Commonwealth v. DeJesus

Citation99 Mass.App.Ct. 275,165 N.E.3d 1048
Decision Date01 March 2021
Docket NumberNo. 19-P-1431,19-P-1431
Parties COMMONWEALTH v. Christopher DEJESUS.
CourtAppeals Court of Massachusetts

Thomas E. Hagar, Wayland, for the defendant.

Tara L. Johnston, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth.

Present: Kinder, Shin, & Hand, JJ.

HAND, J.

The defendant, Christopher DeJesus, was indicted in the Superior Court on three counts -- (1) unlawful possession of a firearm without a license, G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a ) ; (2) unlawful possession of a large capacity feeding device, G. L. c. 269, § 10 (m ) ; and (3) unlawful possession of ammunition, G. L. c. 260, § 10 (h ).1 He was charged after police identified him in several Snapchat2 videos posing with a firearm. As we discuss in greater detail, infra, the firearm was one of several items recovered in the course of a warrantless search of the basement of a multifamily home that had also been depicted in some of the Snapchat videos.

Prior to trial, the defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence recovered during the search. Following an evidentiary hearing, a judge (motion judge) concluded that the defendant had neither standing to contest the search nor a reasonable expectation of privacy in the area searched, and denied the motion.

After a jury trial, the defendant was convicted of two charges -- unlawful possession of both a firearm and a large capacity feeding device -- and acquitted of the remaining charges in the indictments.3 The trial judge sentenced the defendant to concurrent terms of from two and one-half years to five years in State prison.

On appeal, the defendant argues that the motion judge erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained in the course of the warrantless search of the basement of a multifamily home, and that the trial judge erred in denying his motion for a required finding of not guilty of possession of the firearm at issue and the large capacity feeding device attached to it. We conclude that the defendant did not have standing to challenge the search, and that even if he did, he had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the area searched. We are also satisfied that the evidence was sufficient to prove the defendant's possession of the firearm and the large capacity feeding device. Accordingly, we affirm the judgments.

Discussion. 1. Motion to suppress. "In reviewing a ruling on a motion to suppress, we accept the judge's subsidiary findings of fact absent clear error ‘but conduct an independent review of his ultimate findings and conclusions of law.’ " Commonwealth v. Medina, 485 Mass. 296, 299-300, 149 N.E.3d 747 (2020), quoting Commonwealth v. Cawthron, 479 Mass. 612, 616, 97 N.E.3d 671 (2018). The defendant does not challenge the motion judge's factual findings as erroneous, and we summarize them here, supplementing as necessary with uncontroverted testimony from the motion hearing.

In the summer of 2018, following a series of shootings in Fall River, the Fall River police department organized a task force to address growing violence within the city. As part of this task force, Detective Matthew Mendes, a member of the department's gang unit, monitored the social media accounts of various individuals suspected of contributing to the violence. On July 26, 2018, Mendes was monitoring the Snapchat account of Darius Hunt, an individual known to Mendes as a member of a gang with a presence in Fall River. Mendes observed a number of videos on Hunt's Snapchat account (videos), which he identified as being taken within twenty-four hours prior to his having viewed them. These videos depicted Hunt, the defendant, and a third individual. In several of the videos, the defendant was "holding a black semi-automatic pistol with an extended magazine and a distinct tan/cream colored grip"; the videos also depicted a basement area and the outside of a three-family dwelling at 14 Downing Street in Fall River (the premises).4

Mendes and several other officers traveled to the premises, intending to conduct further investigation. On arrival, the officers observed a number of individuals, including Hunt and the defendant, standing outside on the premises; when the police approached, the individuals dispersed. Some of the individuals ran to the back yard while the defendant walked down the sidewalk toward the home of his girlfriend and her mother, at 4 Downing Street. Mendes ran around to the back of the premises, chasing Hunt. Although the back yard was empty when he arrived, Mendes observed that the rear door to the basement was ajar, and he heard people running in the basement.

Mendes and two other officers followed the footsteps and entered the basement through the open door. The basement, a common area utilized by the residents of the apartments on the premises, had no locks on the doors leading into it. Once inside the basement, the officers observed a firearm in plain view in an open bag placed on a table; the firearm appeared to be the same one the police saw in the videos being handled by Hunt and the defendant. The police "seized the scene," obtained a search warrant, and later took possession of the bag containing the firearm and other items. The defendant was arrested on the sidewalk between 14 Downing Street and 4 Downing Street.

The defendant moved to suppress evidence seized from the basement of the premises, including the firearm and ammunition, arguing that the evidence was discovered in the course of an improper warrantless search of the basement.5 The motion judge denied the motion, concluding that the defendant lacked both standing to challenge the search of the basement at the premises and a reasonable expectation of privacy in the area searched.

On appeal, the defendant argues that the motion judge erred in these conclusions; more specifically, he contends that he was entitled to automatic standing to challenge the search under art. 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights and the cases stemming from the Supreme Judicial Court's ruling in Commonwealth v. Amendola, 406 Mass. 592, 600-601, 550 N.E.2d 121 (1990). We are not persuaded.

