Commonwealth v. Darlene
| Decision Date | 30 April 2015 |
| Docket Number | No. 983 EDA 2014,J-S12024-15,983 EDA 2014 |
| Court | Pennsylvania Superior Court |
| Parties | COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, Appellee v. RILEY G. DARLENE, Appellant |
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
Appellant, Darlene G. Riley,1 appeals from the order denying her petition for collateral relief filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act ("PCRA"), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546. We affirm. The facts adduced at Appellant's bench trial are as follows: On March 9, 2006, as a result of an investigation of suspected drug activity at Appellant's address, 1636 North 6th Street in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, Officer Henry Giammarco of the Pennsylvania Office of Attorney General Bureau of Narcotics and Drug Control secured a search warrant for the premises. N.T. (Trial), 12/4/09, at31. When executing the warrant the following day, the participating law enforcement officers encountered and arrested Appellant's son. Id. at 34. Appellant was not at home, but her son informed the officers that she was two blocks away at a school. Id. at 87. Some of the officers travelled to the school where they encountered Appellant. Agent James Avery testified that he approached Appellant in his SWAT uniform with a shotgun slung across his body, but not pointed at Appellant. Id. at 80. Agent Christina Staunton testified that she may have approached Appellant with a weapon drawn because Appellant was conversing with several people on a corner. Id. at 99. Rosita Young, a witness called by Appellant, testified that the officers approached with weapons drawn and pointed at Appellant. Id. at 135-136.
Agents Avery and Staunton testified differently concerning Appellant's arrest. Agent Avery recalled that Appellant was handcuffed and arrested in the school yard area, N.T. (Trial), 12/4/09, at 81; Agent Staunton recounted that Appellant was not handcuffed in the school yard and was not arrested until the officers brought her back to the premises being searched. Id. at 117-120. Agent Staunton further testified that once back at 1636 North 6th Street, she witnessed Appellant receive her Miranda2 rights, sign a waiver of those rights, and sign a consent to search her vehicle. Id. at 101-102, 107-108.
Inside the property, the executing officers discovered approximately 1400 pills and $309.00 in United States currency. N.T. (Trial), 12/4/09, at 34-35. Some of the pills were in bottles with Appellant's name on the label and some were found in bottles with obliterated labels. Id. at 43-44. The majority of the pills were in amber pill bottles and bags scattered on the first floor. Id. at 44-46. Documents verifying that Appellant lived in the house were also seized. Id. at 51. Additionally, the officers searching Appellant's vehicle recovered and searched Appellant's purse. The purse contained $1295.00 in United States currency, including a $100 pre-recorded bill that had been utilized during investigation of the drug activity at Appellant's house. Id. at 35.
After the search was completed, Agents Avery and Staunton transported Appellant to police headquarters. N.T. (Trial), 12/4/09, at 84, 106. Agent Staunton testified that Appellant was cooperative and admitted to selling pills because she "fell on hard times" and "knew she had done wrong." Id. at 107. Agent Staunton was present when Appellant gave a statement to Agent John Cohen confessing to selling pills for about five to six months, and witnessed her initialing each page of the statement. Id. at 109, 126.
On November 21, 2006, Appellant filed an omnibus pretrial motion requesting, inter alia, that her statement be suppressed. On July 9, 2009, a hearing was held on the motion before the Honorable Ramy Djerassi. AgentStaunton testified that Appellant was not arrested at the school and that, when Appellant returned to 1636 North 6th Street, she consented to a search of her vehicle, was issued her Miranda warnings, and signed a waiver of her constitutional rights. N.T. (Suppression), 7/9/09, at 10-12; 15-16; 26. Agent Staunton also detailed that she was present when Appellant gave her statement to Agent Cohen and witnessed Appellant initial each page of the statement. Id. at 16-17.
Appellant also testified at the suppression hearing, offering a very different account of the events. In Appellant's version, Agent Staunton ran up to her in the school yard with a shotgun and held the gun to the base of her neck. N.T. (Suppression), 7/9/09, at 33. She was then restrained with two sets of handcuffs. Id. at 34. Appellant also claimed that she was rushed into signing the consent to search her vehicle and acknowledgement of her Miranda rights. She denied receiving an oral recitation of her Miranda rights or any explanation of the paperwork she signed. She also averred that she was not afforded an opportunity to read the documents. Id. at 35-36. Regarding the questioning at the police station, Appellant remembered being asked only four questions related to her health care provider and her prescribed medications. Id. at 38. Appellant claimed that she did not recognize the written statement that was recorded at the police station by Agent Cohen, nor did she admit to signing the statement. Id. at 39-40.
