Commonwealth v. Duerr
| Decision Date | 18 January 1946 |
| Citation | 45 A.2d 235,158 Pa.Super. 484 |
| Parties | Commonwealth v. Duerr, Appellant |
| Court | Pennsylvania Superior Court |
Argued November 19, 1945.
Appeals, Nos. 74 and 75, April T., 1946, from judgments of O & T., Allegheny Co., Sept. T., 1944, Nos. 64 and 66 respectively, in case of Commonwealth v. William C. Duerr.
Indictments charging defendant with involuntary manslaughter. Before Ellenbogen, J.
Verdicts of guilty and judgments of sentence thereon. Defendant appealed.
Louis Little, with him Henry Kaufman, for appellant.
William J. O'Donnell, Assistant District Attorney, with him Russell H. Adams, District Attorney, for appellee.
Samuel Gorson, for Pennsylvania State Lodge Fraternal Order of Police, amicus curiae.
Andrew J. Hagan and Charles B. Prichard, for Grand Lodge, Fraternal Order of Police, amicus curiae.
OPINION
William C. Duerr, the Chief of Police of Stowe Township, Allegheny County, was convicted of involuntary manslaughter. This appeal, taken after sentence was imposed, raises inter alia the question of the right of this police officer, attempting to make an arrest without a warrant, to shoot and kill two persons whom he suspected of being felons, but who were, in fact, innocent.
An officer, whose duties include the preservation of the peace and the prevention of crimes, is under the peculiar protection of the law, but in the discharge of his official duties he must act within the authority conferred upon him by law, that is to say he is required to exercise such judgment that will not convict him of having a reckless disregard of his official duty. When he exceeds that authority his official cloak will not protect him from punishment. An arrest, not unlawful in itself, may be performed in a manner so improper or criminal as to make the officer guilty of involuntary manslaughter, or even of a higher crime as the circumstances of the case may vary.
We will confine ourselves to a consideration of the issues raised in this appeal, but, as will be observed, they involve principles of criminal law that have a wide application. Before entering into a discussion of these legal questions it will be helpful for an understanding of this case to state in some detail the salient features of the evidence, which are included in an agreed statement of facts in lieu of printing all the record.
On the evening of June 9, 1944, Samuel J. Riddle, sergeant of the county detectives of Allegheny County, and Julius Trombetta, a member of the Pennsylvania State Police, informed the defendant of the stealing and burning of automobiles in Stowe Township, and asked his aid in apprehending the guilty persons. About 2:00 a. m. the next morning Duerr learned that two boys had been arrested, charged with stealing automobiles and would be taken to the township police station. He went there and about 4:00 a. m. that morning Alvin Logue, one of the boys arrested, was brought in by an officer. Defendant learned from Logue that he and two other boys, named Pagan and Creese, had stolen automobiles in that neighborhood and of an engagement to meet these boys at 6:00 a. m. that morning at Keverline's store, near Calvary Cemetery. He gave to Duerr and Riddle a description of, and other information concerning, them. Logue said that he and his associates had stolen a Buick car, which they abandoned. Duerr and Officer Trombetta immediately drove to the place designated and recovered the car. In pursuance of arrangements made after Logue's confession, six officers, all in civilian clothes with the exception of one and there was nothing to indicate that he was an officer except the insignia on his left shirt sleeve near the shoulder reading "Stowe Township Police," in two civilian cars bearing no official insignia or other identification, arrived at or near the Keverline store shortly before 6:30 a. m. Duerr sat next to the driver, a civilian, and two officers were in the back seat. Their car stopped about 260 feet east of the Keverline store and the other car, driven by detective Riddle, parked in the cemetery lane about 125 feet west of the store, or 385 feet from the Duerr car. In this position the officers and Logue, who was in the Riddle car, were awaiting the appearance of Pagan and Creese.
