Commonwealth v. Eichinger

Citation108 A.3d 821
Decision Date31 December 2014
Docket NumberNo. 657 CAP,657 CAP
CourtPennsylvania Supreme Court
PartiesCOMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee v. John EICHINGER, Appellant.

Hunter Stuart Labovitz, Esq., Defender Association of Philadelphia, Maria Katherine Pulzetti, Esq., Federal Community Defender Office, Eastern District of PA, for John Eichinger.

Robert Martin Falin, Esq., Montgomery County District Attorney's Office, Amy Zapp, Esq., PA Office of Attorney General, for Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.

CASTILLE, C.J., SAYLOR, EAKIN, BAER, TODD, STEVENS, JJ.

OPINION

Justice EAKIN.

Appellant, John Eichinger, appeals from the order denying him collateral relief from his criminal convictions and death sentences, pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541 –9546. We affirm.

On March 25, 2005, appellant drove to the Montgomery County home of Heather Greaves, planning to murder her if she did not break up with her boyfriend. Appellant later told police he pre-arranged to meet with Heather so she would be expecting him at her house. He came armed with a concealed knife and a pair of rubber gloves.

Almost immediately after appellant arrived at Heather's residence, an argument broke out between them in the kitchen. As Heather turned to walk away, appellant pulled out the knife and stabbed her repeatedly in the stomach. Appellant later admitted he stabbed Heather in the stomach because he knew from movies and books it was easier to puncture organs that way than stabbing her in the chest, where he would hit bone.

Avery Johnson, Heather's three-year-old daughter, witnessed the stabbing. Heather called out to Avery to call 911. In an attempt to prevent the call, appellant slashed the child in the neck. Avery ran down the hallway and fell. Lisa Greaves, Heather's sister, stepped out of the bathroom. Appellant overpowered Lisa and stabbed her repeatedly to eliminate her as a witness. Appellant then turned back to Avery and stabbed her through the back, momentarily pinning her body to the floor. Appellant then returned to the kitchen, stabbed Heather in the diaphragm, and slit her throat.

While washing his hands in the sink, appellant noticed he was cut. He used one of his rubber gloves to prevent his blood from being left at the crime scene. Before leaving, appellant cut open Lisa's shirt to confuse police into thinking she had been the target of the killings. Appellant was spotted by a neighbor when he left the house. He subsequently drove to work.

Heather and Lisa's father found the three bodies later that day and notified the police. The police tracked appellant to his workplace at the Somers Point Acme market in New Jersey. Appellant agreed to be interviewed, and after a few initial false statements, confessed to the murders. During the same conversation, appellant also confessed to the July 6, 1999, murder of Jennifer Still, in which he used the same knife as in the Greaves/Johnson murders. In a written statement, appellant recalled killing Jennifer because she romantically rejected him, and described slitting her throat in graphic detail.

The police arrested appellant and kept him in a local jail in New Jersey over the weekend. The following Monday, police transported appellant back to Pennsylvania for arraignment. In transit, appellant made another incriminating statement describing the 1999 and 2005 murders. Later, while in jail awaiting trial, appellant wrote journal entries and letters in which he recorded graphic details of both incidents in his own hand.

Trial counsel was appointed1 and filed an omnibus pre-trial motion to suppress appellant's numerous statements to the police, and to sever the trials for the 1999 and 2005 murders. Following a hearing, the trial court denied appellant's suppression motion, but deferred ruling on the severance claim.

Following the denial of the suppression motion, trial counsel began considering a remorse-based strategy. The plan called for appellant to stipulate to the evidence of both sets of murders at a bench trial, rather than plead guilty, thereby preserving his right to appeal the admission of his numerous confessions. Thereafter, trial counsel would put appellant on the stand and seek to ingratiate him with the penalty phase jury in order to avoid the death penalty.

The trial court granted appellant's previously deferred motion for severance. Jury selection for the separate trials began the same day. The following day, appellant withdrew his severance motion, and the trial court vacated its severance order by agreement of the parties. Appellant then waived his right to a guilt phase jury. See N.T. Trial, 10/18/05, at 3–7. Later the same day, appellant stipulated to the Commonwealth's evidence and was found guilty of four counts of first degree murder at a consolidated guilt phase bench trial. The Commonwealth sought the death penalty for all three of the 2005 murders; the trial court imposed a life sentence for the 1999 murder.

