Commonwealth v. Sean Donahue & the Office of Open Records. Appeal of Office of Open Records

• Citation: 98 A.3d 1223
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, OFFICE OF the GOVERNOR v. Sean DONAHUE and the Office of Open Records. Appeal of Office of Open Records.
• Decision Date: 18 August 2014
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

98 A.3d 1223

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, OFFICE OF the GOVERNOR
v.
Sean DONAHUE and the Office of Open Records.
Appeal of Office of Open Records.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued Nov. 20, 2013.
Decided Aug. 18, 2014.

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Sean Donahue, for Sean Donahue.

Charles Rees Brown, Esq., PA Department of Community and Economic Development, Dena Lefkowitz, Esq., J. Chadwick Schnee, Esq., Office of Open Records, for Office of Open Records.

Thomas Paul Howell, Esq., PA Department of Labor & Industry, for Office of the Governor.

CASTILLE, C.J., SAYLOR, EAKIN, BAER, TODD, McCAFFERY, STEVENS, JJ.

OPINION
Justice BAER.

In this matter, the Office of the Governor brought a declaratory judgment action in the Commonwealth Court, challenging the Office of Open Records' interpretation of 65 P.S. § 67.901, which addresses an agency's time frame for responding to written requests for documents made pursuant to the Right–to–Know Law.¹ The Commonwealth Court granted the Office of the Governor's request for declaratory relief, and held that pursuant to 65 P.S. § 67.901, an agency must respond to a Right–to–Know Law records request within five business days of receipt of the request by the agency's respective open-records officer. After explaining the procedural history of this case, we first consider whether the Office of the Governor had standing to bring the declaratory judgment action and then whether the Commonwealth Court had subject matter jurisdiction in this matter. Finally, we address the Commonwealth Court's interpretation of 65 P.S. § 67.901 of the Right–to–Know Law. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the order of the Commonwealth Court.

I.

On March 7, 2012, Sean Donahue (Donahue) submitted to the Office of the Governor (OG) a Right–to–Know Law (RTKL)

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request via email, seeking various budgetary and employment records. OG's open-records officer did not receive the request until March 12, 2012; and five business days later, on March 19, 2012, the open-records officer proceeded to grant Donahue's request in part and deny the request in part.

On March 29, 2012, Donahue timely appealed to the Office of Open Records (OOR). OOR determined that Donahue's request was “deemed denied” because OG failed to respond to the request within a five business day period as required by 65 P.S. § 67.901. According to OOR, Section 901 affords an agency five business days to respond to a RTKL request after receipt of the request by any employee of the agency. Instantly, OOR concluded that the five business day period for responding to Donahue's request began to run on March 7, the date on which an OG employee first received the request, and that the request was therefore “deemed denied” when OG failed to respond within five business days, which was by March 14.² The fact that OG's open-records officer did not receive the request until March 12 was immaterial to OOR's analysis. Notwithstanding its holding that the request was “deemed denied,” OOR issued a final order upholding OG's substantive response and denying Donahue's appeal on the grounds that his records request was insufficiently specific.

Even though OG prevailed in the matter before OOR, it appealed OOR's final order to the Commonwealth Court, where it contested OOR's interpretation of Section 901 of the RTKL. OG contended that OOR wrongly concluded that an agency must respond to a RTKL request within five business days from the date any person within the agency receives such a request. To the contrary, OG argued that an agency, including it, has five business days to respond from the date its RTKL open-records officer receives the request for records. See65 P.S. § 67.901 (stating that agencies must respond to record requests within “five business days from the date the written request is received by the open-records officer for an agency.”). On July 2, 2012, the Commonwealth Court issued a per curiam order quashing OG's petition for appellate review. The Commonwealth Court held that OG lacked standing to appeal from the OOR order because OG was not “aggrieved” by the order, but merely disagreed with an issue decided against it regarding the time frame for responding to RTKL records requests.

In addition to appealing OOR's final order, OG simultaneously filed a declaratory judgment action in the Commonwealth Court's original jurisdiction, seeking a declaration that OOR misinterpreted Section 901 of the RTKL with respect to the commencement of the five business day period for responding to a RTKL request under Section 901.³ As noted above, OG sought a holding from the court that the five business day period for an agency to respond to a RTKL records request does not start running until receipt of the request by an agency's open-records officer, as opposed to receipt by any employee of the respective agency.

