Commonwealth v. Evans

Decision Date20 December 2016
Docket NumberNo. 1196 WDA 2015,1196 WDA 2015
Parties COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee v. David Eugene EVANS, Appellant
CourtPennsylvania Superior Court

Robert E. Mielnicki, Pittsburgh, for appellant.

Marjorie J. Fox, District Attorney, Waynesburg, for Commonwealth, appellee.

BEFORE: SHOGAN, OLSON and STRASSBURGER,* JJ.

OPINION BY OLSON, J.:

Appellant, David Eugene Evans, appeals from the judgment of sentence entered on July 14, 2015. We vacate Appellant's judgment of sentence, vacate the suppression order, and remand the case for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Appellant was arrested on May 19, 2012 and the Commonwealth later charged him with a variety of crimes, including driving under the influence of alcohol ("DUI"), highest rate of alcohol, third offense, and DUI general impairment, third offense.1

On January 9, 2014, Appellant filed a motion to suppress the blood that was taken from him at the hospital and the results of the blood alcohol test. Within Appellant's suppression motion, Appellant claimed that, after his arrest, the police transported him to the hospital and requested that he submit to a blood alcohol test. According to Appellant, he "believed" that the police provided him with the "implied consent" warnings required by 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 15472 and, in doing so, "informed [Appellant] that if he refused to give blood, he subjected himself to enhanced criminal penalties[ ] and a suspension of his driver's license."3 Appellant's Motion to Suppress, 1/9/14, at 1. Appellant declared that, "[a]fter being informed of [the warnings, Appellant] gave hospital personnel a sample of his blood and subsequent testing revealed a blood alcohol content above the legal limit." Id. The police did not obtain a warrant prior to taking Appellant's blood. Id. at 3.

Within the suppression motion, Appellant claimed that the police coerced his consent by "inform[ing him] that if he [did] not submit to extraction and subsequent testing of his blood, he [would] face[ ] stiffer criminal penalties." Id. Therefore, Appellant claimed, his consent was involuntary and, since the police did not have a warrant, the taking of his blood constituted an unreasonable search in violation of both the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. Id. Appellant claimed that the results of the blood test must be suppressed as the product of the unreasonable search. Id.

On May 20, 2014, the trial court held a hearing on Appellant's suppression motion and, during the hearing, the Commonwealth presented the testimony of Lieutenant John Beckus, of the Cumberland Township Police Department.4 As Lieutenant Beckus testified, he was present on the night of May 19, 2012 when his fellow-officer, Officer Green,5 arrested Appellant for DUI. N.T. Suppression Hearing, 5/20/14, at 19. Lieutenant Beckus testified that, after Officer Green arrested Appellant, Officer Green placed Appellant in the back of the patrol car and "advised [Appellant] that he was going to take him to submit to a chemical test of blood." Id. at 21 and 28. Lieutenant Beckus testified that Appellant "[j]ust kind of shook his head and said okay." Id. at 21.

As Lieutenant Beckus testified, when they arrived at the hospital, the officers took Appellant to the laboratory and Officer Green advised Appellant of both the implied consent warnings set forth in 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1547(b)(2) and the O'Connell warnings.6 Specifically, Lieutenant Beckus testified that Officer Green told Appellant:

Please be advised that you are under arrest for driving under the influence of alcohol or controlled substance, in violation of § 3802 of the vehicle code.
[Number two]: I request that you submit to a chemical test of ... the blood. ...
[Number three]: It is my duty as a police officer to inform you that if you refuse to submit to a chemical test, your operating privilege will be suspended for at least 12 months and up to 18 months. If you have prior refusals or have been previously sentenced to driving under the influence, in addition, if you refuse to submit to chemical test and you are convicted or plead to violating § 3802(a)(1) [,] related to impaired driving under the vehicle code, because of your refusal, you will be subject to more severe penalties set forth in § 3804(c)[,] relating to penalties, the same as if you were—if you would be convicted at the highest rate of alcohol, which can include a minimum of 72 consecutive hours in jail and a minimum fine of $1,000, to a maximum of [five] years in jail and a maximum fine of $10,000.
It is also my duty as a police officer to inform you that you have no right to speak with an attorney or anyone else before deciding whether to submit to testing, and any request to speak with an attorney or anyone else after being provided these warnings, remaining silent when asked to submit to chemical testing will constitute a refusal resulting in a suspension of your operating privilege and other enhanced criminal sanctions if you are convicted of violating § 3802(a) of the vehicle code.

