Commonwealth v. Darmska

• Decision Date: 28 February 1908
• Docket Number: 215-1907
• Citation: 35 Pa.Super. 580
• Parties: Commonwealth v. Darmska
• Court: Pennsylvania Superior Court

35 Pa.Super. 580

Commonwealth v. Darmska

No. 215-1907

Superior Court of Pennsylvania

February 28, 1908

Argued December 11, 1907

Appeal by City of Philadelphia, from order of O. & T. Phila Co.-1907, No. 287, overruling demurrer to petition for allowance of fees under Act of March 22, 1907, P. L. 31, in case of Commonwealth v. Josephine Darmska.

Petition for allowance of fees for professional services in a murder trial, provided by the Act of March 22, 1907, P. L. 31.

The city and county of Philadelphia demurred to the petition.

The court in an opinion by Von Moschzisker, J., in which Magill J., concurred, overruled the demurrer. Wiltbank, J., filed an opinion setting forth a contrary view.

Error assigned was the order of the court.

Thomas D. Finletter, with him J. Howard Gendell, for appellant. -- The title does not indicate that the county was to pay the compensation and expenses. This is a fatal omission and renders the act invalid: Wayne County v. Waller, 90 Pa. 99; Com. v. Ramuno, 16 Pa. Dist. 449; Dorsey's App., 72 Pa. 192; Dailey v. Potter County, 203 Pa. 593; Ridge Ave. Pass. Ry. Co. v Philadelphia, 124 Pa. 219.

Owen J Roberts, with him Henry S. Drinker, Jr., for appellee. -- The act is constitutional: Com. v. Rapid Transit Street Ry. Co., 219 Pa. 11; Hays v. Cumberland County, 5 Pa.Super. 159; Baker v. Warren County, 11 Pa.Super. 170; Read v. Clearfield County, 12 Pa.Super. 419; Williams v. Northumberland County, 110 Pa. 48.

Before Rice, P. J., Porter, Henderson, Morrison, Orlady, Head and Beaver, JJ.

OPINION

HENDERSON, J.

This appeal presents for our consideration the constitutionality of the Act of March 22, 1907, P. L. 31. The objection urged is that the subject of the statute is not clearly expressed in its title as required by sec. 3 of article III of the constitution. The title is " An act to provide for the assignment of counsel in murder cases, and for the allowance of expenses and compensation in such cases." In examining the question we are to have in mind the well-known principle that an act of assembly is only to be declared void when it violates the constitution clearly, plainly and in such a manner as to leave no doubt or hesitation. It must be manifest that the legislative department has overstepped the boundaries marked by the constitution before the courts are justified in nullifying a statute. The legislature comes directly from the people and by its enactment gives expression to the popular will. This will so expressed is the law of the land except where the constitution unquestionably forbids it. The reason for the constitutional provision in question is apparent. It was intended to prevent the incorporation into one bill of legislation on distinct and unrelated subjects. Its purpose is well stated in Road in Phoenixville, 109 Pa. 44. It is just as apparent that it was not the intention that the title should be an index to the contents of the bill. What is required is that the title fairly give such notice of the subject of the act as should lead to an inquiry into its details. Where the title is not deceptive and relates to one subject and is sufficient to put those interested on inquiry as to the contents of the bill the demand of the constitution is met, even though the various provisions by which the object of the bill is to be attained are not indicated in the title. A recent admonition from the Supreme Court in Com. v. Rapid Transit Street Ry. Co., 219 Pa. 11, indicates the true spirit of the constitutional requirement and suggests that brevity which does not mislead should be aimed at in the construction of titles of statutes. Such a title, though general, will cover all details and collateral matters naturally and properly incident to the subject: Stegmaier v. Jones, 203 Pa. 47. What, then, was the purpose of the act? This is indicated with reasonable clearness in the title. It is therein stated that the legislation relates to trials for murder and that provision is made for the assignment of counsel and for the allowance of expenses and compensation to them. The specific object is compensation to counsel appointed by the court to defend impecunious prisoners tried for murder. Prior to this enactment such services were gratuitously rendered according to the duty which the members of the bar owed to the court and to the public. Human sympathy and a due sense of professional responsibility were considered to be the sufficient motive for action in such cases. The relation of the counsel so appointed was not one of contract with the accused, but was a gratuitous responsibility arising from the official relation of such counsel to the court. The right to compensation was denied because neither at common law nor by any statute was it authorized. This act was passed for the purpose of enabling poverty stricken persons accused of murder to more fully prepare a defense. Under its provision the attorneys appointed are not only allowed compensation, but may be reimbursed for their personal and incidental expenses connected with the discharge of the duty imposed. The provision for payment by the county is a reasonable if not a necessary incident. Indeed, it is not apparent how resort could be consistently made to any other fund than that provided by the county. And this view is not answered by the fact that statutory authority for the appointment of counsel for persons charged with crimes, who were financially unable to engage attorneys, had for a long time existed. There is no limitation on the power of the legislature to enact another law on the same subject with additional provisions relevant thereto. Light is thrown on the value of the title when we take into consideration the fact that the cost of the administration of criminal justice is, generally speaking, cast upon the county. Such has been the state of the law since the organization of the commonwealth. This extends to many cases where no statutory liability exists, as in the case of a prisoner taken ill at the trial or a juror in the box; the expenses of a coroner in a post-mortem examination; the lodging and board of a jury, and many other instances which might be enumerated. It was stated in general terms in McCalmont v. Allegheny County, 29 Pa. 417, " where no other provision is made for the expenses of the judiciary,...