel. West v. Myers, supra, 423 Pa. at 5 n. 3, 222 A.2d at 921 n. 3; Commonwealth ex rel. Barnosky v. Maroney, supra at 165, 199 A.2d at 426. Criminal Procedure Rule 319 requires that the trial court not accept a plea 'unless it determines that it is competently and intelligently made;' this determination can best be made through the vehicle of an on the record inquiry. * * * The task of our trial courts would * * * be immeasurably eased if a sufficient on the record examination is available to refute the prisoners' contentions. Although we hesitate to adopt a rule which...