Commonwealth v. Fields

• Decision Date: 17 October 2018
• Docket Number: No. 1069 WDA 2016,No. 445 WDA 2016,1069 WDA 2016,445 WDA 2016
• Citation: 197 A.3d 1217
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Keith FIELDS, Appellant Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Gerald Howard Davis, Jr., Appellant
• Court: Pennsylvania Superior Court

197 A.3d 1217

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania

v.Keith FIELDS, Appellant

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania

v.Gerald Howard Davis, Jr., Appellant

No. 1069 WDA 2016

No. 445 WDA 2016

Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued April 24, 2018

Filed October 17, 2018

Rachael C. A. Santoriella, Pittsburgh, for Fields, appellant.

Thomas N. Farrell, Pittsburgh, for Davis, appellant.

Rebecca G. McBride, Assistant District Attorney, Pittsburgh, for Commonwealth, appellee.

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., PANELLA, J., SHOGAN, J., LAZARUS, J., OLSON, J., STABILE, J., DUBOW, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and MURRAY, J.

OPINION IN SUPPORT OF AFFIRMANCE BY BENDER, P.J.E.:

Appellants, Keith Fields and Gerald Howard Davis, Jr., appeal from the judgments of sentence imposed after they were resentenced following their original sentences being vacated on collateral review. Fields and Davis contend that the post-conviction court lacked jurisdiction to vacate their sentences, and resentence them, at certain counts for which they had completed their sentences or received no further penalty. After careful review, we affirm.

The facts of Fields' and Davis' underlying convictions are not pertinent to our disposition of their appeals. We only briefly note that both men were charged with various offenses stemming from robberies that they, and a third cohort, had committed at nine separate restaurants and convenience stores in Allegheny County, Pennsylvania. On August 29, 2012, Fields and Davis both pled guilty to all of the offenses with which they were charged. Specifically, Fields pled guilty to twenty-three counts of robbery, nine counts each of conspiracy and theft by unlawful taking, eight counts each of terroristic threats and recklessly endangering another person (REAP), six counts of aggravated assault, two counts of persons not to possess a firearm, and one count each of discharging a firearm into an occupied structure, firearms not to be carried without a license, and receiving stolen property. Davis pled guilty to six counts each of robbery, aggravated assault, REAP, and terroristic threats, as well as one count each of discharging a firearm into an occupied structure, carrying a firearm without a license, theft by unlawful taking, receiving stolen property, and criminal conspiracy.

On January 18, 2013, both men were sentenced, with Fields receiving an aggregate term of 25 to 50 years' incarceration, and Davis receiving an aggregate term of 22 to 44 years' incarceration. This Court affirmed their judgments of sentence on direct appeal. See Commonwealth v. Fields , 104 A.3d 55 (Pa. Super. 2014) (unpublished memorandum); Commonwealth v. Davis , 105 A.3d 46 (Pa. Super. 2014) (unpublished memorandum), appeal denied , 628 Pa. 627, 104 A.3d 2 (2014).

Fields and Davis both then filed timely petitions under the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541 - 9546. Counsel was appointed, and amended petitions were filed on their behalf arguing, inter alia , that Fields and Davis had received mandatory minimum sentences for several of their robbery convictions that were rendered illegal by Alleyne v. United States , 570 U.S. 99, 133 S.Ct. 2151, 2163, 186 L.Ed.2d 314 (2013) (holding that "facts that increase mandatory minimum sentences must be submitted to the jury" and found beyond a reasonable doubt).

On February 19, 2016, the PCRA court issued an order granting Davis' petition, vacating his original judgment of sentence in its entirety, and scheduling his resentencing hearing for that same day. At the resentencing proceeding, the court imposed an aggregate term of 17 to 40 years' incarceration. Davis filed a timely notice of appeal from his new judgment of sentence, and he complied with the court's order to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of errors complained of on appeal. On April 11, 2016, the court filed a Rule 1925(a) opinion.

In Fields' case, the PCRA court entered an order on March 11, 2016, granting his PCRA petition in part, to the extent that he challenged the legality of his mandatory-minimum sentences. That order vacated the entirety of Fields' original judgment of sentence, and scheduled his resentencing hearing for April 5, 2016. At the resentencing hearing, the court imposed an aggregate term of 17 to 50 years' incarceration.¹ Fields filed a timely notice of appeal, and he also complied with the trial court's order to file a Rule 1925(b) statement. The trial court issued a Rule 1925(a) opinion on October 21, 2016.

Ultimately, this Court consolidated Fields' and Davis' appeals and assigned their case to a three-judge panel. Before that panel, Fields and Davis presented the following issues, respectively:

Whether the sentencing court had jurisdiction to sentence [Fields] at count 29 ( [c]riminal [c]onspiracy) when the PCRA court had no jurisdiction to grant PCRA relief as to those counts because [Fields'] sentence had already been served as to [that] count[ ]?

