Commonwealth v. Dulaney

• Decision Date: 04 October 1972
• Citation: 449 Pa. 45,295 A.2d 328
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Robert Rozier DULANEY, Appellant.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

295 A.2d 328

449 Pa. 45

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Robert Rozier DULANEY, Appellant.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

October 4, 1972.

Anthony D. Pirillo, Jr. (Submitted), Michael E. Wallace Philadelphia, for appellant.

Arlen Specter, Dist. Atty. (Submitted), Richard A Sprague, First Asst. Dist. Atty., James D. Crawford, Deputy Dist. Atty., Philadelphia, Milton M. Stein, Chief, Appeals Div., for appellee.

Before JONES, C.J., and EAGEN, O'BRIEN, ROBERTS, POMEROY NIX and MANDERINO, JJ.

OPINION

EAGEN Justice.

Robert Dulaney convicted by a jury of murder in the second degree, appeals from the judgment of sentence of four to fifteen years imprisonment.

The prosecution arose from the fatal stabbing of Leroy Johnson about midnight on a public street in Philadelphia. At trial, the Commonwealth established through the testimony of eyewitnesses that Dulaney and Johnson initially engaged in a verbal argument in a bar; that they then parted and went their separate ways but fortuitously met again a few blocks away where the argument renewed (this time more heatedly); that Dulaney drew a knife and inflicted the fatal stab wound in Johnson's chest.

The Commonwealth also introduced the testimony of two police officers who stated that following the stabbing they attempted to gain custody of Dulaney by effectuating a voluntary surrender; that twice his parents notified them that Dulaney would submit to arrest at their home but in these instances he failed to appear; that on the third such arranged date, three days after the stabbing, Dulaney was present and taken into custody.

The arresting officers also testified that at the time of the arrest, Dulaney appeared 'glassey-eyed' and complained 'of not feeling too good' so they escorted him to the Philadelphia General Hospital where a doctor examined him and informed the officers Dulaney was under the influence of narcotics.

Dulaney was then taken to police headquarters where he was immediately given notice of his constitutional rights as required by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). According to the police witnesses, although Dulaney may have been under the influence of drugs, he gave every indication of understanding his constitutional rights and answered responsively when asked a series of questions to determine if he understood and waived these rights. Asked to 'explain the murder of Leroy Johnson', Dulaney responded by saying, 'I stabbed him . . . thats all I have to say.'

Testifying in his own defense at trial, Dulaney said he was a drug addict and Johnson was the collecting agent and strong arm man for a local drug supplier; that the argument which precipitated the stabbing involved a debt Dulaney owed for drugs and he drew the knife only after Johnson threatened him and reached for a gun. During cross-examination the district attorney asked Dulaney if he 'acted out of fear or, if you want to call it self-defense' why he hadn't so told the police when he was questioned after his arrest. Subsequently, in his closing argument to the jury the district attorney in part said the following:

'Now, I ask you, junkie or no junkie, if you had killed a man in self-defense and an officer, a detective in Homicide Division, and you knew you had been apprehended and this was it, asked you explain the murder of Leroy Johnson, what would you say? What would you say? You'd say 'Maybe I did it. I did it, but listen, I did it because I was afraid of him. He had a gun . . .. Honest, Detective, I didn't mean to kill him. I wouldn't have killed him, but I was scared . . ..' You wouldn't say 'I stabbed him' and leave it at that. If there was a reason you stabbed him, you'd want the detective to know from the very, very beginning . . .. But the first thing you do once the police finally apprehended you and asked you explain the murder, boy they couldn't get me to stop talking if they said explain the murder and I had murdered somebody in self-defense, they couldn't shut me up until I told them every ramification of why I was afraid of him, what a bad guy he was, how he was an enforcer for a dope ring. They couldn't shut me up until I told all that. But all this defendant said is 'I stabbed him' and we didn't hear the story of self-defense until five months later. You think about that.' (Emphasis supplied.)

We rule that under the circumstances, the district attorney's argument commenting upon Dulaney's exercise of his constitutional right to remain silent when questioned by the police and urging the jury to draw an adverse inference from his exercise of this right constituted prejudicial error and mandates a new trial. We reject the Commonwealth's position that having waived his right to remain silent in the beginning of the interrogation by admitting the stabbing Dulaney was then...