In response to OG's petition for declaratory judgment naming OOR as respondent, OOR filed preliminary objections

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claiming, inter alia, that OG lacked standing to bring a declaratory judgment action against it because, as found by the Commonwealth Court with regard to OG's appeal in the Donahue matter, OG was not aggrieved by OOR's decision in Donahue and, therefore, lacked standing to bring an original jurisdiction action raising an issue decided therein. OOR also claimed that the Commonwealth Court lacked original jurisdiction to entertain OG's petition for declaratory relief, because the General Assembly specifically placed such matters in the judiciary's appellate rather than original jurisdiction through the statutory appeals process established in Chapter 13 of the RTKL. See65 P.S. § 67.1101. Finally, OOR averred that OG's claim should be dismissed because the Commonwealth Court previously held in Pennsylvania Gaming Control Bd. v. Office of Open Records, 48 A.3d 503 (Pa.Cmwlth.2012) (“ PGCB ”) that an agency employee's receipt of a RTKL request triggered in that case the five business day period for responding to the request.

In a single judge order, issued without opinion on August 28, 2012, the Commonwealth Court dismissed OOR's preliminary objections and proceeded to entertain OG's declaratory judgment action against OOR. Order of the Cmwlth. Ct., No. 376 M.D.2012 (Aug. 28, 2012). As justification for its August 28, 2012 order dismissing OOR's preliminary objections, the Commonwealth Court cited without explanation the following two cases: Pennsylvania State Educ. Ass'n ex rel. Wilson v. Commonwealth, 616 Pa. 491, 50 A.3d 1263 (2012) (permitting a teachers' union to sue OOR in declaratory judgment in the Commonwealth Court, where the teachers' union raised substantial constitutional issues and was not a party to the underlying RTKL request proceeding); and Pennsylvania State Lodge v. Commonwealth, 692 A.2d 609 (Pa.Cmwlth.1997) (affirming the dismissal of a declaratory judgment action against the Pennsylvania Department of Labor and Industry where the plaintiff failed to allege any facts demonstrating that it suffered actual and immediate harm as a result of the department's actions).

In an order and supporting opinion filed January 23, 2013, a three judge panel of the Commonwealth Court granted OG its requested declaratory relief on the merits. Commonwealth v. Donahue, 59 A.3d 1165 (Pa.Cmwlth.2013). Notably, the court expressly declined to address the issues of standing or jurisdiction raised by OOR in preliminary objections because these issues, in the court's view, were resolved by the single judge August 28 order denying the preliminary objections. Id. at 1167 n. 5. Instead, the court proceeded directly to the merits.

The court rejected OOR's determination that an agency's five business day period for responding to a RTKL request under Section 901 commences when any agency employee receives the request. Specifically, the court held that OOR mischaracterized the Commonwealth Court's holding in PGCB to stand for the proposition that an agency employee's receipt of a RTKL request triggers the five business day period for responding to the request. Id. at 1169. In PGCB, an agency employee failed to forward a records request to an open-records officer and, allegedly, ignored the request after deciding, in a solitary act, that the request was defective. 48 A.3d at 504–05. The Commonwealth Court concluded in PGCB that under these circumstances the records request was “deemed denied,” and held that, generally, written requests for records do not need to be specifically addressed to the agency's open-records officer or follow certain formatting guidelines in order to be valid. Id. at 508–10. ⁴ In its analysis of

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the case before us, the Commonwealth Court limited its holding in PGCB to the substance and form of RTKL requests, and refused to treat that case as dispositive with regard to the five day time frame for responding to a RTKL request under Section 901. Donahue, 59 A.3d at 1169. Ultimately, the court held that, according to the plain language of Section 901, an agency must respond to a written RTKL request within five business days of the request's receipt by the agency's designated open-records officer. Id. at 1170.

II.

We first consider whether OG possessed standing to petition the Commonwealth Court for declaratory relief given OOR's interpretation of 65 P.S. § 67.901 enunciated in Donahue. The issue of standing is a question of law; thus, our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary. Johnson v. Am. Standard, 607 Pa. 492, 8 A.3d 318, 326 (2010).

OOR argues that the Commonwealth Court's decision granting declaratory relief should be vacated because OG suffered no harm as a result of OOR's final order in the Donahue case, and therefore lacked standing to sue OOR. OOR reasons that just as the Commonwealth Court correctly found that OG lacked standing to appeal OOR's final order in Donahue because it was not aggrieved, the court should have also held that OG lacked standing to sue OOR in...