N.T. Suppression Hearing, 5/20/14, at 22–23, 24, and 26 (internal quotations and some internal capitalization omitted).

Lieutenant Beckus testified that, after Appellant was informed of the above, Appellant agreed to submit to the requested blood draw. Id. at 24. The phlebotomist then drew Appellant's blood and, following testing, it was revealed that Appellant's blood alcohol content was 0.18%. Id. at 25.

Appellant also testified during the suppression hearing. According to Appellant, although he could not recall much of what occurred on the night of May 19, 2012, he testified that, following his arrest, he "asked [the police officer] if [he] was going to jail and [the police officer] was like no, not if you go take this [blood] test." Id. at 63.

The trial court denied Appellant's motion to suppress on August 4, 2014, reasoning that Appellant "consented to [the] blood draw after being read his [implied consent w]arnings by the arresting officer."7 Trial Court Order, 8/4/14, at 1; Trial Court Opinion, 10/2/15, at 3. Following a stipulated bench trial, the trial court found Appellant guilty of DUI, highest rate of alcohol, third offense and DUI, general impairment, third offense.8 ,9 On June 23, 2015, the trial court sentenced Appellant to serve a term of 12 to 60 months in jail for his DUI, highest rate of alcohol, third offense conviction and, on July 14, 2015, the trial court amended the sentencing order to reflect the fine for Appellant's summary conviction. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal and Appellant now raises the following claim to this Court:10

Whether the trial court erred in failing to suppress evidence of Appellant's blood alcohol content where his blood was taken without a warrant and in the absence of knowing and voluntary consent by Appellant?

Appellant's Brief at 4.

"Once a motion to suppress evidence has been filed, it is the Commonwealth's burden to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the challenged evidence was not obtained in violation of the defendant's rights." Commonwealth v. Wallace , 615 Pa. 395, 42 A.3d 1040, 1047–1048 (2012) (en banc ); see also Pa.R.Crim.P. 581(H). With respect to an appeal from the denial of a motion to suppress, our Supreme Court has declared:

Our standard of review in addressing a challenge to a trial court's denial of a suppression motion is whether the factual findings are supported by the record and whether the legal conclusions drawn from those facts are correct. When reviewing [such a ruling by the] suppression court, we must consider only the evidence of the prosecution and so much of the evidence of the defense as remains uncontradicted when read in the context of the record. ... Where the record supports the findings of the suppression court, we are bound by those facts and may reverse only if the legal conclusions drawn therefrom are in error.

Commonwealth v. Eichinger , 591 Pa. 1, 915 A.2d 1122, 1134 (2007) (internal citations omitted). "Moreover, appellate courts are limited to reviewing only the evidence presented at the suppression hearing when examining a ruling on a pre-trial motion to suppress." Commonwealth v. Stilo , 138 A.3d 33, 35–36 (Pa. Super. 2016) ; see alsoIn re L.J. , 622 Pa. 126, 79 A.3d 1073, 1083–1087 (2013).

Appellant claims that the trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress the results of his blood alcohol test. According to Appellant, his consent to submit to the blood test was involuntary, as it was coerced by Pennsylvania's enhanced criminal penalties upon DUI suspects who refuse a requested blood test and are then convicted of DUI, general impairment. Appellant's Brief at 9 and 20. Appellant claims that, since his consent was involuntary and since the police did not obtain a warrant to draw his blood, the search was unreasonable under both the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution.11 Id. at 34.

"The Fourth Amendment to the [United States] Constitution and Article I, Section 8 of [the Pennsylvania] Constitution protect citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures." Commonwealth v. McAdoo , 46 A.3d 781, 784 (Pa. Super. 2012). "A search conducted without a warrant is deemed to be unreasonable and therefore constitutionally impermissible, unless an established exception applies." Commonwealth v. Strickler , 563 Pa. 47, 757 A.2d 884, 888 (2000). "Exceptions to the warrant requirement include the consent exception, the plain view exception, the inventory search exception, the exigent circumstances exception, the automobile exception ..., the stop and frisk exception, and the search incident to arrest exception." Commonwealth v. Dunnavant , 63 A.3d 1252, 1257 n.3 (Pa. Super. 2013).

The "administration of a blood test ... performed by an agent of, or at the direction of the government" constitutes a search under both the...

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    ...of the evidence, that the challenged evidence was not obtained in violation of the defendant's rights." Commonwealth v. Evans, 153 A.3d 323, 327 (Pa. Super. 2016) (citation omitted). Our standard of review in addressing a challenge to a trial court's order granting a suppression motion is w......
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