About 6:30 a. m. an automobile, containing two men who it later developed were Ralph Landefeld and Edwin N. Schuler, stopped a short distance below Keverline's store and then proceeded toward the Duerr car. Duerr directed the driver of his car to block the road. When Landefeld, who was driving the approaching car, saw the barrier he put his car in reverse and backed toward the store. At that moment Officer Petrilli, an occupant of the rear seat of the Duerr car, jumped out and ran toward the Landefeld car shouting "wait a minute, fellows." Landefeld kept on retreating and Petrilli continued his pursuit. When Landefeld came to the store he backed into a driveway and started westward toward the Riddle car. As he was turning Petrilli jumped on the running board of the Landefeld car and he testified that he said: "Pull over, fellows, you're under arrest;" that they told him to "get the hell off" and tried to dislodge him. In the meantime, Colbert, the other policeman in the Duerr car, ran after Landefeld's automobile and testified that he shouted: "Stop, Police." According to Landefeld's statement, made immediately after the shooting, it appeared that neither he nor Schuler heard these statements made by the officers. Riddle and his party became aware of the commotion and tried to stop Landefeld's car. They drove along its side, collided two or three times, and soon locked bumpers, causing both to stop. Duerr, whose car had approached the colliding cars, saw Landefeld and Schuler jump out of their car and run into a nearby dairy, and he chased after them. The young men entered the side door of the dairy, ran through a couple offices, and down the steps into the basement. Duerr was in hot pursuit, not far behind. Crone saw Duerr with a revolver in his hand and shouted "don't shoot." Riddle, who was at the side of the building passing one of the windows, also saw Duerr with his revolver in his hand pursuing the two men and he shouted: "For God's sake, don't shoot." The windows were open about two inches, but defendant denies that he heard Riddle's or Crone's warnings. Duerr, when about at the bottom of the steps, fired the first shot, which entered the body of Landefeld. About eleven and one-half feet beyond the bottom of the steps, where there was plenty of light, he fired the second shot which entered the body of Schuler, when he was close to a large open garage door. Schuler pitched forward and died almost instantly. Duerr said to Landefeld: "Why didn't you stop, we are the police." He replied: "Policemen hell, highwaymen." Landefeld's mother, who lived nearby, came to the scene and her son said to her: "Mom, we were being held up." He died a few days after the shooting. It appeared that both of these men who thus lost their lives were innocent.
Duerr was arrested, charged with murder and voluntary manslaughter. After the evidence was in, the jury was instructed by the trial judge to find the defendant "not guilty" of murder and left it to determine whether he was guilty of voluntary manslaughter. The jury found him not guilty of that charge. Thereafter he was brought to trial on the two indictments before us, each charging involuntary manslaughter. At the beginning of the second trial the defendant entered a plea to each indictment of autrefois acquit. The commonwealth offered in evidence the record of the previous trial, admitted the defendant was the same person and filed a demurrer to each, which was sustained. Thereupon the defendant renewed his pleas of autrefois acquit in the statutory form under section 30 of the Act of March 31, 1860, P. L. 427, 19 PS § 464. The trial judge properly refused to entertain this plea on the ground that it had already been disposed of on the demurrer.
Little need be said in support of the correctness of this ruling as it has been decided adversely to appellant's position in Commonwealth v. Greevy, 271 Pa. 95, 114 A. 511. The defendant there, as here, was charged with murder and voluntary manslaughter and was acquitted. Subsequently, he was indicted for involuntary manslaughter for killing the same person named in the prior indictment, for which offense he was convicted. On the day of the trial of the last indictment a special plea was filed, alleging that the facts necessarily involved in the first case were essential to prove his guilt of involuntary manslaughter. The Supreme Court held the verdict of acquittal on the charge of murder did not prevent the later prosecution for the same killing on an indictment charging involuntary manslaughter. In the course of its opinion, p. 100, it cited with approval the quotation from Hilands v....
To continue reading
Request your trial