Commonwealth v. Figueroa-Garcia
| Decision Date | 16 March 2022 |
| Docket Number | 20-P-701 20-P-703 |
| Parties | COMMONWEALTH v. WERNER FIGUEROA-GARCIA (and a companion case[1]) .[2] |
| Court | Appeals Court of Massachusetts |
Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass.App.Ct. 1017 (2020) (), are primarily directed to the parties and therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass.App.Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
1. The murder.
We summarize the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, see Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 677-678 (1979), reserving some facts for our discussion of the issues. Sergio and Antonio arrived at the Las Vegas Bar and Restaurant sometime after 6 P..M. on May 13, 2017. Drunk and tired, Antonio left around midnight and began walking home. Antonio returned after Sergio called and told him that "a couple of people were causing him trouble."
a The first attack.
Sergio met Antonio outside the restaurant just after 1 A.M. and identified three men near the front door -- Werner, Selvin, and their friend, Mario[6] -- as the people causing him trouble. While Sergio spoke with one of the waitresses as she was preparing to leave for the night, Antonio told Werner, Selvin, and Mario that he and Sergio did not want any problems. They replied that Sergio was "a son of a bitch."
After the waitress departed, Sergio approached Werner, Selvin, and Mario, who were standing just outside the restaurant.[7] Sergio spoke to them, but Antonio could not hear the conversation. Shortly thereafter, Werner stepped out of the restaurant's vestibule and punched Sergio in the face. A fistfight ensued. As Antonio tried to stop Selvin from joining the fight, Selvin punched Antonio multiple times. Antonio fought back. Werner knocked Sergio to the ground, then Werner and Selvin walked away. The fight was brief, and neither Antonio nor Sergio sustained serious injuries.
b. The second attack.
After gathering themselves and searching for Sergio's glasses, Sergio and Antonio left the area of the restaurant on foot and in search of a taxi. Meanwhile, surveillance video footage showed Werner and Selvin fleeing the scene of the first attack; they ran up the street away from the bar, toward the Omar & Oscar jewelry store. As Antonio and Sergio walked in the same direction and stood at the entrance of the jewelry store's parking lot, Werner and Selvin approached them and attacked Sergio a second time. Antonio tried to stop Selvin, but Selvin punched Antonio "really hard," as Werner continued to beat Sergio. Antonio ran into the street to call 911. Selvin followed for a short distance before returning to the parking lot, where Werner continued to beat Sergio. As he spoke to the 911 operator, [8] Antonio yelled at Werner and Selvin to stop and told them the police were coming. Werner and Selvin then left the scene of the second beating. When Antonio returned to the parking lot, he saw Sergio lying face down on the ground, shaking.
c. The third attack.
About a minute later, Werner and Selvin returned to the parking lot. As they approached, they both put up the hoods of their sweatshirts. Selvin tapped Werner on the back, and they then moved quickly toward Antonio and Sergio. When Antonio saw Werner and Selvin, he retreated into the street. Werner and Selvin rushed Antonio and "beat [him] up." Antonio described a baseball-sized "brick or something like that" that Werner used to hit Antonio on the left side of the face, breaking Antonio's nose and teeth. Antonio escaped by jumping on the hood of a car and running down the street. Werner and Selvin then ran at Sergio, who lay motionless on the ground, and each kicked him once in the head; first Selvin, then Werner. Werner and Selvin then fled on foot.
2. The investigation.
Police officers arrived on the scene and found Sergio bloody and unresponsive. He had a "baseball size soft spot ... in the back of his skull" and struggled to breathe. One of the officers observed a red brick on the ground close to Sergio's body.[9] Sergio was taken to the hospital, where he was pronounced dead later that morning. An autopsy revealed that Sergio died of subarachnoid hemorrhaging -- bleeding between the brain and its outer arachnoid membrane. His injuries were consistent with being punched, kicked, and hit with an object. Any one of the several blunt force injuries to the head could have caused Sergio's death.
A few days after the murder, police arrested Werner and Selvin and executed a search warrant at their residence. Police seized clothing, including Werner's sweatshirt, which contained Sergio's blood and deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA). Werner and Selvin were interviewed after signing Miranda waivers. Werner and Selvin initially denied or minimized their involvement, but later acknowledged their participation when confronted with the surveillance video footage.
3. The defenses.
Neither defendant testified at trial. Werner called one witness, a pathologist who testified regarding Sergio's injuries and the cause of death. Through counsel, Werner acknowledged his participation in the fight, but denied any intent to kill Sergio. Selvin's counsel also argued that Selvin did not intend to kill Sergio, and that there was "no evidence of where Selvin was or what he was doing" when the fatal blow was struck. Selvin's counsel acknowledged that it was "reprehensible" for Selvin to kick Sergio in the head but argued that the kick did not cause Sergio's death.
Discussion.
1. Werner's appeal. a. Motion to suppress.
Werner argues that a judge other than the trial judge (motion judge) erred in denying his motion to suppress statements because the Commonwealth failed to prove that Werner knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to remain silent. More specifically, Werner claims that his "unclear responses . . . raised significant doubt as to [his] comprehension." We review the motion judge's decision under familiar standards. We accept his factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous. See Commonwealth v. Welch, 420 Mass. 646, 651 (1995). We defer to the judge's assessment of the credibility of the testimony taken at the evidentiary hearing on the motion to suppress, see Commonwealth v. Scott, 440 Mass. 642, 646 (2004), but we are in the same position as the motion judge when reviewing the video of the defendant's interrogation, and therefore make our own determination as to the weight of that evidence. See Commonwealth v. Novo, 442 Mass. 262, 266 (2004). We "make an independent determination of the correctness of the judge's application of constitutional principles to the facts as found." Commonwealth v. Mercado, 422 Mass. 367, 369 (1996).
Custodial statements are admissible at trial only if the Commonwealth proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant made a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of his Miranda rights before speaking with police. Commonwealth v. Tremblay, 480 Mass. 645, 655-656 (2018). To make a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver, the defendant must understand each of the Miranda warnings. See Commonwealth v. Libby, 472 Mass. 37, 54-55 (2015); Commonwealth v. Garcia, 379 Mass. 422, 429 (1980). While Miranda "does not require that its warnings be given in 'precise formulation, '" Commonwealth v. Lajoie, 95 Mass.App.Ct. 10, 13 (2019), quoting California v. Prysock, 453 U.S. 355, 359 (1981), it does require that the warnings "reasonably 'convey to [a suspect] his rights as required by Miranda.'" Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 203 (1989), quoting Prysock, supra at 361. In assessing whether the defendant understood his rights and thus knowingly and intelligently waived them, we consider "the totality of the circumstances, including the characteristics of the accused and the details of the interrogation." Commonwealth v. Hoyt, 461 Mass. 143, 153 (2011), quoting Commonwealth v. Silva, 388 Mass. 495, 501 (1983) .
Werner's affidavit in support of the motion to suppress stated that Werner was nineteen years old when he was arrested, with a...
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