The automatic standing rule, set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 80 S.Ct. 725, 4 L.Ed.2d 697 (1960), provides that "defendants charged with crimes of possession have standing to challenge the search."6

Commonwealth v. Frazier, 410 Mass. 235, 241, 571 N.E.2d 1356 (1991), citing Jones, supra at 263, 80 S.Ct. 725. It applies where "possession of the seized evidence at the time of the contested search is an essential element of guilt."7 Frazier, supra at 243, 571 N.E.2d 1356, quoting Amendola, 406 Mass. at 601, 550 N.E.2d 121.

"Under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, the question whether the defendant has standing to challenge the constitutionality of a search or seizure is merged with the determination whether the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the place searched," and therefore, "a defendant has no standing if he has no reasonable expectation of privacy in the place searched." Commonwealth v. Mubdi, 456 Mass. 385, 391, 923 N.E.2d 1004 (2010), citing Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 138-139, 99 S.Ct. 421, 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978). Under art. 14, "the question of standing remains separate from the question of reasonable expectation of privacy." Mubdi, supra. See Commonwealth v. Williams, 453 Mass. 203, 208, 900 N.E.2d 871 (2009) ("Although the two concepts [of standing and expectation of privacy] are interrelated, [under art. 14] we consider them separately"). Thus, using an art. 14 analysis, where automatic standing applies, the defendant need not demonstrate his or her own personal privacy interest, see Mubdi, supra at 392, 923 N.E.2d 1004 ; instead, a defendant with automatic standing need only "show that there was a search in the constitutional sense, that is, that someone had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the place searched." Id. at 393, 923 N.E.2d 1004.

a. Standing. It is undisputed that the defendant was not in possession -- actual or constructive -- of the firearm at the time of the search.8 Thus, automatic standing does not apply on the basis of the defendant's possession. Cf. Commonwealth v. Ware, 75 Mass. App. Ct. 220, 227, 913 N.E.2d 869 (2009), quoting Amendola, 406 Mass. at 601, 550 N.E.2d 121 ("[w]hen a defendant is charged with a crime in which possession of the seized evidence at the time of the contested search is an essential element of guilt, the defendant shall be deemed to have standing to contest the legality of the search and the seizure of that evidence" [emphasis added]).9

The defendant has not met his burden of demonstrating his automatic standing to challenge the search of the premises.10 b. Expectation of privacy. Even had the defendant shown that he had automatic standing to challenge the search, his entitlement to protection under the automatic standing rule falters on his inability to demonstrate that he, or anyone else, had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the area searched, and thus, that a search in the constitutional sense had taken place. See Mubdi, 456 Mass. at 393, 923 N.E.2d 1004 ("that someone had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the place searched"). See also Commonwealth v. Johnson, 481 Mass. 710, 715, 119 N.E.3d 669, cert. denied, ––– U.S. ––––, 140 S. Ct. 247, 205 L.Ed.2d 138 (2019) (defendant bears burden of demonstrating violation of reasonable expectation of privacy); Commonwealth v. Rice, 441 Mass. 291, 295, 805 N.E.2d 26 (2004) (same). Relevant to this determination is the character of the location involved, whether the defendant owned or had access to the area, and the area's accessibility to others. See Williams, 453 Mass. at 208, 900 N.E.2d 871, citing Commonwealth v. Welch, 420 Mass. 646, 653-654, 651 N.E.2d 392 (1995).

The search was conducted in the basement of a home that the defendant concedes he does not own or occupy; the defendant does...

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9 cases
  • Commonwealth v. Dejesus
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
    • December 6, 2021
    ...then found the defendant guilty of those charges.7 The defendant appealed, and the Appeals Court affirmed. Commonwealth v. DeJesus, 99 Mass. App. Ct. 275, 283, 165 N.E.3d 1048 (2021). We granted the defendant's application for further appellate review.Discussion. 1. Motion to suppress. The ......
  • Commonwealth v. Correia
    • United States
    • Appeals Court of Massachusetts
    • January 28, 2022
    ...jury beyond a reasonable doubt of the existence of every element of the crime charged" (quotations omitted). Commonwealth v. DeJesus, 99 Mass. App. Ct. 275, 282 (2021), quoting Commonwealth v. Squires, 476 Mass. 703, 708 (2017).We recite the facts as the jury could have found them, reservin......
  • Commonwealth v. Correia
    • United States
    • Appeals Court of Massachusetts
    • January 28, 2022
    ... ... reasonably drawn therefrom were sufficient to persuade a ... rational jury beyond a reasonable doubt of the existence of ... every element of the crime charged" (quotations ... omitted). Commonwealth v. DeJesus, 99 Mass.App.Ct ... 275, 282 (2021), quoting Commonwealth v. Squires, ... 476 Mass. 703, 708 (2017) ... We ... recite the facts as the jury could have found them, reserving ... other facts for later discussion. The defendant entered a ... pizza shop ... ...
  • Commonwealth v. DeJesus
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
    • March 15, 2022
    ...with it, pointedly displaying the attached feeding device, and mimicking the action of aiming and firing the weapon." DeJesus, 99 Mass.App.Ct. at 282-283. This was sufficient to show that the defendant had the power to handle the firearm, with its attached magazine, as he wished. Cf. Harvar......
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