Fields' Original Brief at 24.

Whether the sentencing court had jurisdiction to sentence [Davis] at count 5 ( [REAP] ) and count 23 (possession of a firearm) when the PCRA court had no jurisdiction to grant PCRA relief as to those counts because [Davis'] sentence had already been served as to those counts?

Davis' Original Brief at 16.

After hearing oral argument, the three-judge panel requested that Fields' and Davis' case be certified for en banc review, which was unanimously granted by our Court. Accordingly, their case was assigned to the present, en banc panel, which heard oral argument by Fields and Davis on April 24, 2018. Fields and Davis also both filed substituted briefs, reiterating the identical, single issues set forth supra . See Fields' Substituted Brief (hereinafter, "Fields' Brief") at 22; Davis' Substituted Brief (hereinafter, "Davis' Brief") at 18. We will now address those claims.

Both Fields and Davis argue that under 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(1)(i), discussed infra , "the PCRA court had no jurisdiction to grant PCRA relief as to those counts" on which their original sentences had already been served, or on which they had received no further penalty. See Fields' Brief at 22; Davis' Brief at 18. More specifically, Davis takes issue with the PCRA court's vacating his no-further-penalty sentences for one count of REAP and one count of possession of a firearm, and then resentencing him to 1 to 2 year terms of incarceration for each of those convictions. See Davis' Brief at 30-31. The only sentence that Fields specifically identifies on appeal is his term of incarceration imposed for his conspiracy conviction at count 29. See Fields' Brief at 33. Fields maintains that at the time he was resentenced in 2016, he had completed his original sentence of 1 to 2 years' incarceration for that offense. Thus, Fields asserts that "[t]he PCRA court lacked jurisdiction to vacate and impose a new sentence as to any counts where [he] had already served his sentence." Id. at 33-34.

We begin by recognizing that "[j]urisdiction is purely a question of law; the appellate standard of review is de novo and the scope of review is plenary." Commonwealth v. John , 854 A.2d 591, 593 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citation omitted). Additionally, to the extent that Fields' and Davis' claims involve statutory interpretation of the PCRA, they constitute "a question of law, and our review is plenary and non-deferential." A.S. v. Pennsylvania State Police , 636 Pa. 403, 143 A.3d 896, 903 (2016) (citation omitted). Our Supreme Court has directed that,

[i]n such cases, the Statutory Construction Act directs courts to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the General Assembly. [ Commonwealth v. Conklin , 587 Pa. 140, 897 A.2d 1168, 1175 (Pa. 2006) ], citing 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(a). "The statute's plain language generally provides the best indication of legislative intent." See, e.g., McGrory v. Dep't of Transp., ... 591 Pa. 56, 915 A.2d 1155, 1158 ( [Pa.] 2007) ; Commonwealth v. Gilmour Mfg. Co., ... 573 Pa. 143, 822 A.2d 676, 679 ( [Pa.] 2003).

Id.

In the present case, Fields and Davis rely on 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(1)(i) to support their argument that the PCRA court lacked jurisdiction to disturb their sentences on certain counts. Section 9543, entitled "Eligibility for relief," states:

(a) General rule.--To be eligible for relief under this subchapter, the petitioner must plead and prove by a preponderance of the evidence all of the following:

(1) That the petitioner has been convicted of a crime under the laws of this Commonwealth and is at the time relief is granted:

(i)currently serving a sentence of imprisonment, probation or parole for the crime;

(ii) awaiting execution of a sentence of death for the crime; or

(iii) serving a sentence which must expire before the person may commence serving the disputed sentence.

42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(1)(i) (emphasis added). Fields and Davis essentially contend that the ‘currently serving a sentence’ requirement of section 9543(a)(1)(i) constitutes a bar that petitioners must overcome before the PCRA court has jurisdiction to grant them relief.

We disagree. The plain language of section 9543 does not mention the jurisdiction of the PCRA court, but instead sets forth the eligibility requirements a petitioner must meet in order to obtain post-conviction relief. Notably, the language, "to be eligible for relief," implicates only the petitioner's ability to obtain a remedy through post-conviction proceedings, not the jurisdiction of the PCRA court to act on a petition. Moreover, reading the PCRA statute as a whole, as we must,² supports our interpretation of the language of section 9543. Specifically, in drafting the PCRA, the General Assembly included 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545, a separate provision addressing "Jurisdiction and proceedings." Had the General Assembly intended the eligibility requirements of section 9543 to be jurisdictional prerequisites, it would have included that provision within section 9545.

Additionally, the cases on which both Davis and Fields rely do not convince us to adopt a different ...