Commonwealth v. Doria

• Decision Date: 08 October 1976
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Anthony DORIA, Appellant.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

364 A.2d 322

468 Pa. 534

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Anthony DORIA, Appellant.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

October 8, 1976

Argued Jan. 23, 1976.

Norris E. Gelman, Philadelphia, for appellant.

F Emmett Fitzpatrick, Dist. Atty., Steven H. Goldblatt, Asst Dist. Atty., Chief, Appeals Div., for appellee.

Before JONES C.J., and EAGEN, O'BRIEN, ROBERTS, POMEROY, NIX and MANDERINO, JJ.

OPINION OF THE COURT

MANDERINO Justice.

In 1960, appellant, who has no other criminal record, was convicted of obtaining a loan under false pretenses and of fraudulent conversion. Post-verdict motions were argued and denied, and on appeal, the conviction was affirmed by the Superior Court. Commonwealth v. Doria, 193 Pa.Super. 206, 163 A.2d 918 (1960). A petition for allowance of appeal from the Superior Court to this Court was filed und subsequently denied by this Court. Appellant paid fines of $150 on each count, thereby completely complying with the judgment of sentence.

On May 30, 1974, appellant filed a petition pursuant to the Post Conviction Hearing Act, Act of January 25, 1966, P.L. (1965) 1580, § 1 et seq., 19 P.S. § 1180--1. In his petition he alleged that the 1960 conviction was based solely on perjured evidence; that he was denied his right to remain silent at trial; that he was denied his constitutional right to representation by effective counsel; that the trial judge improperly prejudiced the case because the trial judge had previously represented the prosecution's only witness; and that he had suffered collateral civil consequences as the result of the 1960 conviction. In its answer the prosecution denied appellant's substantive claims, but indicated that appellant had stated facts which, if proven, would warrant relief. The prosecution recommended that a hearing be held to determine the accuracy of appellant's allegations.

On June 28, 1974, appellant's petition was dismissed by the trial court without an evidentiary hearing. Basing its decision on Commonwealth v. Sheehan, 446 Pa. 35, 285 A.2d 465 (1971), the court refused to consider the merits of appellant's claim. Sheehan, the trial court concluded, held that appellant's claims were moot. Timely appeal from the trial court's order was taken to the Superior Court, which on February 27, 1975, affirmed the order in a 4 to 3 decision (JJ. Hoffman, Cercone, and Spaeth dissenting), holding that appellant's case was moot because he was not presently suffering any direct criminal consequences as the result of his conviction. Commonwealth v. Doria, 232 Pa.Super. 439, 335 A.2d 472 (1975). We granted appellant's petition for allowance of appeal on June 19, 1975, and this appeal followed.

The question presented by this appeal is whether one who has completed a criminal sentence, and who is not presently in danger of suffering any collateral criminal sanctions as a result of that conviction, can challenge the propriety of that conviction in a post conviction hearing pursuant to the Post Conviction Hearing Act, Act of January 25, 1966, P.L. (1965) 1580, § 3 19 P.S. § 1180--3), or whether the doctrine of mootness should, standing by itself, support the denial of the PCHA petition. Stated otherwise, should this Court extend the holding of Commonwealth v. Sheehan, supra, 446 Pa. 35, 285 A.2d 465 (1971), to a case which, although not involving direct Criminal consequences, does involve direct collateral Civil consequences. The majority of the Superior Court, refused to so extend Sheehan. The dissenters on the Superior Court, quoting from a footnote in Sheehan, supra, indicating that recent United States Supreme Court cases 'seem to stand for the proposition that the possibility of either civil or criminal collateral consequences forecloses application of the mootness doctrine,' 232 Pa.Super. at 446, 335 A.2d at 476, concluded that appellant has a substantial stake in his conviction, that that stake had survived the satisfaction of the judgment of sentence, and that the doctrine of mootness therefore should not apply to deprive appellant of the right to challenge his conviction. We agree with the dissenters in the Superior Court, and reverse and remand the case for an evidentiary hearing.

In Commonwealth v. Sheehan, supra, 446 Pa. 35, 285 A.2d 465 (1971), this Court carefully analyzed the question of whether satisfaction of the judgment of sentence renders an allegedly invalid conviction moot. Our analysis included an examination of the three general theories with respect to the availability of collateral relief following full satisfaction of sentence, and their application to the mootness doctrine. These views were stated by the Sheehan's court as follows:

'(1) The 'traditional' view that satisfaction of the contested sentence, per se, rendered the case moot;

(2) The 'liberal' view that the petitioner's interest in clearing his name, per se, permits review or attack upon the conviction; and

(3) the modified traditional view that satisfaction of the sentence renders the case moot unless, in consequence of the conviction and sentence, the petitioner suffers collateral legal disabilities or burdens, surviving the satisfaction of the sentence, sufficient to give petitioner standing to attack his conviction.'

Id. at 41, 285 A.2d at 468.

Prior to our ruling in Commonwealth ex rel. Ulmer v. Rundle, 421 Pa. 40, 218 A.2d 233 (1966), Pennsylvania followed the socalled 'traditional' rule. The Ulmer decision introduced the 'collateral criminal consequences' rule, and allowed an attack on a prior criminal conviction where the conviction directly affected sentences Presently being served by the petitioner. Commonwealth v. Sheehan, allowed a hearing on a post-conviction challenge to a conviction where the petitioner had been subsequently arrested and had good reason to believe that, if convicted, he would face a prison sentence since a subsequent conviction would render him a second offender, and because the trial court in which petitioner was convicted had established a policy of imposing sentences of imprisonment for a second offense on drunk driving charges, whereas, first offenders were subjected only to fine. Thus, in both Ulmer, supra, and Sheehan, supra, criminal consequences existed. It is conceded by appellant in the present case that no criminal consequences exist here.

In his PCHA petition, however, appellant alleged the existence of severe civil and social consequences, including but not limited to, the forced resignation of his position as Dean of the Vermont Law School, voting restrictions in several states, and the fear of being impeached should he ever testify on his own behalf or on behalf of someone else in a trial court case. Appellant now argues that Sheehan should be extended to permit a challenge to convictions where the sentence has been satisfied if collateral civil consequences are shown to flow from said conviction.

We agree that the rationale of Sheehan, supra, applies to collateral attack upon convictions from which direct civil consequences are shown to flow. Several reasons compel this conclusion. First, Sheehan dealt with a factual setting which did not require an answer to the question presented by the instant appeal. The Sheehan court adopted the position it did simply because that was all that was required by the facts of the case before it. The Sheehan opinion, however, indicates that the court was aware of the possibility that a case such as this might arise, and hinted at least, at the position which this Court would adopt if, and when, such a case came before us. By taking the position it did, the Sheehan court was by on means implicitly rejecting the more liberal view as to the applicability of the mootness doctrine to cases where the judgment of sentence...