On cross examination, Appellant initially averred that, although her signature appeared on the bottom of the consent to search the vehicle, she did not sign the document. N.T. (Suppression), 7/9/09, at 43. However, Appellant recanted that statement when she was shown her certificate of bail and her signature on that document matched the signature on the consent. Id. at 44. She also reiterated her direct examination testimony that Agent Cohen only questioned her about her physician and denied admitting that she had done "a bad thing." Id. at 46-47.
At the conclusion of the hearing, Judge Djerassi denied the suppression motion, convinced that Appellant "lied to this Court." N.T. Suppression, 7/9/09, at 56. He further found that Appellant received her Miranda rights and that the statement she gave to Agent Cohen was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. Id. at 57. Given Judge Djerassi's unfavorable assessment of Appellant's credibility, Appellant's counsel requested that the judge recuse himself from further proceedings involving Appellant. Judge Djerassi granted the motion. Id. at 58.
On December 4, 2009, Appellant waived her right to a jury trial and proceeded to a bench trial before the Honorable Glynnis Hill. At the conclusion of testimony and argument by counsel, the trial court found Appellant guilty of possession with intent to deliver controlled substances ("PWID"), possession of controlled substances, and criminal conspiracy. Appellant was sentenced to a five-to-ten-year term of incarceration.
Appellant appealed to this Court. Appellant's trial counsel, James Mugford, Esquire, filed a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement of errors complained of on appeal raising four issues. Trial counsel then withdrew, and the trial court appointed Jerome Brown, Esquire, as appellate counsel who filed an additional Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement. The trial court addressed the substantive issues raised in both statements in its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion, but, citing Commonwealth v. Grant, 813 A.2d 726 (Pa. 2002), declined to discuss those issues alleging ineffectiveness of counsel. Trial Court Opinion, 6/4/10, at 3 n.3. Concerning the merits of Appellant's claims, the trial court concluded that the suppression court did not err when it denied Appellant's motion to suppress because her written and oral statements were given voluntarily. The trial court also determined that the statements were not the fruit of an illegal arrest. Finally, the trial court considered and rejected Appellant's claims that the Commonwealth committed misconduct by presenting false police testimony concerning whether the agents approached Appellant with their weapons drawn, that her waiver trial colloquy was deficient, and that the verdict was against the sufficiency and weight of the evidence. Id. at 18.
In her appellate brief, Appellant restyled her argument about Agent Staunton's inconsistent testimony and Commonwealth misconduct as aBrady3 violation. Appellant also argued that her statement should have been suppressed on the alternate ground that it was not voluntary. Commonwealth v. Riley, 237 EDA 2010 (Pa. Super. filed June 24, 2011) (unpublished memorandum at 1-2). The Superior Court panel in the direct appeal agreed with the trial court that the claim of misconduct lacked merit and noted additionally that there was no legal basis supporting a Brady violation. Riley, slip op. at 3-4. The panel also observed that Appellant did not establish that Agent Staunton's credibility was determinative of Appellant's guilt or innocence. The panel reasoned that even if coercive tactics employed by the agents rendered Appellant's statement to the police involuntary, the other evidence offered at trial supported the guilty verdict. Id. at 6. Finally, the panel rejected Appellant's claim that her statement was not voluntary and affirmed on the basis of the trial court's opinion. Id. at 7.
On April 20, 2012, Appellant filed a timely PCRA petition alleging trial counsel's ineffectiveness. Appellant first claimed that counsel was ineffective for failing to move for a mistrial or to have the suppression hearing reopened when the trial testimony revealed that Appellant testified credibly at the suppression hearing regarding the circumstances of her apprehension. As part of this allegation of ineffectiveness, Appellantcontends that her arrest was illegal and that the Commonwealth's seizure of her vehicle and search of the purse discovered therein, as well as the taking of her statement, were illegal acts by the Commonwealth as they constituted fruit of the...
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