Following conviction, trial counsel filed numerous motions, including a request for a presumption of life instruction, preclusion of victim impact statements, a request for a life without parole instruction,2 preclusion of the killing of a witness aggravator,3 preclusion of the cross-examination of appellant, preclusion of the use of autopsy photos, and preclusion of the use of multiple confessions. See N.T. Pre-trial Motions, 10/31/05, at 3–16.

Following a three-day penalty phase hearing, the jury found at least two aggravating circumstances in the deaths of each victim. See N.T. Trial, 11/3/05, at 80–81. As to Heather, the jury found two aggravating circumstances: (1) appellant had been convicted for another offense for which a sentence of life is imposable, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(d)(10) ; and (2) appellant had committed another murder at the time of the offense, id., § 9711(d)(11). As to Lisa, the jury found three aggravating circumstances: (1) appellant was convicted of another offense for which a sentence of life was imposable, id., § 9711(d)(10) ; (2) appellant had committed another murder at the time of the current offense, id., § 9711(d)(11) ; and (3) Lisa was a witness to a murder committed by appellant and was killed for the purpose of preventing her testimony in any criminal proceeding involving such offenses, id., § 9711(d)(5). As to Avery, the jury found four aggravating circumstances: (1) appellant had been convicted of another offense for which a sentence of life imprisonment could have been imposed, id., § 9711(d)(10) ; (2) appellant had been convicted of another murder that was committed before or at the time of the offense at issue, id., § 9711(d)(11) ; (3) Avery was a witness to a murder and was killed to prevent her testimony in any criminal proceeding concerning the offense, id., § 9711(d)(5) ; and (4) Avery was a child less than 12 years of age at the time of her murder, id., § 9711(d)(16). The jury also determined each murder had one mitigating circumstance; appellant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance at the time of the murders, caused by his father's recent Alzheimer's diagnosis.See id., § 9711(e)(2). On those findings, the jury found the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances, and returned three consecutive death sentences for the 2005 murders. This Court affirmed on direct appeal, Commonwealth v. Eichinger, 591 Pa. 1, 915 A.2d 1122 (2007), and the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari, Eichinger v. Pennsylvania, 552 U.S. 894, 128 S.Ct. 211, 169 L.Ed.2d 158 (2007).

Three weeks later, the Federal Community Defender Office (FCDO) filed a motion in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania seeking appointment as federal habeas counsel in this case. Once appointed, the FCDO obtained a stay of the federal habeas proceeding. At about the same time, appellant filed a pro se PCRA petition in state court naming the FCDO as his counsel. The FCDO subsequently filed an amended petition on his behalf raising 27 claims of error, each with numerous sub-issues. The PCRA court held 22 days of evidentiary hearings. The FCDO presented testimony of prior counsel, appellant, five mental health experts, and 14 other witnesses. In rebuttal, the Commonwealth presented two mental health experts. Following final argument, the PCRA court dismissed appellant's petition in a 129–page opinion. PCRA Court Opinion, 7/25/12, at 129. Appellant presents 12 issues for this Court's review:

I. Was [a]ppellant denied a full and fair PCRA proceeding?
II. Was [a]ppellant denied effective assistance of counsel because trial counsel failed to investigate factual defenses, legal defenses, or whether [a]ppellant was able to make a knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiver prior to [a]ppellant's jury waiver and stipulated bench trial?
III. Did trial counsels' ineffective failure to investigate, prepare and develop the defense case in order to give [a]ppellant the benefit of counsels' full and careful advice result in [a]ppellant's uninformed agreement to a stipulated “trial” where he did not contest the charges and failed to present a defense?
IV. Was the trial court's colloquy securing [a]ppellant's waiver of his right to a jury trial and his right to contest the evidence against him constitutionally insufficient and were all prior counsel ineffective for failing to object to this colloquy?
V. Were the statements introduced against [a]ppellant at trial unconstitutionally obtained, should the evidence seized based on these statements have been suppressed, and were prior counsel ineffective for failing to investigate and litigate these claims?
VI. Was [a]ppellant denied effective assistance of counsel because trial counsel failed to investigate, develop and present substantial mitigating evidence?
VII. Did the prosecutor improperly inject future dangerousness into [a]ppellant's trial during cross[-]examination of [a]ppellant's mental health expert; and was [a]ppellant denied
...

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    ...trial courts in crafting jury instructions; rather, as their title suggests, the instructions are guides only." Commonwealth v. Eichinger , 631 Pa. 138, 108 A.3d 821, 845 (2014).12 The precise questions we agreed to consider, as framed by the DAO, are:(1) Did the Superior Court err when it ......
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