Commonwealth v. Daniels
| Decision Date | 25 March 1974 |
| Citation | 455 Pa. 552,317 A.2d 237 |
| Parties | COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Harold W. DANIELS, Appellant. |
| Court | Pennsylvania Supreme Court |
Richard B. Schwartz, Stanley M. Schwarz, Philadelphia for appellant.
Arlen Specter, Dist. Atty., Richard A. Sprague, 1st Asst. Dist. Atty., David Richman, Asst. Dist. Atty., Chief Appeals Div., John H. Isom, Philadelphia, for appellee.
Before JONES, C.J., and EAGEN, O'BRIEN, ROBERTS, POMEROY NIX and MANDERINO, JJ.
Appellant, Harold Daniels, was convicted by a judge, sitting with a jury, of murder in the first degree, aggravated robbery and conspiracy. Post-trial motions were denied and appellant was sentenced to life imprisonment. This appeal followed.
Appellant was 'picked up' by the Philadelphia police on February 11, 1970, at approximately 7:00 p.m., for questioning concerning a homicide committed in Philadelphia. Appellant and his girlfriend, Diane Jones, who were then in the process of cooking dinner, immediately stopped what they were doing and went with the police to headquarters for questioning. Appellant was advised of his rights and interrogated until 8:00 p.m., when the first interrogation sessions ended. Appellant was then given two polygraph tests. He was then returned to the interrogation room and questioning began anew at 12:05 a.m. Appellant's interrogation finally concluded in the early hours of February 12, 1970, when he gave his incriminating statement.
Appellant contends that his confession should have been suppressed because it was the product of an illegal arrest, one made without probable cause. At the suppression hearing, the Commonwealth took the position that appellant was not under arrest when he accompanied the police to headquarters for questioning. The Commonwealth also contended that, if appellant was under arrest, it was a legal arrest because it was based on probable cause. According to the opinion of the suppression court, appellant was not under arrest but, assuming he were under arrest, the arrest was supported by probable cause. In addition, the suppression court determined that, in any case, the confession was not the product of the arrest and, therefore, was admissible even if that arrest were illegal. The Commonwealth, in its brief, relied upon this last contention.
We shall discuss each of the Commonwealth's alternative positions seriatum.
(1) Appellant was not under arrest at the time of his confession. In Commonwealth v. Bosurgi, 411 Pa. 56, 190 A.2d 304 (1963), we defined the term 'arrest' as follows:
On the facts of this case, we are convinced that appellant was under arrest. Although the police testified that they had simply 'requested' that he accompany them for questioning, the facts indicate that appellant was not free to refuse to comply with their request. For one thing, although appellant was preparing dinner when the police came to the door, the officers admitted that he was not given time to complete preparation and that, in fact, he had no dinner. To us, this indicates that appellant was subject to the will of the officers. For another, the police admitted that once appellant had 'failed' the polygraph test, he immediately became a suspect. It strains credibility to believe that, even then, he remained free to leave. It is worth noting, moreover, that the officers who testified at the suppression hearing, and the prosecuting attorney, constantly referred to the 'arrest' of appellant.
(2) The arrest was based on probable cause. The Commonwealth's contention that if there was an arrest, it was based on probable cause stems from the testimony at the suppression hearing that before the police 'picked up' appellant, they had been given the following information:
(a) Interrogation of people who lived in the neighborhood where the crime was committed disclosed a possible eyewitness who stated that he had seen two young men acting in a suspicious manner at the approximate time which the murder occurred. One of the suspicious men was described as follows:
'. . . he was a Negro . . . he was approximately 20 years of age . . . he was 5 foot 11 to 6 feet tall . . . he had a slender built (sic), he weighed about 165 pounds, he had a light brown complexion, he had a long dark coat and a small dark cap and a slender face.'
The arresting officer further testified that through his work with juvenile gangs in the area, he knew three men, including appellant, who fit that general description.
(b) An anonymous caller told the police that a man known as 'dead leg' was involved in the murder. The arresting officer testified that he knew appellant had been nicknamed 'deadleg.'
The Commonwealth admits that neither the anonymous tip nor the general description would alone be sufficient to establish probable cause, but takes the position that taken together, the two pieces of information were sufficient to justify the arrest. We do not agree. While it is true, as we recognized in Commonwealth v. Mamon, 449 Pa. 249, 297 A.2d 471 (1972), that two sources, insufficient in themselves, can sometimes establish probable cause when taken together, both such sources should be of a higher quality than those involved here.
In Manon, supra, one source was an anonymous informant who claimed to be an eyewitness and named the defendant. The other was a victim who had been severely injured and consequently 'not capable of rationally reasoning' on the date of her identification, but who was, nevertheless, able to identify the defendant as her assailant. Thus, both sources indicated that they were eyewitnesses and both specifically identified the defendant as the perpetrator of the crime.
In the instant case, on the other hand, neither source can be said to be an eyewitness. The first source, only observed two men acting 'suspiciously' and had no idea of the identities of the people he observed. The second source, who specifically named appellant, gave no indication of how he obtained his information.
While the information which the police received certainly...
To continue reading
Request your trial